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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of lockup length on three important issues related to initial 
public offerings (IPOs) on Main Market of London Stock Exchange (LSE). First, we 
investigate the effect of lockup length on the survival of IPOs following five years after the 
issue. Our results show that IPOs with longer lockups have higher survival rates and longer 
survival time compared to IPOs with shorter lockups. Comparing the reasons of delisting 
from market, we find that IPOs with longer lockups are less likely to delist due to bankruptcy 
and other negative delisting reasons. The results from our survival models suggest that a 12-
month increase in median lockup length increases the survival time by 27 percent, an effect 
which is statistically and economically significant. Second, a comparative analysis of long-run 
performance over three years after IPO reveals that IPOs with longer lockups have superior 
performance relative to IPOs with shorter lockups. These results are consistent across 
different benchmarks and factor models in both event-time and calendar-time analysis. 
Furthermore, longer lockup length is a statistically significant predictor of better long-run 
stock return performance using buy-and-hold returns. We also find negative abnormal returns 
around lockup expiry. The negative returns tend to be concentrated in IPOs with shorter 
lockups. Finally, we analyse the association between lockup length and the level of earnings 
management. We document a statistically significant inverse relationship between earnings 
management and lockup length. Longer lockups effectively reduce earnings management and 
this result is invariant to adjustments for potential endogeneity of lockups and alternative 
proxy for earnings management. Overall evidence suggests that longer lockups tend to be 
associated with longer survival, superior performance and lower earnings management. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) frequently feature agreements which are commonly termed as 
lockup (or lockin). A lockup is a contract between the shareholders of an issuing firm and the 
underwriter (or sponsor) taking the company public. The lockup agreement provides that 
initial shareholders (insiders and managers) will not directly or indirectly sell all or some 
portion of their shares for a certain period after the IPO without prior written consent of the 
underwriter. These agreements are generally voluntary and are not regulated by the securities 
regulatory authorities but could be mandatory requirement for listing in case of certain 
countries and/or segments of the market. The detailed terms of lockup and its expiry are 
clearly stated in IPO prospectus for the information of investors. Although voluntary in 
nature, lockups are taken as an important aspect of going public process and market 
participants place trust in these agreements.
1
   
The IPO prospectuses usually cite that the purpose of lockups is to create an orderly market in 
the shares of a new company so that the market is not flooded by insiders’ shares immediately 
after the IPO. Moreover, a large volume of new shares in the early days after the listing might 
hamper the price stabilisation efforts by underwriters (Aggarwal, 2000) and may also obscure 
the true value of the IPO shares. A review of the academic literature on IPO lockups, 
however, indicates that lockups serve much more important purposes than just creating an 
orderly market. Previous literature focusing on the presence and divergence in length of 
lockups suggests two main motivations for their use: quality signalling and commitment 
device. 
                                                 
1
Recently, Association of British Insurers (ABI) expressed its concerns regarding the early release of lockups by 
underwriters. ABI emphasised that investors rely significantly on lockups because they regulate the supply of 
shares in new company and are, therefore, relevant to price formation (ABI, 2014).  
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The signalling explanation for the use of lockups suggests that lockups signal issuer quality 
and reveal insiders’ private information about the future prospects of issuing firm. Issuing 
firms are subject to high information asymmetry between the firms’ insiders and outside 
investors. IPO issuers can mitigate this information asymmetry by accepting and committing 
to longer lockups. As lockups restrict insiders’ selling ability for some time after IPO and 
impose illiquidity and non-diversification costs on insiders, they represent a credible 
signalling mechanism. Given the significant costs associated with longer lockups and fear of 
discovery of true value of issuing firms in the market after IPO, only high quality firms will 
accept longer lockups and signal their quality via lockup length. Insiders in low quality 
companies with marginal prospects will not accept longer lockups as mimickers in low 
quality firms are likely to be hurt more due to the significant costs of lockups. Previous 
studies have shown with theoretical models (Courteau, 1995, Brau et al., 2005) and empirical 
evidence (Arthurs et al., 2009, Karpoff et al., 2013, Yung and Zender, 2010) that longer 
lockups mitigate information asymmetry and signal the quality of issuing firms.             
A competing explanation for the use of lockups suggests that (longer) lockups represent a 
commitment solution to the agency or moral hazard problem in issuing firms. Commitment 
explanation assumes that quality of the issuing firm is known ex ante, however, the actions of 
insiders in the aftermarket are not known. Insiders may oversell the prospects of their firms in 
the offering document causing issuing firms to be overvalued. After the IPO, insiders may 
cash out immediately and leave investors with overvalued shares. Therefore, insiders in 
issuing firms subject to large moral hazard problem are more likely to accept longer lockups 
to assuage the investors’ concerns by showing that their ability to take advantage by informed 
trading immediately after listing is reduced. Over time, the true quality of firm will be 
revealed through regulatory filings, analyst following and public trading. Lockups help to 
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align the interests of insiders and investors by requiring the insiders to hold shares for certain 
post-issue period and let the true market value of the firm be revealed. Thus, lockups act as a 
commitment device to solve moral hazard in issuing firms in the aftermarket. Empirical 
evidence in the literature provides support to the commitment explanation of the lockups 
(Brav and Gompers, 2003, Yung and Zender, 2010).         
Irrespective of the motivation (signalling or commitment) for use of (longer) lockups, it is 
clear that lockups play an important role in going public process at the time of IPO and both 
of these motivations have received empirical support. The extant literature, however, paid 
relatively little attention to the importance and impact of lockups in the post-IPO period. This 
thesis relates the length of lockup to three different aspects of IPOs: survival of IPOs in the 
aftermarket, long-run performance of IPOs and earnings management at the time of IPO. 
Although, these aspects of IPOs have been extensively researched in the previous literature, 
none of these studies directly link lockup length to these important aspects of IPOs. We argue 
that examination of lockup features in relation to the survival, performance and earnings 
management is important and timely due to at least three reasons, discussed below.     
Firstly, the focus of IPO lockup literature has been on the motivations of presence and length 
of lockups at the time of IPO. However, there has been very little attempt to discover the 
impact of lockup features on issuing firms in the post-IPO period. For example, the previous 
literature on IPO long-run performance has paid no attention to lockup characteristics in 
explaining the long-run IPO performance. Moreover, although studies have examined lockup 
expiry returns to find variables which could predict cross-sectional performance differences 
around lockup expiry, these studies have ignored the length of lockup itself in such 
examination. In this thesis, we build on the signalling and moral hazard reduction role of 
lockups at the time of IPO and argue that lockup length could explain the survival of IPOs in 
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the aftermarket and long-run IPO performance. More specifically, we examine the impact of 
lockup length on the survival and long-run stock performance in chapter 4 and 5. There is vast 
body of literature which shows that insiders in issuing firms engage in opportunistic earnings 
management at the time of equity issuance to get higher valuations and appropriate more 
funds for their firms and themselves (DuCharme et al., 2001, Rangan, 1998, Teoh et al., 
1998a). A related strand in the earnings management literature documents the positive impact 
of presence and reputation of Venture Capitalists (VCs), prestige of underwriters and auditors, 
independent boards and audit committees (Morsfield and Tan, 2006, Lee and Masulis, 2011, 
Brau and Johnson, 2009, Chen et al., 2013, Klein, 2002, Osma, 2008) in restraining earnings 
management at the time of IPO. However, this literature has largely ignored the role of lockup 
length in deterring earnings management. Moreover, IPO firms with higher earnings 
management at the time of IPO are associated with poor long-run stock performance and 
higher chances of failure (Teoh et al., 1998a, Alhadab et al., 2015). As longer lockups bind 
insiders with IPO firm for a longer period of time after listing, insiders in firms with longer 
lockups will restrain earnings management. Based on the signalling and moral hazard 
reduction role of lockups, we predict better quality reporting and lower earnings management 
in IPOs with longer lockups. We empirically test this prediction in chapter 6.   
Secondly, the Main Market of London Stock Exchange (LSE) provides a unique setting to test 
the implications of signalling and commitment hypothesis of lockups on the performance, 
survival and earnings management of IPOs. Unlike some other leading European markets 
such as France and Germany (Goergen et al., 2006b), lockups are completely voluntary for 
firms listed on Main Market of LSE. Yet, most of the firms go public with lockups in place on 
Main Market (Ahmad and Jelic, 2014) and there is large diversity in terms of lockup length 
and other characteristics (Espenlaub et al., 2001). Moreover, evidence suggests that lockups 
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are substantially longer for LSE Main Market IPOs (Espenlaub et al., 2001, Hoque, 2011) 
compared to the standardised 180 days lockups observed in US markets (Field and Hanka, 
2001, Yung and Zender, 2010). Prior research on IPO lockups has mainly focused on US 
markets and evidence mainly supports the commitment device hypothesis for lockups (Brav 
and Gompers, 2003, Cline et al., 2014, Gao and Siddiqi, 2012). The relatively shorter lockups 
in US may not mitigate the information asymmetry to a large extent as little mandated 
information is disclosed between the IPO and expiry of lockups (Brau et al., 2004). Chapter 3 
provides a detailed comparison of IPO lockups in US and UK with examples. The 
implications of previously observed signalling and commitment explanations in US may not 
be applicable to the UK IPOs due to the large diversity in UK lockups. Furthermore, apart 
from a positive effect at the time of IPO, the impact of longer lockup may also extend to the 
post-IPO performance of the UK IPOs.    
Finally, a recent government report (Kay, 2012) has raised concerns regarding the short 
termism of listed companies in UK. The short term focus fails to promote long term 
performance, investment and growth. Kay (2012) suggests misalignment of the incentives as 
one of the reasons for the alleged short termism in UK equity markets and recommends that 
directors’ remuneration and incentives should be linked to sustainable long term performance. 
More specifically, Kay proposes that long term performance incentives should be provided in 
the form of company shares locked-in until the retirement of directors. Moreover, recently 
some institutional investors in the public companies have also argued in favour of lengthening 
executives’ incentive schemes in order to reduce the temptation for short term financial 
performance at the expense of long term growth and performance of the listed companies 
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(BBC, 2013).
2
 We argue that the examination of lockup length and its impact on long term 
performance and survival of issuing firms is important to inform this debate, at least partially.       
Motivated by the paucity and need of research on lockups and their relation to post-IPO 
performance, unique nature of lockups on LSE Main Market and recent debate on alleged 
short termism, we examine the role of lockup length in three important aspects of IPOs 
mentioned above. This thesis consists of seven chapters including the introduction, a chapter 
on institutional differences in UK and US IPO lockups, literature review chapter, three 
empirical essays and a conclusion chapter. The remainder of the thesis is structured as 
follows.  
In chapter 2, we briefly review the differences between UK and US IPO lockups documented 
in prior literature. First, the requirements of lockups on both segments of LSE, Main Market 
and Alternative Investment Market (AIM), are reviewed. Second, we provide examples of 
lockups from IPO prospectuses in US and UK to highlight diversity of UK IPO lockups in 
terms of their types.      
Chapter 3 critically reviews the literature, both theoretical and empirical, on IPO lockups, 
survival of IPOs in the aftermarket, long-run performance of IPOs and earnings management 
in IPOs. This review shows that the current research on lockups focuses mainly on the 
motivations of lockups at the time of going public and abnormal return performance around 
the expiry of lockups. Although prior research identifies that lockup represents a contracting 
solution to the information asymmetry and agency problem at the time of offering, there is 
paucity of research on the role of lockups in post-IPO survival and performance. Moreover, 
                                                 
2In a review of 300 UK’s largest listed companies, Fidelity Worldwide Investments (one of the biggest investor 
in European companies) found that 238 companies had no long term share based plan or had a too short time 
frame. Moreover, Fidelity also announced to start voting against executive pay schemes unless executives are 
made to hold (lock up) shares for longer than three years before cashing in (BBC, 2013).  
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prior studies have largely ignored the impact of lockup in deterring earnings management 
around IPOs.    
Chapter 4 presents first empirical essay and investigates the impact of lockup length on the 
post-issue survival of IPOs in UK. Our sample consists of 580 IPOs listed on Main Market 
from 1990-2006. We define survivors as IPOs which remain listed independently on the 
market and no-survivors as the ones which are delisted due to mergers and acquisitions, 
administration and liquidations and other negative delisting reasons. We find that IPOs with 
longer lockups have consistently higher survival rates over one, three and five post-IPO years 
compared to IPOs with shorter lockups. The results further indicate that median survival time 
for IPOs with longer lockups is significantly higher than those with shorter lockups. Finally, 
we use survival analysis in our multivariate settings and find that lockup length is a 
significant predictor of better survival in the aftermarket. Our results are robust to a number of 
estimation models, heterogeneity of issuing firms and alternative definition of variables.   
In chapter 5, we examine the long-run stock performance of IPOs and relate it to the length of 
the lockup period for a sample of 268 IPOs. Apart from one recent study by Gao and Siddiqi 
(2012), prior literature has not considered lockup length as a predictor of long-run IPO 
performance. Gao and Siddiqi (2012) find that long-run IPO performance is negatively related 
to lockup length for a sample of US IPOs and suggest that lockups are used to control agency 
problems (moral hazard) instead of signalling IPO quality. We argue that these results might 
not be generalizable to the UK or other non-US markets due to the significant institutional 
differences between US and UK as discussed earlier (and in detail in chapter 2). The results 
from chapter 5 confirm our arguments. Contrary to the results of Gao and Siddiqi (2012), we 
find that longer lockup IPOs exhibit superior long-run performance over three years after IPO 
compared to the shorter lockup IPOs. We use both event-time and calendar-time approach to 
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evaluate the long-run performance differences between IPOs with shorter lockups and longer 
lockups. Our results are consistent over a number of performance benchmarks and weighting 
sachems in event-time analysis and over different factor models in calendar-time analysis 
using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS) regressions. 
Results from our multivariate analysis show that lockup length is significantly and positively 
related to the three year post-IPO abnormal returns. In addition, we also examine abnormal 
returns around lockup expiry and find that negative performance in different windows around 
lockup expiry is concentrated in IPOs with shorter lockups. Taken together, this evidence 
shows that longer lockups are related to better stock return performance in the long-run and 
our findings are consistent with the view that IPO firms signal their higher quality through 
longer lockups. 
In chapter 6, we ask the question that whether longer lockups constrain earnings management 
at the time of IPO by examining the association between lockup length and the level of 
earnings management in IPO fiscal year. We contend that with significant liquidity and 
portfolio non-diversification costs, longer lockups remove insiders’ incentives for earnings 
management to avoid potential wealth losses at lockup expiry. Consistent with this argument, 
we document a significant negative relationship between earnings management and lockup 
length. Longer lockups effectively reduce earnings management and this result is invariant to 
adjustments for potential endogeneity of lockups and alternative proxy for earnings 
management. Overall, our evidence suggests that lockup length acts as an important constraint 
to opportunistic earnings management around equity issues.                  
 Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. We recap the objectives of the research, summarise the key 
findings in empirical chapters, highlight further contribution and inferences of the research 
findings, acknowledge the limitations and provide further areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 UK INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND LOCKUP 
AGREEMENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
The LSE consists of two market segments: the Main Market (also called Official List) and the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The admission criteria, ongoing regulations and 
regulatory regimes for both markets are significantly different. Main Market is primarily for 
established and larger companies which have satisfied the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) 
requirements. For listing on Main Market, the companies need to satisfy three criteria: 
minimum 25% shares in public hands (public float), minimum market capitalisation of            
£700,000 at admission and three years of trading history. Moreover, there are higher levels of 
compliance with LSE rules and on-going obligations regarding transparency and disclosure. 
On the other hand, AIM is targeted towards younger and smaller companies as there are no 
requirements for minimum market capitalisation, trading history and public float. There are, 
also, less onerous regulations and fewer continuing obligations for the AIM companies. 
Currently, there are no compulsory requirements for lockups on the Main Market listed 
companies.
3
 However, certain types of companies were required to have compulsory lockups 
before January 2000. For example, mineral and scientific research based companies with less 
than three years of trading records were required to have compulsory lockups. More 
specifically, the directors and other key employees were not allowed to sell shares either at 
the time of IPO or during the first two years following the date of IPO. Similar but less 
stringent lockup requirements were also in place for substantial shareholders (holding more 
                                                 
3
 However, certain companies on AIM are subject to compulsory lockups. AIM rule 7 stipulates that a business 
which has not been independent and earning revenues for at least two years must ensure a lockup of one year 
from admission date for all related parties and employees. 
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than 10% shares) and other shareholders. Since January 2000, lockup period is not mandatory 
for these companies following a change of rules. However, mineral, scientific research based 
and innovative high growth companies with trading records of less than three year are 
required to include a statement in their IPO prospectus detailing lockup or provide reasons if 
lockups are absent. The details of rules regarding lockups on Main Market  are summarised in 
Table 2.1 which is adapted from Espenlaub et al. (2001, pp.1244). Rest of this chapter is 
structured in the following way. We highlight the diversity of UK IPO lockups in section 2.2 
by providing examples of lockups from IPO prospectuses. Some examples of lockups from 
US IPOs are also provided to show the differences between US and UK markets in terms of 
lockups. Conclusion of the chapter is given in section 2.3.     
2.2 Diversity of UK IPO Lockups 
There are noteworthy differences between the UK and US markets in terms of lockups and 
their characteristics. The research on lockups has almost exclusively focused on US market 
and there are limited studies outside US. Most US studies have reported standardised and 
homogenous lockups with an average length of 180 days (Field and Hanka, 2001, Mohan and 
Chen, 2001, Brau et al., 2004).  
On the other hand, IPO lockups in UK are heterogeneous and more diverse compared to their 
US counterparts in many ways (Espenlaub et al. 2001, Hoque, 2011). First, unlike US where 
almost all IPO lockups are set in terms of absolute expiry dates, lockups in UK can be set in 
terms of both absolute and relative dates. Absolute expiry lockups specify the expiry at a 
fixed calendar date or a fixed period after the IPO. Absolute expiry lockups often mention the 
exact length of lockup period. Relative expiry lockups are set in terms of different corporate 
events like profit announcements, publication of annual reports, earnings announcements or 
annual general meetings etc. In case of lockups with relative expiry, the exact length of 
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lockup is hard to calculate ex-ante as the precise timing of the event to which lockup expiry is 
linked in not known. Second, UK lockups could be single or staggered, where single lockup 
has one expiry date while a staggered lockups has multiple expiry dates and is gradually 
released over time during which only a certain percentage of shares may be allowed to sell. 
Third, lockup period may be different for different types of shareholders such as directors, 
VCs and other shareholders. Espenlaub et al. (2001) indeed find different lockup lengths for 
directors and other shareholders. Finally, lockups in UK are substantially longer than US 
lockups. In this chapter, we discuss different types of UK lockups with examples. The 
empirical literature on heterogeneity of UK lockups in terms of length is provided in section 
3.3 of chapter 3.  
In order to appreciate the heterogeneity and complexity of UK IPO lockups, we present below 
some examples from IPO prospectuses in UK.  
2.2.1 Examples of UK IPO Lockup Agreements 
As discussed above, UK lockups could be of absolute expiry, relative expiry and finally 
staggered lockups with multiple expiry dates. Moreover, there could be different lockup 
periods for different types of shareholders. Following are some examples of lockups from UK 
Main Market IPOs.  
2.2.1.1 Absolute Expiry Lockups 
Following are two examples of Absolute expiry lockups which could be set in terms of a fixed 
calendar date or a fixed period after the IPO. 
“In order to demonstrate their long-term commitment to Nord Anglia, Kevin McNeany 
(and certain connected parties) and David Johnson have given undertakings, subject to 
certain limited exceptions, not to dispose of any of the Ordinary shares which will be 
held by them upon Admission (amounting to 5,832,409 Ordinary shares, representing 
45.4 per cent of the Company’s issued ordinary share capital immediately following the 
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Placing) for the period until 5 April 1999”(Nord Anglia Education PLC, pp. 8 of 
prospectus, IPO date: 27/02/1997). 
 
“Following the Placing, the interests of the Directors, their families and trusts will 
amount in aggregate to 59.1 per cent. of the issued Ordinary share capital of the 
Company. Under the terms of the placing agreement entered into with Nat West 
Markets, the executive Directors have agreed, inter alia, not to dispose of any of their 
Ordinary shares in the period up until the second anniversary of Admission and not to 
dispose of half of their Ordinary shares for a further year thereafter” (Harvey Nash 
Group PLC, pp. 20 of prospectus, IPO date: 03/04/1997). 
 
2.2.1.2 Relative Expiry Lockups 
Below are examples of a Relative expiry lockup, where the expiry of lockup is linked to 
certain company announcements or events; 
“The Directors, their wives, Credit Suisse and the Vendors have undertaken, subject to 
certain limited exceptions, not to dispose of any Ordinary Shares they will hold 
immediately following Admission prior to the publication of the annual report of the 
Company for the year ending 31 May 1999 without the prior written consent of NatWest 
Markets” (Monsoon PLC, pp. 62 of prospectus, IPO date: 11/02/1998). 
 
“The Directors and Mr Krikorian have agreed not to dispose of any Ordinary Shares 
they hold following the Placing prior to the date falling one month after the publication 
of the audited accounts of the Company for the year ending 31 December, 1997 and 
during the immediately following period of twelve months not to dispose of Ordinary 
Shares if to do so would result in the total number of Ordinary Shares disposed of by 
them and their immediate family, during that period, exceeding 25 per cent. of the 
aggregate number of Ordinary Shares held by such persons immediately following the 
Placing”(KBC Advanced Technologies PLC, pp. 59 of prospectus, IPO 
date:20/03/1997). 
 
2.2.1.3 Staggered Lockups 
Staggered lockups have multiple expiry dates and are released gradually over a longer period 
during which certain portion of the equity holding may be sold. Additionally, the staggered 
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lockup could be of absolute or relative expiry dates. Following is an example of a staggered 
lockup with multiple fixed (Absolute) expiry periods. 
“Pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement, each of QinetiQ and the Principal Selling 
Shareholders has agreed that, subject to certain exceptions, they will not, without the 
prior written consent of the Joint Book runners, during the period commencing on the 
date of the Underwriting Agreement and ending on the date falling 180 days after the 
date of Admission, directly or indirectly, issue or sell (as appropriate) or grant any 
option, right or warrant to purchase or otherwise dispose of any Ordinary Shares. 
 
In addition, each of the Executive Directors, certain members of Senior Management 
and certain other senior employees have entered into lock-up arrangements preventing 
them from selling Ordinary Shares (subject to certain exceptions) without the prior 
written consent of the Joint Bookrunners and the Company, during the period 
commencing on 24 January 2006 and ending (subject to one exception):  
(a) in the case of one third of the Ordinary Shares held at Admission, one year after the 
date of Admission;  
(b) in the case of an additional one third of the Ordinary Shares held at Admission, two 
years after the date of Admission; and  
(c) in the case of the remaining one third of Ordinary Shares held at Admission, three 
years after Admission”(QinetiQ Group PLC, pp. 73 of prospectus, IPO date: 
15/02/2006). 
 
Finally, below is an example of a more complex and staggered lockup with relative expiry 
dates linked to events in company calendar: 
“Each of the Directors, the Selling Shareholders (other than Mercury, the Governor 
and Company of the Bank of Scotland, National Westminster Bank plc and The Royal 
Bank of Scotland pic) and the Other Shareholder has undertaken to the Sponsor that 
neither he or it nor any of his or its associates or persons connected with him or it will, 
except under the Offer and in certain other limited circumstances; 
 
(i) before the conclusion of the annual general meeting of the Company at which 
the Company's accounts for the financial year ending on or first ending after 30 
June 2001 are laid (whichever is the earlier), dispose of, or enter into any 
agreement or arrangement to dispose of, any interest in any shares in the 
capital of the Company; 
 
(ii) after the time specified in paragraph (i) above and until the conclusion of the 
annual general meeting of the Company at which the Company's accounts for 
the financial year ending on or first ending after 30 June 2002 are laid 
(whichever is the earlier), dispose of, or enter into any agreement or 
arrangement to dispose of, any interest in any shares in the capital of the 
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Company which would reduce the number of shares in the capital of the 
Company registered in the name of, or beneficially owned by, such person to 7 
5 per cent. or less of the number of shares so owned or registered immediately 
following Admission; 
 
(iii) after the time specified in paragraph (ii) above and until the conclusion of the 
annual general meeting of the Company at which the Company's accounts for 
the financial year ending on or first ending after 30 June 2003 are laid 
(whichever is the earlier), dispose of, or enter into any agreement or 
arrangement to dispose of, any interest in any shares in the capital of the 
Company which would reduce the number of shares in the capital of the 
Company registered in the name of, or beneficially owned by, such person to 50 
per cent. or less of the number of shares so owned or registered immediately 
following Admission; or 
 
(iv) dispose of, or enter into any agreement or arrangement to dispose of, any 
interest in any shares in the capital of the Company without offering such 
shares to the Company's stockbrokers for placing or otherwise disposing of 
such shares on a best price and execution basis” (Dechra Pharmaceuticals 
PLC, pp. 59 of prospectus, IPO date: 21/09/2000). 
 
2.2.2 Examples of US IPO Lockup Agreements 
Following are two examples of US IPO lockups for companies which went public on 
NASDAQ; 
“Each of our executive officers and all of our employees who have either purchased 
shares of our common stock or received options to purchase shares of our common 
stock, have entered into stockholder's agreements with us. Under those agreements, the 
employees agreed not to transfer any shares of our common stock for 180 days 
following the completion of the offering. There is an exception for transfers to trusts and 
estates for estate planning purposes and for sales of a pro rata portion of these shares 
of our common stock in connection with a sale by Ripple wood Partners of its shares of 
our common stock. In addition, following the completion of the offering and the 
expiration of the 180-day lock-up period, employee stockholders will have the right to 
sell shares of our common stock in any registration statements that we file”(Western 
Multiplex Corporation, pp. 47 of prospectus, IPO date: 31/07/2000). 
 
 “In connection with this offering, officers, directors, employees and stockholders, who 
together hold substantially all of our outstanding stock, stock options and restricted 
stock units have agreed, subject to limited exceptions, not to directly or indirectly sell or 
dispose of any shares of our common stock or any securities convertible into or 
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exchangeable or exercisable for shares of our common stock for a period of 180 days 
after the date of this prospectus (or such earlier date or dates as agreed between us and 
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC), and in specific circumstances, up to an additional 34 
days, without the prior written consent of Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC on behalf of the 
underwriters, or are otherwise subject to substantially similar contractual restrictions 
with us"(Groupon Inc., pp. 147 of prospectus, IPO date: 04/11/2011). 
 
As discussed above the US lockups are standardised in terms of length and homogeneous in 
the way they are stated in the IPO prospectus. 
2.3 Conclusion 
We compare US and UK lockups mainly due to the reason that most of the lockup studies 
have been conducted on US lockups. It is clearly evident from above discussion and examples 
of lockups from US and UK that there are striking differences between IPO lockups between 
the two countries. The lockups are almost standardised and homogenous in terms of their type 
and length in US. But IPO lockups in UK are much more varied relative to the US ones in 
terms of their types. Moreover, prior studies have documented that lockups in UK are 
substantially longer relative to the ones in US (Espenlaub et al., 2001, Ahmad and Jelic, 2014, 
Hoque, 2011). This fact has important implications for the findings of lockup studies in both 
countries. US studies mostly favour commitment device hypothesis of lockups and reject the 
signalling role of lockups in conveying issuer quality (Brav and Gompers, 2003, Gao and 
Siddiquie, 2012, Cline et al., 2014). Brau et al. (2004) note that due to standardisation and 
shorter length of lockups in US, lockups might not mitigate information asymmetry to a 
significant extent and hence might not be a credible signal of issuer quality. Similarly, 
comparatively shorter lockups might not be effective in mitigating agency problems in the 
long term and could be detrimental for long-run performance of issuing firms. The observed 
heterogeneity and longer periods in UK lockups may be more consistent with mitigation of 
information asymmetry and signalling role of lockups. Similarly, longer lockups ensure that 
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founders and key employees remain with the firm for a longer period and their interests are 
aligned with the outside investors reducing agency problems. This is likely to have a 
favourable impact on long-run performance of the issuing firms, particularly in UK.   
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Table  2.1: LSE Rules Relating to Lockups 
Type of company 
Type of Shareholder 
A. Directors, senior 
employees and their 
associates 
B. Shareholders holding 
more than 10% 
C. Other shareholders 
Panel A: Main Market 
Before January 2000 
  
Mineral companies 
with trading records 
of less than three 
years 
Either: no shares to be sold 
in the IPO  
Or: no shares to be sold 
during the 2 years after the 
first day of trading 
1. Either: no shares to be 
sold in the IPO  
Or: no shares to be sold 
during the 6 months after the 
first day of trading or the 
publication of the first semi-
annual or annual results. 
                                
2. Not more than 40% of 
their stake within the2 years 
of first day of trading 
Sales must not exceed 20% 
of the total number of shares 
Scientific research 
based companies 
with trading records 
of less than three 
years 
Either: no shares to be sold 
in the IPO                                
Or: no shares to be sold 
during the 2 years after the 
first day of trading 
1. Either: no shares to be 
sold in the IPO  
Or: no shares to be sold 
during the 6 months after the 
first day of trading or the 
publication of the first semi-
annual or annual results.  
                               
2. Not more than 40% of 
their stake within the 2 years 
of first day of trading 
Sales must not exceed 20% 
of the total number of shares 
From January 2000 
  
Mineral companies, 
scientific research 
based companies 
and innovative high 
growth company 
with trading records 
of less than three 
years 
No minimum lock in period, 
but lockup statement must 
be contained in prospectus 
No minimum lock in period, 
but lockup statement must 
be contained in prospectus 
No minimum lock in period, 
but lockup statement must 
be contained in prospectus 
Source: Table adapted from Espenlaub et al. (2001), pp. 1244 
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CHAPTER 3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction  
Lockup provisions are present in most of the IPO prospectuses. Lockups prevent insiders of a 
firm to sell full or some percentage of their equity at the time of IPO for a certain post IPO 
period. Lockups are not regulated by the regulators and are agreements between the issuers 
and underwriters (sponsors in UK) of the securities. Although voluntary in general, lockups 
are mandatory listing requirement in specific markets/countries under certain circumstances.
4
 
Underwriters insist on lockups to have an orderly market in the newly issued shares. At the 
time of IPO, insiders sell relatively small percentage of overall equity in the firm and a 
substantial percentage is withheld. If the insiders are allowed to sell large volumes of shares at 
the time of IPO or immediately after the IPO, this will flood the market with new shares and 
adversely affect the market impairing the true value of the IPO firm. The detailed terms of the 
lockup agreement and the date of lockup expiration are disclosed prominently in the IPO 
prospectus.   
IPO is an ideal opportunity for the pre-issue owners to cash in their holdings. IPO also serves 
as an exit route for the VCs who want to harvest their investments in portfolio companies. But 
a lockup will restrict the liquidation of insiders and venture capitalists’ holdings at IPO and 
even some time after the IPO. The important question then is why the corporate insiders 
commit to a (longer) lockup? This chapter reviews the relevant literature to answer this 
question. Moreover, we also identify gaps in the existing literature relevant to lockups and 
discuss our motivations to study lockups with certain aspects of the IPO firms.   
                                                 
4
 For example see Goergen et al. (2006) for France and Germany and Chong and Ho (2007) for Singapore.   
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews theoretical 
explanations of lockups and empirical literature on the use of lockups. Section 3.3 discusses 
empirical evidence on length of lockup period. In section 3.4, abnormal return performance 
around lockup expiry mainly from US and UK is reviewed. Section 3.4 provides evidence on 
the survival of IPOs. Section 3.5 surveys long-run performance of IPOs in US, UK and in 
international context along with a brief outline of various reasons for long-run 
underperformance.  Related literature on earnings management in IPOs and mitigating factors 
is presented in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter and provides rationale for the 
empirical chapters. 
3.2 Motivations of IPO Lockups  
Prior research suggests two main (apart from others) explanations behind the presence of lock 
up agreements. Firstly, lockups serve as a signal of firm quality to mitigate the adverse 
selection problem caused by the information asymmetry between issuers and investors (Brau 
et al., 2004, Brau et al., 2005, Arthurs et al., 2009). Secondly, lockups may serve as a 
“commitment device” to reduce the moral hazard problem after the IPO (Brav and Gompers, 
2003). There are also some less popular motivations like rent seeking by underwriters 
proposed in the literature for lockups. 
3.2.1 Lockups as a Signal of Firm Quality  
Firms wishing to raise equity through IPO face a greater amount of uncertainty regarding their 
value. This uncertainty exists due to a large amount of information asymmetry between the 
issuers and investors of the securities. The insiders of the issuing firms know the real value of 
their firms. The investors on the other hand have very little information about the true value of 
issuing firms. This information asymmetry can result in adverse selection because investors 
are unable to distinguish between the low and high quality firms. The issuers, however, can 
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reduce this information asymmetry by sending signals of their quality to the prospective 
investors. But for a signal to be credible, it should be costly and reliable. Moreover, a signal 
should be able to distinguish between the low and high quality firms (Arthurs et al., 2009).  
Signalling theory remains an important component of the IPO research due to the information 
asymmetry between the insiders of issuing firms and potential outside investors at the time of 
issuing. The IPOs are susceptible to information asymmetry problem due to limited 
information available about the issuing firms prior to the IPO, no trading history and no news 
media coverage (Rao, 1993). Owners and managers of IPO firms possess inside and private 
information about the current and future cash flows and prospects of the firms which is not 
known to the outside investors. The issuing firms can reduce this information asymmetry by 
revealing the positive inside information through various signalling mechanisms. Previous 
research has identified certain signals which IPO firms may use to indicate their quality to the 
investors in an environment of high asymmetric information. Early studies, such as Leland 
and Pyle (1977), suggest that higher level of retained equity at the time of offering serves as a 
signal of quality. Models proposed by Welch (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and 
Chemmanur (1993) propose that high quality firms signal their quality by underpricing more 
at the time of IPO and these firms will be able to recoup the “money left on the table” in 
subsequent offerings. Similarly, certification by third parties has also been proposed as a 
signal of firm quality at the time of offering. Presence of reputed underwriters (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990, Carter et al., 1998, Dong et al., 2011), reputable accounting firm (Michaely 
and Shaw, 1995), VCs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991, Barry et al., 1990) and reputed VCs 
(Krishnan et al., 2011) have been found to be the quality certification signals in the earlier 
literature.  
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An IPO lockup can also serve as a signalling mechanism to reveal the inherent quality of 
issuing firms to the potential investors. Arthurs et al. (2009) argue that for a signal to be 
beneficial, it must be visible and costly or difficult for others to mimic. Lockup as a signal of 
quality meets both of these criteria. The details about the lockup and expiry date of the lockup 
are clearly stated in the IPO prospectus. Sometimes, issuing firms particularly emphasise in 
the IPO prospectus that the lockups show the commitment of insiders to their business
5
.   
Moreover, lockups are costly because of non-diversification and illiquidity on part of insiders 
for a certain post IPO period. Only high quality firms with positive information about current 
and future prospects will be willing to bear the cost of being undiversified for a long period 
after the IPO. It will be difficult for the low quality firms to commit to a longer lockup as the 
true quality of the firm will be revealed in the aftermarket. A longer lockup is likely to hurt 
insiders of poor firms more than the insiders of a high quality firms. Lockup length may prove 
to be a better and credible signal than the retained ownership as in Leland and Pyle (1977). 
Insiders can signal quality by retaining a large equity at the time of IPO but they can sell the 
shares immediately after IPO if restrictions on insiders’ sales (lockups) are not in place. In 
that case, the signalling strategy may not be convincing to investors and the signal might not 
be effective in communicating the private information of insiders (Gale and Stiglitz, 1989). 
Courteau (1995) uses the length of holding period (lockup) as a signal of firm value. This 
commitment to holding period complements the signal provided by retained ownership. 
Insiders of firms can use lockup length to signal their quality. As lockups are costly signals, 
only the insiders of high quality firms will be willing to accept longer lock up periods (Brav 
and Gompers, 2003). Insiders in low quality firms will fear the discovery of true quality 
(through earnings announcements, regulatory filings, analyst scrutiny etc.) before they can 
                                                 
5
 For example, see the lockup of Nord Anglia Education PLC in section 2.3.1 of chapter 2.  
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cash out at the expiry of lockups and will not accept longer lockups (Brau et al., 2005).  Brau 
et al. (2005) develop a formal signalling model for lockup length in which insiders of high 
quality firms’ signal “by putting and keeping (locking up) their money where their mouths 
are”. Longer lockups reduce information asymmetry and solve a pre-IPO adverse selection 
problem by signalling the quality of issuing firm.  
3.2.2 Lockups as a Commitment Device 
Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that the lockups mitigate the moral hazard in IPO 
aftermarket rather than signalling the issuer quality. They argue that the level of information 
asymmetry regarding the actions of insiders in the aftermarket is critical as they might not act 
in the best interest of outside investors. Consequently, lockup agreements help to align the 
interests of insiders and investors in the aftermarket and reduce agency problems. Moreover, 
the insiders may have hid some negative information regarding the firm value at the time of 
IPO. With the passage of time this information will become public through regulatory filings 
and earnings announcements. By accepting longer lockups, the insiders provide evidence that 
the information about the future prospects of the issuing firms is correct and that they are not 
over selling the merits of the firm. As the insiders are tied with issuing firms along with 
investors, any revelation of withheld negative information is likely to hurt insiders more 
severely due to their illiquid positions. Thus the lockup serves as a bonding mechanism and 
commitment device to regulate the actions of insiders (Arthurs et al., 2009). Brav and 
Gompers (2003) argue that holding the quality of issuing firm constant; firms with greater 
potential of moral hazard are likely to accept longer lockups to assuage the concerns of 
investors. The commitment explanation suggests that underwriters impose strict (longer) 
lockups on insiders to mitigate their opportunistic behaviours after the IPO. Empirical 
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evidence regarding signalling and commitment motivations is, at best, mixed and is reviewed 
in the next section.  
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Signalling and Commitment Hypothesis 
Signalling and commitment have been suggested to be the main reasons behind the presence 
of lockup provisions in academic literature as discussed above. However, both of these 
explanations suggest that lockups exist as a mechanism to reduce the risk to the IPO investors. 
The two studies which examine these motivations separately and come to opposing 
conclusions are Brav and Gompers (2003) and Brau et al. (2005). Brav and Gompers (2003) 
find support for the commitment device hypothesis of lockups and reject the signalling 
explanation for lockups. They argue that younger firms, firms with low cash flow margin and 
low book-to-market ratio and firms with high risk suffer from greater potential for moral 
hazard and are likely to accept longer lockups to show their commitment. Their empirical 
results support the prediction that longer lockups reduce moral hazard after the IPO. On the 
other hand, Brau et al. (2005) find empirical support for their signalling model of IPO lockups 
and show that firms with higher degree of information asymmetry and low level of 
idiosyncratic risk have longer lockups. Moreover, Brau et al. note that some of the proxies 
used by Brav and Gompers (2003) for commitment hypothesis are also consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis. Yong and Zender (2010) in a recent study resolve the apparent conflict 
mentioned in the previous two studies. They argue that asymmetric information and moral 
hazard are not mutually exclusive motivations and that both of these motivations are 
dominant for different types of firms. They find results to support their predictions and assert 
the need to identify the moral hazard and asymmetric information firms separately when 
examining the motivations for lockups. Two recent studies on the US IPO and SEOs find 
support for the commitment hypothesis of the lockups. Gao and Siddiqi (2012) use operating 
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and stock return performance after the IPO as a measure of issuing firm quality and relate it 
with the length of lockup period. They find that longer lockups are related to poor long run 
performance and conclude that longer lockups are used to mitigate agency problem 
(commitment hypothesis) and not to signal issuer’s quality at the IPO.  Cline et al. (2014) 
study the lockups in SEOs and find that announcement day returns increase with the presence 
of length of lockup. However, they report that SEO discount and long run performance are not 
related to the lockup length. They report that their overall findings are consistent with the 
commitment device hypothesis instead of signalling theory.      
Other studies on lockups find empirical evidence to supports either or both of the signalling 
and commitment motivations. For example, Arthurs et al. (2009) find that longer lockups act 
as substitute quality signal to reputed underwriter and VC backing for a sample US IPOs. 
Moreover, longer lockups help to assuage the investor concerns in ventures with high 
uncertainty in the form of going concern issues and reduce the underpricing for these 
ventures. Karpoff et al. (2013) find that longer lockups guarantee the quality of new equity 
issues by reducing information asymmetry and represent a contracting solution to agency 
problem by deterring opportunistic insider trading in a sample of US seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs).  Espenlaub et al. (2001), in first ever study of UK IPO lockups, find 
evidence that is consistent with the commitment device hypothesis at least in case of high tech 
IPOs on LSE Main Market. They also suggest that issuing firms might use underwriter 
reputation as a substitute signal of quality to the lockup agreements consistent with the 
Arthurs et al. (2009). Hoque (2011) examines the heterogeneity and different types of lockups 
on LSE Main Market and AIM for a sample of 831 IPOs from 1999-2006. The results show a 
strong evidence of information asymmetry explanation and partial support of the agency 
(commitment) explanation for the choice of lockups. Ahmad and Jelic (2014) study the 
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survival of LSE Main Market IPO in relation to the lockup period and find that longer lockups 
predict better survival rate and time for IPOs which is consistent with the signalling 
hypothesis of IPOs.   
The evidence from other markets/countries regarding the motivations for lockups also 
supports both motivations for lockups. Goergen et al. (2006b) test whether lockup agreements 
mitigate problems of agency and asymmetric information in France and Germany. Their study 
is interesting in the sense that both of the countries have requirements of mandatory lockup 
periods. They find that lockup contracts are not only determined by firm characteristics but 
also by shareholder type. Their results suggest that firms with higher uncertainty have longer 
lockup periods and German firms may use the lockup period as a signal of quality as a 
substitute of underpricing. Bessler and Kurth (2007) investigate German VC backed IPOs and 
find that there are serious agency problems particularly when banks are also underwriters and 
VCs. They report lower underpricing and higher long- run performance for non-bank VC 
IPOs who accepted longer lockup than the minimum required and suggest that longer lockups 
signal the quality of IPOs. However, extended lockups in case of bank affiliated VC IPOs do 
not serve as a commitment device, inconsistent with the findings of (Brav and Gompers, 
2003). Chong and Ho (2007) study the lockups and earnings forecasts disclosures in 
Singapore IPOs. They observe longer lockups for firms which are subject to greater 
asymmetric information and moral hazard in line with Brau et al. (2005) and Brav and 
Gompers (2003). Moreover the firms with longer lockups make conservative forecast because 
the longer lockup removes the incentive to make overly optimistic forecast. Their results 
suggest that lockups act as complement to earnings forecasts, similar to the complementary 
relation between lockups and retained ownership (Courteau, 1995).    
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3.2.4 Other Explanations for Lockups 
Apart from the signalling and commitment hypothesis, researchers have tried to theorise other 
explanations for the presence of lockups. Brav and Gompers (2003) propose that lockups may 
be used by underwriters to extract more compensation from the issuers. The underwriter can 
allow equity sales before the lockup expiry. The insiders will have to sell the equity using the 
services of the same underwriter which will bring additional fees for the underwriter. The 
highly reputed underwriters can impose longer lockups on issuers based on their prestige in 
the market. Based on this argument, the probability of using the same underwriter for equity 
issuance (SEO) during the lockup period will be higher. However, Brav and Gompers (2003) 
find that probability of retaining the same underwriter is not related whether the SEO is 
within lockup period or not. They conclude that if the lockup is used to extract additional 
compensation by underwriters, the probability of retaining the same underwriter should have 
been related to equity issue within lockup period.  
3.3 Empirical Evidence on Lockup Length  
In this section, we review relevant literature on lockup length observed mainly in US and UK 
studies. For example, Filed and Hanks (2001) show that 80% of their sample IPOs from 1988 
to 1997 have a lockup of 180 day period.  Similarly, Brau et al. (2004) also report that 70% of 
their sample IPOs over 1988-1998 have a 180 day lockup. Brav and Gompers (2003) also find 
a clustering of lockup periods around 180 days for US issuers. Brav and Gompers report that 
the 10
th
 and 50
th
 percentile lockups are all 180 days and more than 64% IPOs have lockups of 
exactly 180 days. Yung and Zender (2010) in a recent study of 4025 US IPOs during the 
period 1988-2006 confirm that the lockup standardization not only continues but has also 
intensified after the year 1997. They report median and mode lockup length of 180 days for 
their entire sample. They also find low dispersion and strong clustering at 180 days for IPOs 
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which are associated with high quality underwriters and VCs. Conversely, UK IPO lockups 
are substantially different from US IPOs in at least two aspects: length of lockup period and 
diversity in types of lockup agreements. IPO lockups in UK are much longer compared to the 
US IPO lockups. Espenlaub et al. (2001) report an average length of 561 days for director’s 
lockups on LSE Main Market, which is much larger than those reported for US issuers. 
Hoque and Lasfer (2009) find an average lockup length of 365 days for UK IPOs from 1999 
to 2006. In a recent study of UK Main Market IPOs, Ahmad and Jelic (2014) find that the 
mean (median) lockup length for a sample of IPOs from 1990-2006 is 468 (395) days. Table 
3.1 reports mean and median lockup length reported in different studies for US and UK 
markets. 
The comparison in Table 3.1 and above discussion clearly provides evidence that there are 
significant differences in terms of length between US and UK lockups. IPO lockups in UK are 
substantially longer than their US counterparts.     
3.4 Market Reaction at Lockup Expiry 
Most of the studies on IPO lockups have concentrated on market returns at the expiry of 
lockups. The lockup parameters and expiry details are clearly disclosed in the offering 
prospectus which makes expiry of lockup a completely observable event (Field and Hanka, 
2001, Brav and Gompers, 2003). The lockup expiry event is well anticipated and devoid of 
any new information, there should be no reaction to the expiry of lockup. Although, most US 
studies have reported significant negative abnormal returns around the lockup expiry dates 
which is anomalous and against the efficient market hypothesis. For example, Ofek and 
Richardson (2000) report a 1%-3% permanent drop in price and a 40% increase in volume of 
shares at expiry of lockups. They, however, provide evidence that due to trading costs and 
difficulty in shorting new shares, the lockup effect is not arbitrageable. They show empirical 
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evidence that partially supports the long-run downward slopping demand curve explanation 
for price drop. Bradley et al. (2001) find significant abnormal returns at the expiry of lockups 
for a sample of 2,529 US IPO firms. They also report that VC backed firms suffer much larger 
and significant declines which are four times higher than the non-VC backed firms. High tech 
firms within the VC backed sub sample are even harder hit. Interestingly, firms associated 
with high quality underwriters also suffer large losses surrounding expiry period. Field and 
Hanka (2001) provide evidence of significant abnormal returns of -1.5% and increase in 
trading volume of 40% around the lockup expiry day. They find that abnormal returns cannot 
be entirely explained by the downward slopping demand curve. Moreover, the VC backed 
firms suffer almost three times compared to other firms in terms of price decrease and volume 
increase which also shows that VCs sell more aggressively than other shareholders. Keasler 
(2001) finds that unrestricted investors sell shares prior to the lockup release which leads to 
negative abnormal returns. There is also significant increase in the volume of shares at the 
expiry of lockup date. Garfinkle et al. (2002) examine the impact of lockup provisions on 
1193 US IPOs from 1997 to 1999. They find a permanent significant increase of 47.5% in the 
volume traded after the lockup expiry date. They report highly significant negative returns 
starting three weeks before the scheduled expiry date suggesting the market anticipation of 
heavy selling at expiry. Brav and Gompers (2003) report similar negative abnormal returns 
and permanent increase in volume of shares traded after lockup expiry for US IPOs during 
1988-1996.  Brau et al. (2004) provide evidence of abnormal and significant negative returns 
for IPOs around the lockup expiry. They, however, argue that as returns start declining days 
before the exact expiry date, the decline in price cannot be fully attributed to new shares 
entering the market as a result of lockup expiry. Yung and Zender (2010) also report 
significant negative abnormal returns during the two day event window around lockup expiry. 
29 
 
They, nonetheless, find that high reputation of underwriter and larger firm size reduces the 
volatility of abnormal returns 
 The results of lockup expiry returns from other markets are not entirely consistent with the 
US evidence.  For example, Espenlaub et al. (2001) examine the lockup expiry returns for 
IPOs on LSE Main Market for the years 1992-1998. They report abnormal returns in the 
range of -0.5% to -2.5% around the lockup expiry date although the abnormal returns are not 
significant in most of the cases. Similarly, Goergen et al. (2006b) find no evidence of 
significant negative abnormal returns at the expiration of lockups for French and German 
markets. Finally, Goergen et al. (2010) also fail to find significant abnormal returns at expiry 
of lockup for the Hong Kong market but report a significant increase in trading volume of 
shares after lockup expiry. On the other hand, Hoque (2011) find significant negative 
abnormal returns at lockup expiry for UK IPOs which is consistent with US evidence but is 
inconsistent with the previous evidence on UK and Continental Europe. 
The results of the above mentioned studies show that the findings of negative abnormal 
returns are not robust across US and other markets. While most of the US studies document 
significant negative abnormal returns, the studies on rest of the markets (UK, France, 
Germany and Hong Kong) fail to find evidence of abnormal returns at or around the lock up 
expiry.       
3.5 Survival of IPOs 
Going public is one of the most important events in the life of a company. Although there is 
vast theoretical literature on motivations to go public, there is little empirical evidence to 
support these theories. Moreover, the empirical evidence on the question of why firms go 
public is far from a consensus on any single motivation for going public. For example, 
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Pagano et al. (1998) find that companies go public to rebalance their accounts after periods of 
high growth and investment and not to finance future investment and growth. On the other 
hand, Kim and Weisbach (2005) find capital raising as an important motive for going public 
and listing on the stock market. Bancel and Mittoo (2009) find ability to raise capital and 
enhanced visibility as the most important motives for listing on the market. Although, 
evidence on reasons to go public remains divergent, raising equity capital is considered to be 
one of the major motivations to go public (Kim and Weisbach, 2005, Aslan and Kumar, 2011, 
Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). This view is further supported by the survey evidence reported in 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) and Bancel and Mittoo (2009).  
Post-IPO survival as an independent listed company has important implications for IPO firm 
and its insiders. Survival is a logical and necessary condition for success and profitability of 
companies going public with a view to finance their growth prospects. Listing provides easy 
access to capital markets, visibility among investment community, higher liquidity, pricing 
efficiency and is associated with lower cost of bank credit. Being public enhances credibility 
and reputation of a firm and improves its ability to hire key managers through incentives such 
as stock options (Bancel and Mittoo, 2009). Survival ensures the continuity of listing benefits 
and represents arguably the most critical benchmark of a company’s operating performance 
(Hsu et al., 2010). Likewise, stock exchanges and certain other stakeholders (board members 
and executives, underwriters, auditors, brokers, legal advisors etc.) have their interests linked 
with the continued listing of a firm on the stock market (Espenlaub et al., 2012). Prior 
literature has identified firm survival in the long term as a consistent measure of firm 
performance and a pre-requisite of success in other terms such as market share and 
profitability (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005, Welbourne and Andrews, 1996, Suárez and 
Utterback, 1995). Finally, survival is a primary goal of the firm and represents an 
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unambiguous measure of issuing firm’s performance (Chancharat et al., 2012) and nothing 
could be more real than survival of the firm (Bhattacharya et al., 2011). In the following 
sections we present empirical evidence on the survival (failure) rates and durations as well as 
determinants of the survival of IPOs. 
3.5.1 Empirical Evidence on Survival of IPOs  
In this section, we review the empirical evidence on the survival rates of IPO survival in 
aftermarket from different countries. The relatively scant literature on IPO survival has almost 
exclusively focused on the determinants of survival of newly listed firms. Moreover, much of 
the literature pertains to the US market and is reviewed first. Schultz (1993) examines the 
survival of unit and shares IPOs for a sample of 797 issuing firms from 1986-1988. He reports 
that after three years from the date of IPO, the survival rates for share IPOs are 89 percent 
compared to 59 percent for the unit IPOs. He argues that higher delisting rates for the unit 
IPOs are a result of agency problems on the part of unit IPO firms. Hensler et al. (1997) report 
a delisting (failure) rate of 28 percent after five years from the initial listing date for US IPOs 
from 1975 to 1984. Seguin and Smoller (1997) compare the mortality of low-priced (penny) 
shares with high-priced shares and find that penny shares are three times more likely to delist 
from the market for negative reasons than high-priced shares. The five year failure rates for 
low-priced stocks are 47 percent compared to 17 percent for high-priced shares in sample of 
5896 IPOs listed on NASDAQ from 1974 to 1988. Comparing the survival profile of VC 
backed and non-VC backed IPOs in the US from 1977-1990, Jain and Kini (2000) find higher 
post-IPO survival rates for the former group. They report that the cumulative failure rates 
within five years of IPO are 25.5 percent for VC backed IPOs compared with 30 percent for 
non-VC backed IPOs. Fama and French (2004) examine the characteristics of the newly listed 
firms in US from 1973-1991 and report that 10 year failure rates for their sample IPOs are 
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58.5 percent. They suggest that higher delisting rates are mainly due to the increased number 
of firms with lower profitability and high growth, issuing public equity. Demers and Joos 
(2007) examine the comparative failure rates for the high-tech and non-tech IPOs listed in US 
from years 1980 to 2000. They find that non-tech IPOs have higher failure rates of 16.7 
percent compared to the 9.2 percent for high-tech IPOs. Demers and Joos further suggest that 
financial accounting variables, mostly overlooked by previous studies, play important role in 
assessing failure risk of IPOs. In another, study of US IPOs from 1985-2005, Kooli and 
Meknassi (2007) report that only 55.18 percent of the issuing firms are listed independently 
after five years of IPO. They treat acquisitions differently from other delistings and show that 
24.59 percent of IPOs in their sample are acquired and 20.23 percent get delisted due to other 
negative reasons within five years of IPO. Jain and Kini (2008) report a failure rate of 35 
percent after 5
th
 anniversary of issuing firms for IPOs issued between 1980 and 1997 in the 
US. They find that IPO firms with commitment to R&D spending and a diversified product 
line increase the viability of issuing firms for longer time.  Bhattacharya et al. (2010), in a 
study focusing on internet IPOs, find that 24 percent of internet companies fail within five 
years of their listing dates. They also report failure rates of 14.3 percent and 18.2 percent for 
high-tech companies and firms listed on NASDAQ respectively. In a recent study of US IPOs 
for the period 1980-2003, Chou et al. (2013) show that only 11 percent of their sample IPOs 
delist within five years of their listing date for performance related problems (liquidations, 
financial distress, insufficient capital etc.). The reason for comparatively low failure rate 
reported by Chou et al. is that they do not include mergers and acquisitions in their definition 
of delisting.  
There is paucity of empirical literature on IPO survival outside the US markets. For example, 
there are a handful of recently published studies on IPO survival for the UK market and 
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failure rates of UK IPOs have been mentioned in some related studies. Gregory et al. (2010), 
for instance, study the long-run performance of IPOs listed on LSE during 1975-2004. They 
briefly report the proportion of firms in their sample that are delisted due to ‘bankruptcy’ over 
the three and five years after the IPO. Their classification of bankruptcy includes firms 
delisted due to liquidations or administrative receiverships. They report that five year attrition 
rates for companies listed on the Main Market and AIM are 3.6 percent and 9.5 percent 
respectively. Espenlaub et al. (2012) relate survival of AIM IPOs to the reputation of 
nominated advisors (NOMADS) for a sample of 896 IPOs during 1995-2004. They find that 
failure rates of IPOs on AIM are 26 percent and 41 percent respectively for three and five post 
IPO years. They further conclude that delisting rates in their study are comparable to the ones 
reported for US and Canadian markets. Similarly, Kashefi Pour and Lasfer (2013) study the 
voluntary delisting from LSE AIM for the period 1995-2009. Although, they do not report the 
survival or failure rates for their sample IPOs, they show voluntary delisting accounts for 44 
percent of their total delisted sample firms. Their findings suggest firms that delist voluntarily 
come to the market to rebalance their leverage rather than financing their growth 
opportunities; but these firms leave the market voluntarily when they fail to benefit from 
listing. Ahmad and Jelic (2014) focus on Main Market IPOs and examine the survival of IPOs 
in relation to the lockup agreements. Their study is by far the exclusive and comprehensive 
analysis of IPO survival on the LSE Main market. They report that the five year failure rate 
for their sample IPOs form 1990-2006 is 31 percent, which is comparable to the US evidence 
discussed earlier. They also find that survival rates and times of IPOs with longer lockups are 
consistently better than that those of with shorter lockups.  
Although there was a spate of recent studies on survival of IPOs in UK, other non-US markets 
remain relatively ignored. The other markets with notable IPO survival studies include 
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Canada, Australia and Taiwan.  For instance, Carpentier and Suret (2011) examine the 
survival of penny stock IPOs on the Canadian stock market for the period 1986-2003. They 
find that 11.60 percent of their sample IPOs delist within five years following the IPO. They 
show that the failure rate of penny stocks in Canada is comparatively lower than that of US 
penny stocks reported in (Bradley et al., 2006). Carpentier and Suret, however, further 
classify their surviving firms into successful and unsuccessful; where successful surviving 
IPOs include those which have been transferred to a higher tier market or cross listed in the 
US exchanges. They find that only about 7% of their sample IPOs can be categorised as 
surviving successful firms. Chancharat et al. (2012) analyse the survival of Australian new 
economy (small firms with high growth opportunities) IPOs and relate it to the board structure 
of these IPOs. Their sample consists of 125 IPOs between 1994 and 2002 and they find that 
25.60 percent of their sample IPOs delist from the market within five years of their listing 
date. They also report that the board independence increases the likelihood of corporate 
survival. Finally, Yang and Sheu (2006) study the survival of IPOs listed on the Taiwan stock 
market from 1992 to 2000. They report that 38 out of their 560 sample IPOs do not survive 
after three years of IPO which equates to a failure rate of 6.7 percent. The relatively lower 
failure rate is due to the reason that they only consider IPOs delisted due to the negative 
reasons and do not account for mergers and acquisitions as delisted IPOs. Their results also 
suggest that likelihood of IPO survival first decreases and then increases with the percentage 
of insider ownership at the time of listing.  
The above discussion summarises survival rates of newly listed firms mainly in the US and 
other countries including UK, Canada, Australia and Taiwan. The reported failure rates for 
US market range from 9 percent to 47 percent over five years following the listing. The 
variation in failure rates is mainly because of different sample periods, different sub-samples 
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(high-tech vs non-tech, VC vs non-VC backed etc.) and difference in definition of survivors 
and non-survivors. Some studies treat merger and acquisitions as delisted firms (Jain and 
Kini, 2000) while others treat them separately from survivors or non-survivors (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2011) or exclude these firms altogether (Hensler et al., 1997). Similarly, failure rates for 
IPOs in UK range from almost 4 percent to 41 percent after five post-IPO years depending on 
the segment of the market (Main or AIM) and the definition on non-survivors. In next section, 
we discuss the determinants of survival (failure) of IPOs in the aftermarket. 
3.5.2 Determinants of IPO Survival or Failure 
As discussed earlier, much of the literature on survival of IPOs has focused on the 
determinants of the survival of IPOs. The studies have mainly related pre-IPO and IPO 
characteristics to the aftermarket survival of issuing firms in order to find what IPO 
characteristics affect the longevity of IPOs. Each of these predicted determinants examined in 
the literature is discussed in turn below. 
 IPO size: The size effect is well documented in the long run performance and survival of 
IPOs literature. Empirical studies usually proxy firm size by total assets, revenues and market 
capitalisation of the issuing firms. Size is also used as a proxy of firm risk where larger firms 
are likely to have less information asymmetry about the value of the firm in the aftermarket 
(Brav and Gompers, 2003). Moreover, larger IPOs have more resources at hand to deal with 
the difficult market conditions and withstand the decline in value (Hensler et al., 1997).  
Firms raising large funds at the time of IPO are presumed to have less uncertainty about their 
future prospects and are likely to perform better in the long run (Jain and Kini, 2000). 
Consistent with these arguments, studies have reported a positive relation between IPO size 
and long-run performance and survival of issuing firms. For example, Ritter (1991) finds that 
larger IPOs have better long-run performance relative to the smaller IPOs. Goergen et al. 
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(2007) also report positive impact of firm size on the long run IPO performance. In context of 
survival, larger IPOs are less likely to fail and have a higher probability of survival (Schultz, 
1993, Hensler et al., 1997, Jain and Kini, 1999a, Demers and Joos, 2007). Similar results are 
reported in the more recent studies on survival of IPOs. For instance, Espenlaub et al. (2012)  
report a positive impact of size (measured by market capitalisation at offering) on post IPO 
survival of issuing firms in UK. Espenlaub et al. show that a two-standard deviation increase 
in the size of IPO results in a 36 percent increase in the survival time for the issuing firm.  
IPO Age: Firms established long time ago before the IPO are likely to have more information 
available about their operations and history. Age of the issuing firm, therefore, represents 
another proxy of information asymmetry and risk of the issuing firm (Ritter, 1991, Goergen et 
al., 2006a). Older firms are more established, less speculative and are likely to have stable 
sources of business relative to the newer firms (Chancharat et al., 2012, Demers and Joos, 
2007). Moreover, longevity of issuing firm prior to the IPO provides historical information 
for investors to assess the risk and future prospects of the firm (Hensler et al., 1997). In line 
with these arguments, prior researchers have found a positive impact of firm age on post-IPO 
survival and performance of issuing firms. For instance, Ritter (1991) and Dong et al. (2011) 
show that IPO age is positively associated with long-run performance of IPOs. Schultz (1993) 
provides evidence to show that probability of firm failure decreases with increase in the age of 
issuing firm and Demers and Joos (2007) report that younger firms are more likely to fail. 
Similar results of a positive relation between IPO age and survival are reported in Hensler et 
al. (1997) and Espenlaub et al. (2012). For example, Espenlaub et al. (2012) find that a one-
standard deviation (2.67 years) increase in the age of issuing firm increases the median 
survival time by about 35 percent.   
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IPO Underpricing: The results from literature regarding the relation between initial 
underpricing and long-run performance/survival are inconclusive. These studies mainly focus 
on the signalling and uncertainty explanations for the IPO underpricing. According to the 
signalling explanation, higher underpricing represents higher quality of issuing firms (Allen 
and Faulhaber, 1989, Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989, Welch, 1989). Signalling hypothesis 
predicts a positive relation between initial underpricing and post-IPO long-run survival and 
performance. On the other hand, increased underpricing represents higher ex-ante uncertainty 
about the firm value (Beatty and Ritter, 1986); leading to a lower survival of IPOs in the 
aftermarket. The empirical evidence of signalling and valuation uncertainty in relation to the 
performance and survival of IPOs in the long-run is mixed. For instance, Hensler et al. (1997) 
find a positive impact of underpricing on survival of IPOs and Álvarez and González (2005) 
show a positive relation between underpricing and long-run performance. Schultz (1993) 
reports that likelihood of IPO failure is negatively related to the underpricing at least in the 
firms’ first year of IPO. Demers and Joos (2007) find a lower probability of failure for IPOs 
with high underpricing in the high-tech sector of their sample IPOs. The results of these 
studies are in consonance with the predictions of signalling theory of underpricing. On the 
other hand, Hamza and Kooli (2010) find that higher level of underpricing reduces the 
probability of survival relative to non-survival, consistent with the valuation uncertainty 
(higher risk) arguments of (Beatty and Ritter, 1986).  
Insider Ownership Retention: In absence of (or very low) ownership stake in the issuing firm, 
inside managers are likely to engage in non-value maximising transactions resulting in agency 
costs which might destroy firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This would lead to poor 
performance in the post-IPO period, if unabated, resulting in higher failure of issuing firms 
(Hensler et al., 1997, Jain and Kini, 1999a). According to the signalling theory, a higher 
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percentage of ownership retention at the time of IPO can act as a certification device and 
signal issuing firm quality (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Accordingly a higher retained ownership 
by insiders is hypothesised to align the interests of inside managers and outside investors 
mitigating the agency costs and leading to higher survival of issuing firms. Consistent with 
the reduction of agency problems for firms with higher proportion of insider ownership, 
Hensler et al. (1997), Jain and Kini (2008) and Bhattacharya et al. (2010) find a positive 
impact of higher insider ownership retention on the post IPO survival of issuing firms in the 
US. Similarly, Espenlaub et al. (2012) show that percentage of equity retention at the time of 
IPO is positively related to post-IPO survival in the long run for AIM IPOs in UK. Moreover, 
Yang and Sheu (2006) suggest that increasing insider ownership, particularly of top 
executives, will reduce agency problems and improve the survival of the issuing firm in the 
long-run.   
Leverage: The level of debt at the time of listing may have important implications for the post 
IPO performance of the issuing firm. Higher level of debt may result in underinvestment 
problems and reduced profitability in the years following the IPO. This might lead to higher 
financial constraints and weak financial health resulting in increased financial risk of the 
issuing firm. Consequently, the level of financial risk is related to the probability of financial 
distress (Lee and Yeh, 2004) and firms with higher levels of debt are more likely to go 
bankrupt (Chancharat et al., 2012). Moreover, financially distressed firms may use mergers 
and/or takeovers to avoid bankruptcy (Loderer et al., 2009). This would mean a positive 
relation between the degree of leverage and probability of failure in the aftermarket. 
Empirical evidence generally supports this conjecture. For instance, Demers and Joos (2007) 
find that leverage has a significantly positive relation with the likelihood of failure. Similar 
results are reported by Bhattacharya et al. (2010) for internet IPOs, where leverage is found to 
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be an important determinant of IPO failure. Chancharat et al. (2012) find that Australian IPOs 
with lower levels of debt are less likely to fail in post-IPO periods. Finally, Kashefi Pour and 
Lasfer (2013) find that IPOs delisted voluntarily from LSE AIM have significantly higher 
debt levels at the time of offering relative to their control groups. They also show that IPO 
companies leave market voluntarily when they fail to rebalance their leverage by issuing 
additional equity capital.    
IPO Activity: The “hot market” phenomenon is well documented in the IPO literature since 
(Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975). Hot issue periods are characterised by the greater number of IPOs 
with higher initial returns (Demers and Joos, 2007). Moreover, Lowry and Schwert (2002) 
show that more companies tend to go public following periods of high initial returns. Higher 
market levels present opportunities to firms to issue equity capital at relatively lower costs 
due to high investor sentiment. This lures low quality firms to issue equity taking advantage 
of investor sentiment (Coakley et al., 2007a). Consequently, firms going public in hot markets 
underperform in the long-run which is explained by the “window of opportunity” or 
overvaluation hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, Ritter, 1991). For instance, Ritter 
(1991) reports long-run IPO performance is negatively related to the annual IPO volume. In 
line with these arguments, firms going public during hot market periods are expected to be of 
lower quality and hence more likely to fail (Demers and Joos, 2007). Empirical evidence 
supports this conjecture and studies have reported lower survival rates and times for IPOs 
issued in the hot market periods (Hensler et al., 1997, Kooli and Meknassi, 2007, Hamza and 
Kooli, 2010).   
VC/PE Backing: The previous US evidence suggests a positive role of private equity and 
venture capital on the subsequent performance and survival of IPO firms (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991, Jain and Kini, 1995, Jain and Kini, 2000, Bhattacharya et al., 2011). VCs certify 
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the value of IPOs by reducing information asymmetry through employing prestigious 
underwriters, reputed auditors and eliciting greater interest from institutional investors 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). VCs assist and take active role in management of their 
portfolio companies even after IPOs (Barry et al., 1990). The certification and monitoring 
provided by the VCs results in superior post-issue operating performance (Jain and Kini, 
1995) and better survival profile for VC backed IPOs (Jain and Kini, 2000). Moreover, 
reputation of VCs backing the IPO also serves as a signal of better quality issuing firm and 
results in a higher survival for IPOs backed by reputed VCs (Hamza and Kooli, 2010). 
Bhattacharya et al. (2011) show that VCs are associated with lower failure rates of IPOs and 
VCs reduce the failure risk of issuing firms through value added around the public birth of a 
firm. Recently, Chou et al. (2013) provide further evidence that VC backed IPOs are less 
likely to delist for performance failure and have higher survival duration relative to non-VC 
backed ones. However, their further analysis reveals that the better survival rates and higher 
survival durations is only concentrated in IPOs backed by prestigious VCs and IPOs backed 
by an ordinary VC have a probability of failure as high as that of non-VC backed IPOs. On 
the other hand, presence of VCs may be considered as a signal of quality by the potential 
acquirers, hence increasing the viability of firm as a target and higher delisting likelihood 
(Vismara et al., 2012, Kooli and Meknassi, 2007). Besides, young VCs may “grandstand” by 
taking younger and “less mature” companies to public in order to establish their reputation 
(Gompers, 1996). Lee and Wahal (2004) find higher underpricing for VC backed IPOs and 
confirm the grandstanding by VCs as suggested by (Gompers, 1996). VC backed IPOs are 
likely to have higher failure if grandstanding occurs (Chancharat et al., 2012). Likewise, due 
to multiple agency conflicts and short term goals, VCs may enhance the short term 
performance of IPO firms at the detriment of long term performance and survival (Fischer and 
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Pollock, 2004, Arthurs et al., 2008). This would increase premiums to VCs at IPO exit but 
leaves the issuing firms less viable in the aftermarket. The evidence from US markets 
generally finds a positive relation between VC backing (and VC reputation) and post-IPO 
performance and survival. The findings from UK and other markets, however, are less 
pronounced. For instance, studies on UK IPOs have largely failed to find significant 
differences between VC and non-VC backed IPOs in terms of their post-issue performance 
(Coakley et al., 2007a, Jelic et al., 2005, Jelic and Wright, 2011). Likewise, Espenlaub et al. 
(2012) fail to find any evidence of the impact of VC backing on post-IPO survival of AIM 
IPOs in the UK. Coakley et al. (2009), however, find evidence for certification role of VCs 
for UK IPOs during the period of 1985-2003 except for the bubble years of 1998-2000. 
Finally, Chancharat et al. (2012) report that VC backing is associated with higher failure for 
Australian IPOs lending support to short term focus/agency problems of VCs.   
Sponsor/Underwriter Reputation: The certification role of prestigious underwriters is well 
documented in the previous literature. Prior evidence suggests that IPOs backed by reputed 
underwriters are less underpriced consistent with the argument that reputed underwriters are 
associated with less risky issuing firms (Carter and Manaster, 1990, Megginson and Weiss, 
1991). Moreover, Carter et al. (1998) show that IPOs handled by prestigious underwriters 
have superior performance compared to those handled by less reputed underwriters. As a 
repeat player in the IPO underwriting market, underwriters have a lot to lose in terms of their 
reputation from failed IPOs (Hamza and Kooli, 2010) and underwriters try to protect their 
reputational capital (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Reputed underwriters are also associated with 
lower earnings management at the time of IPO, which shows certification of the quality of 
IPO firm’s financial reports (Lee and Masulis, 2011). Jain and Kini (1999b) provide evidence 
that reputable underwriters provide valuable monitoring services to issuing firms and this 
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monitoring leads to superior operating and investment performance on part of IPOs backed by 
prestigious underwriters. Dong et al. (2011) show that higher underwriter quality predicts 
better long-run performance of IPOs and reputed underwriters add value through their 
marketing, certification and screening services. Consistent with the certification role of 
underwriters, Schultz (1993) shows that probability of IPO failure is negatively related to 
reputation of underwriter. Demers and Joos (2007) find that IPOs handled by reputed 
underwriters have lower probability of failure within five years following the IPO. Jain and 
Kini (2008) also find a lower probability of failure and higher survival time for IPOs 
marketed by high prestige underwriters. More recently, Bhattacharya et al. (2011) observe 
lower mortality rates for IPOs associated with more reputed underwriters. They also report 
that observed lower failure rates of IPOs backed by more prestigious underwriters are mainly 
due to their ability of picking good firms to take public. Similar finding are reported by 
Espenlaub et al. (2012) for the impact of reputed nominated advisors (NOMADs) on the 
survival of LSE AIM IPOs. They find that IPOs backed by reputed NOMADs have higher 
survival rates and longer longevity compared to ones backed by other NOMADs. However, 
there is also some evidence which suggest that (prestigious) underwriters are associated with 
higher delisting/acquisition rates. For instance, Kooli and Meknassi (2007) find that 
association of reputed underwriters with IPOs increases the probability of being acquired 
compared to survival and non-survival. Likewise, Chancharat et al. (2012) show that IPOs in 
Australia backed by underwriter are 3.36 times more likely to fail relative to IPOs without 
underwriter backing. They suggest that the reason for this counterintuitive result is the 
possibility that risky firms are more likely to seek backing by the underwriter.  
Industry effect: Some studies on IPO survival have reported differences in survival profile of 
issuing firms across industries. For example, Hensler et al. (1997) find that IPOs in Optical 
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and Drug industries have longer survival times and IPOs in Computer and data, Wholesale 
and Airline industries experience shorter time to failure. Kooli and Meknassi (2007) report 
that being an Internet IPO reduces the likelihood of survival. Carpentier and Suret (2011) 
show that IPOs belonging to Materials and Energy sectors have lower likelihood of failure 
relative to other industries for a sample of Canadian issuing firms. Similarly, Chou et al. 
(2013) find that technology oriented IPOs have higher survival durations and are less likely to 
delist.   
3.6 Long-Run IPO Performance 
There is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that investors in IPOs earn positive returns in 
the short-run but negative returns in the long-run after equity issuance. The short term positive 
performance and long-run underperformance are regarded as anomalies or puzzles in the 
finance literature. The short-run performance of IPOs is termed “underpricing” as shares in 
newly listed firms’ trade at prices higher than the issue price resulting in positive returns to 
the initial investors. The underpricing phenomenon is widely documented and is generally 
accepted as internationally valid. Similarly, literature has widely documented long-run 
performance across many markets of the world. Academic researchers have sought to explain 
the underperformance puzzle since the documentation of long-run underperformance by Ritter 
(1991) for US market. In the next sections we review the empirical evidence of long-run 
underperformance for US, UK and other international markets as well as the determinants of 
underperformance.  
3.6.1 Long-Run IPO Performance in US 
Early results by Ritter (1991) show that IPOs significantly underperform market in three years 
following the listing. For a sample of 1526 US IPOs from 1975 to 1984, Ritter reports that 
issuing firms underperform by about 27 percent relative to comparable seasoned firms in 
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terms of size and industry with small offers the worst performers. Loughran (1993) compare 
the long-run performance of IPOs on NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges and find that 
IPOs on average underperform over six years after listing. The results show that poor 
performance of NASDAQ firms is primarily due to the low returns on IPO firms. In a 
subsequent study, Loughran and Ritter (1995) report long-run underperformance not only for 
IPOs but also for SEOs. For instance, they show that investors in IPOs earn an average return 
of 5 percent during five years after the IPO while the average return for investors in SEOs 
stands at 7 percent. Moreover, they use six different benchmarks and their results show that 
both IPOs and SEOs underperform these benchmarks over the five years period after equity 
issuance. Rajan and Servaes (1997) report five year long-run underperformance in the range 
of -17 percent to -47 percent relative to different benchmarks (NYSE/AMEX) for IPOs issued 
during the years 1975-1987. Carter et al. (1998) find that over a period of three years 
following the issuance, IPOs underperform the market by about 20 percent. Similarly, 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) re-examine the IPO underperformance using Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor models purged for new issues and find that new issues reliably underperform 
using both weighting schemes (equal and value). Similarly, Ritter and Welch (2002) examine 
the long-run stock return performance of IPOs in three years following listing in US from 
1980 to 2001. They report market adjusted (CRSP value weighted index) returns of -23.4% 
and style adjusted (seasoned matched firm with closest market capitalisation and book-to-
market ratio) returns of   -5.1%.    
The evidence of long-run underperformance on part of IPOs, however, has not gone 
uncontested in the literature. For example, Brav and Gompers (1997) cast doubt on the 
evidence that IPO firms underperform in the long-run. They show that underperformance is 
sensitive to the benchmark and weighting scheme used. The level of underperformance is 
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significantly reduced when returns are value weighted instead of equal weighted. They also 
show that underperformance is not exclusive to IPOs and when IPOs are matched to size and 
book-to-market matched portfolios purged for recent equity issuing firms, the 
underperformance of IPOs disappears. Small, low book-to-market firms perform worst 
regardless of whether they are IPOs or not. Brav et al. (2000) document that IPOs perform as 
well as non-issuing firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio and poor performance is 
mainly concentrated in small issuing firms with low book-to-market ratios. Gompers and 
Lerner (2003) examine IPO performance over a long time period from 1935 to 1972 and 
before the formation of NASDAQ and show that the performance depends on the method 
used to measure returns. Their results show that IPOs underperform when value weighted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are used. However, they find no underperformance 
when either value weighted BHARs or cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are used. 
Furthermore, IPOs show no underperformance in calendar time analysis using factor models. 
More recently, Eckbo and Norli (2005) argue that underperformance in IPOs is mainly due to 
their high stock turnover and low leverage ratios and underperformance disappears after these 
two factors are accounted for.  
More recent evidence from US also shows long-run underperformance of IPO firms. Brau et 
al. (2012) study the acquisition activity and long-run performance for a sample of 3547 IPOs 
from 1985 to 2003. They report a market adjusted abnormal return of -25.69 percent and a 
size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns of -10.69 percent after five years 
following the IPO. They, however, find that IPOs which acquire within one year of going 
public underperform significantly following the first year whereas non-acquirers do not 
underperform. Wu and Kwok (2007) examine the long-run performance of domestic vs global 
IPOs in the US during 1986-1997. They find that both domestic and global IPOs 
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underperform the market index (CRSP value weighted index) on equal as well as value 
weighting basis. The underperformance is, however, less severe for domestic issuers. Similar, 
results are reported by Gao and Jain (2011) who examine the long-run performance of 
founder vs non-founder CEO IPOs. They find that both groups (founder vs non-founder CEO) 
of IPOs underperform the market adjusted and style adjusted (size and book-to-market) 
benchmarks for five years after the IPO, although founder CEO IPOs fare better than non-
founder CEO IPOs. For example, five year size and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for 
founder CEO firms are -21.72 percent while the same are -52.88 percent for non-founder 
CEO firms.   
The overall results from the above discussion show that IPOs in US underperform in the long 
run and this underperformance is consistent over time. However, the results of long-run 
performance studies could vary depending upon the benchmarks, methodology (event time vs 
calendar time) and weighting scheme (equal vs value) used. Moreover, studies have 
uncovered performance differences across different firm and issue characteristics.    
3.6.2 Long-Run Performance of IPOs in UK 
Studies on the long-run performance in UK broadly confirm the US findings discussed above. 
To start with, Levis (1993) examines the long-run performance for a sample of 721 UK IPOs 
issued during 1980-1988. Levis uses three different benchmarks; Financial Times Actuaries 
All Share Index, Hoare Govett Small Companies Index and a specially constructed All Share 
Equally Weighted Index to calculate long-run returns. The 36 months cumulative abnormal 
returns vary from -8.31 to -22.96 percent depending on the benchmark used.    
Espenlaub et al. (2000) revisit long-run performance of UK issuing firms over the period 
1985-1992 using a sample of 588 IPOs. In doing so, they use a number of alternative 
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benchmarks and calendar time approach. They find that over the first three years after listing, 
IPOs underperform significantly irrespective of the benchmark used. However, over the five 
year horizon after the IPO, the underperformance becomes less severe and depends on the 
benchmark applied. They also report that statistical significance of abnormal returns is even 
less marked when calendar time approach is used to measure return performance.  
In a study of private to public management buyout (MBO) IPOs on LSE during 1964-1997, 
Jelic et al. (2005) find no evidence of underperformance three years after the IPO date. 
Moreover, they also report that there are no significant performance differences between VC 
backed and non-backed IPOs, although IPOs backed by highly reputable VCs tend to be 
better long term investment relative to the ones backed by less reputable VCs. They attribute 
their inconsistent (with existing evidence on long-run IPO underperformance) results to the 
fact that MBO backed IPOs are a different subsample within the IPO population based on 
their characteristics.     
Goergen et al. (2007) also find results which corroborate the underperformance earlier 
documented by Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. (2000). Goergrn et al. report significantly 
negative returns in the range of -13.17 percent to -21.98 for different benchmarks over three 
years after the IPO. They also find that small firms perform worst in the long-run which is 
consistent with the US evidence (Brav and Gompers, 1997, Brav et al., 2000). 
Coakley et al. (2008) examine the long-run performance of 571 IPOs on Main Market of LSE 
during 1985-2003. They report three year mean abnormal return of -1.3 percent over the full 
sample period but the abnormal return is not significantly different from zero, thus discarding 
the underperformance hypothesis. However, they find that returns are significantly negative in 
hot market periods and statistically different from returns in normal markets. Finally they do 
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not find significant differences in long-run performance between VC backed and non-VC 
backed IPOs.   
Gregory et al. (2010) examine the long-run performance of 2499 IPOs on LSE undertaken 
during the period 1975-2004.  Their sample is by far the largest of all studies conducted on 
UK stock market and covers Main Market, AIM and USM (Unlisted Securities Market). They 
report significant underperformance which persists between 36 months and 60 months after 
the listing. They use three benchmarks; equally-weighted size decile portfolio, value-weighted 
size decile portfolio and size matched control firm. Their results show significant 
underperformance of IPOs in the range of 31 percent to 69 percent in five post listing years. 
They, however, find that IPOs on the Main Market experience less severe underperformance 
and that overall poor performance is mainly driven by AIM and USM IPOs
6
. They also report 
results for calendar time portfolio approach and their results lack evidence of 
underperformance, at least, for Main Market IPOs when returns are value weighted. They 
conclude that IPOs on AIM and USM significantly underperform both in event time and 
calendar time analysis while underperformance of Main Market IPOs is sensitive to the 
method employed.  
Levis (2011), recently, investigates long-run performance of LSE IPOs during 1992-2005 
based on three different groups of issuing firms; PE backed, VC backed and non PE-backed. 
Consistent with previous evidence on UK IPO underperformance, Levis reports negative 
abnormal returns across different benchmarks. However, the magnitude of abnormal returns 
and their statistical significance is lower than those reported in previous studies. For example, 
                                                 
6
 The five year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for equal weighted size decile portfolio, value weighted size 
decile portfolio and size matched control benchmarks are -19.2%, 9.9% and 35.7% respectively for the Main 
Market IPOs. Furthermore, abnormal returns for value weighted size decile portfolio are not statistically 
different from zero. 
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he shows that abnormal returns vary from -13.46 percent to 13.67 percent for various 
benchmarks based on equal-weighting basis and negative abnormal returns are only 
significant in case of FTA benchmark. Moreover, although negative, none of the value 
weighted returns are significantly different from zero. Surprisingly, he finds that PE backed 
IPOs outperform significantly across all benchmarks and in both equal and value weighting 
basis. The three year abnormal returns range between about 14 percent and 29 percent for PE 
backed IPOs. The poor performance in overall sample is mainly driven by VC backed and 
non-sponsored IPOs. Finally, none of the alphas in his factor regression models in calendar 
time approach are negative, suggesting no evidence of long-run underperformance.        
In sum, although studies on the US markets find strong evidence of long-run IPO 
underperformance, the reported results from UK are not conclusive. For example, there are 
marked differences between performance of IPOs on Main Market and AIM (or now defunct 
USM) in post-issue periods (Gregory et al., 2010). Moreover, long-run returns are not 
consistent across event time and calendar time approaches (Levis, 2011) and are dependent on 
the benchmark applied (Espenlaub et al., 2000). Finally, some researchers fail to find 
underperformance in long-run altogether for UK IPOs (Coakley et al., 2008, Jelic et al., 
2005). This warrants for further investigation of long-run performance of issuing firm in the 
UK markets.      
3.6.3 International Evidence on Long-Run IPO Performance  
The IPO long-run underperformance is not exclusive to US and UK markets and has been 
observed widely in other developed and developing markets in the world. Empirical evidence 
from developed markets like France, Germany, Japan and Australia clearly shows that IPOs 
perform poorly in the aftermarket. Similar results of underperformance are reported for other 
developing markets such as Brazil, China, Thailand and Chile etc. However, there are some 
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markets which seem to defy the established pattern of long-run underperformance of IPOs. 
For instance, Kim et al. (1995) show that Korean IPOs outperform similar seasoned firms in 
the post-issue periods. Loughran et al. (1994) report positive three year abnormal returns for 
Swedish IPOs after the listing date. Finally, IPOs in Thailand and Malaysia also do not show 
evidence of significant underperformance in the long-run (Allen et al., 1999, Ahmad-Zaluki et 
al., 2007). Since the findings of IPO long-run underperformance seem to be consistent around 
the globe, the studies have not been discussed in detail. A summary of findings from 
international literature regarding long-run IPO performance is presented in Table 3.1.  
3.6.4 Long-Run Performance Explanations 
Although there is ample evidence to suggest that IPOs underperform in the long-run, the 
explanations for the persistence of long-run underperformance are less abundant. There are 
few studies that attempt to explain underperformance theoretically while most of other studies 
simply attempt to find cross-sectional variations in long-run performance by relating it to 
various IPO firms and issue characteristics. We briefly discuss below and summarise the 
literature that attempts to explain the reasons and determinants of long-run underperformance. 
3.6.4.1 Theoretical Explanations of Long-Run Underperformance 
As mentioned above, the theoretical explanations for poor performance of IPOs in the long-
run are scarce. One semi-rational explanation for the underperformance phenomenon is the 
investors’ divergence of opinion proposed by Miller (1977). Miller assumes heterogeneous 
expectations of investors about the firm valuation under the short sale constraints. IPO shares 
are bought by the investors who are most optimistic about the future prospects of the firms, 
resulting in higher prices for IPO shares than their fair prices. With flow of more information 
about the firm, the divergence of opinion decreases and valuation of shares converge to mean 
or fair price. The resultant fall in price leads to underperformance in the long-run predicting a 
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negative relation between divergence of opinion and long-run performance. Moreover, riskier 
firms with large divergence of opinion about their value are even more likely to underperform 
in the long-run. Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that this explanation is also consistent with 
the drop in prices at the time of lockup expiration. The argument of Miller (1977) works best 
when the number of investors in not large and the public float is small. However, at the time 
of lockup expiry, market is flooded with released shares causing higher volumes and negative 
returns. Houge et al. (2001a) find support for Miller’s (1977) theory and show that their 
proxies for greater divergence of opinion are negatively related to poor long-run returns.  
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that issuers take advantage of “window 
of opportunity” and issue shares when investors are irrationally overoptimistic about the 
future potential of issuers. IPO market is subject to fads that can affect the market prices of 
shares (Shiller, 1990). The window of opportunity explanation posits that investor optimism 
during a period will result in large cycles of IPO volume.  The issuers have incentive to issue 
overvalued equity in these periods of market buoyancy taking advantage of investor 
sentiment. Consequently, IPOs issued in hot periods are likely to be overvalued and of lower 
quality resulting in long-run underperformance. For example, Ritter (1991) finds that volume 
of IPO activity is negatively related to the long-run performance of IPOs. Lerner (1994) finds 
that companies go public near market peaks when equity valuations are high. Similarly, 
issuers selling shares in the hot market periods underperform severely in the aftermarket 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Rajan and Servaes (1997) show that analysts are overoptimistic 
regarding the potential of earnings and long term growth of recent IPOs and IPO frequency is 
positively related to optimistic growth forecasts. In addition, firms with more optimistic long-
run growth projections perform poorly in the aftermarket. In another study, Baker and 
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Wurgler (2000) also find partial support for the window of opportunity hypothesis and market 
timing by managers in issuing equity.     
3.6.4.2 Firm and Issue Characteristics 
Much of the literature on long-run performance of IPOs has attempted to find firm and issue 
characteristics (variables) that predict long-run performance. In doing so, researchers have 
also focused on signalling in IPOs and the role of third party certifiers like underwriters, VCs 
etc. in the going public process. These factors are briefly reviewed in the discussion below.  
Ritter (1991) reports that young growth companies are worst performers in the long-run after 
the IPO. Since then, researchers have consistently reported similar results of poor long-run 
returns for small and younger firms (Brav and Gompers, 1997, Brav et al., 2000).  Brav and 
Gompers (1997) point to a number of possible reasons for the poor performance on part of 
small, low book-to-market firms. First, among them, is the possibility of negative impact of 
unexpected shock to small growth firms in early 1980s. This is consistent with Fama and 
French (1995), who find that earnings of small firms declined in 1980s but could not recover 
when those of large firms did. The other reasons include lack of institutional holdings in small 
firms and higher information asymmetry attached to smaller firms.    
Jain and Kini (1994) provide an explanation of the long-run performance using the agency 
problem.  They relate long-run post IPO performance to the ownership retained by the 
insiders at the time of IPO. They argue that higher ownership retention would predict a better 
long-run performance of IPOs consistent with the signalling and agency cost hypothesis 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They find that post-issue operating 
performance is positively related to level of equity retention by inside managers. However, 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) fail to find significant relation between long-run operating 
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performance and the ownership structure. Similarly, Goergen and Renneboog (2007) also find 
that long-run IPO performance is not related to the control and ownership retention.  
Another factor that seems to explain the poor long-run performance in IPOs is the earnings 
management at the time of offering (Teoh et al., 1998a). Teoh et al. find that firms with 
aggressive accruals in IPO year experience poor performance in three years after the IPO. 
They conclude that investors do not fully incorporate the effect of large accruals in pricing of 
IPOs and could pay a high price for the shares. Discovery of the real value and earnings of the 
issuers in the post-IPO period leads to loss of optimism and prices are revised downwards 
leading to poor long-run returns in the aftermarket. Teoh et al. (1998c) also find that 
opportunistic earnings management in IPOs partially explains the long-run underperformance 
after the IPO. They find that IPO year abnormal accruals, a proxy of earnings management, 
explain the performance variation in earnings and stock reruns after the issuance. Rangan 
(1998) provides similar evidence for SEOs and reports that a one standard deviation increase 
in the earnings management during offer year leads to a decline of about 10% in the market-
adjusted returns in the following year. He concludes that investors overvalue the offerings by 
extrapolating the earnings growth related with higher earnings management. Subsequent 
reversal of earnings and poor earnings performance leads to correction of valuation and 
decline in prices and returns.  In a related vein, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) find 
that IPOs are overpriced compared to the industry peer price multiples for a sample of 2000 
IPOs from 1980 to 1997. They further report poor long-run performance for these overpriced 
IPOs and conclude that investors become optimistic by growth forecasts and pay less 
attention to profitability in valuation of IPO shares. The earning management and 
overvaluation are both related to the overconfidence on part of investors and entrepreneurs 
alike (Ritter and Welch, 2002, Heaton, 2002).  
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Presence of VCs and PE firms in IPOs has also been examined in the going public process. 
Prior literature has generally reported positive impact of VC presence on the underpricing and 
long-run performance of IPOs. For example, VC backed IPOs on average are less underpriced 
due to the monitoring and certification role of VCs compared to their non-VC counterparts 
(Barry et al., 1990, Megginson and Weiss, 1991). As VCs maintain their positions in the IPOs 
long after going public (Barry et al., 1990), their certification and monitoring should result in 
better performance in the long-run for equity issuers. Consistent with this argument, Brav and 
Gompers (1997) find that VC backed IPOs outperform non-VC backed IPOs over a five year 
period after listing on an equal weighted returns basis. Jain and Kini (1995) relate VC backing 
at the time of IPO with post-issue operating performance and find that VC backed IPOs 
experience superior operating performance compared to non-VC backed ones. Recently, 
researchers have focused on the differences between VC and private equity (PE) firms to 
explain cross sectional performance variations in the VC and PE backed IPOs. For instance, 
Gompers (1996) develops a ‘grandstanding’ hypothesis which asserts that young VC in order 
to establish reputation and raise new funds, bring younger companies to the public market 
which are more underpriced compared to the companies backed by older VCs. Lee and Wahal 
(2004), on the other hand, find that VC backed IPOs are more underpriced compared to non-
VC backed IPOs once the endogeniety issues of VC financing are addressed. They, however, 
find support for the grandstanding hypothesis by showing that young VC firms and those with 
fewer IPOs in the past, rush young and smaller companies to the public market. Along the 
similar lines, another stream of research has examined the reputation of VC and PE firms in 
relation to the post-IPO performance of companies they bring to the market (Nahata, 2008). 
Krishnan et al. (2011b), for example, find that VC reputation, measured by previous market 
share of VC backed IPOs, is significantly positively related to the long-run performance of 
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IPOs. They also report that reputed VCs are actively involved in the corporate governance of 
their companies after the IPO and this involvement positively influences the performance 
even after controlling the VC selection bias. Much of the evidence discussed above relates to 
US markets and is conclusive; however, results from other markets are not consistent. For 
instance, studies on VC backing and performance of IPOs from UK report mixed results 
regarding the impact of VCs on performance. Jelic et al. (2005) examine private-to-public 
management buyout IPOs in the UK and fail to find significant differences in performance 
between VC backed vs non-VC backed IPOs. They, however, find that IPOs backed by 
reputed VC are better long-term investment compared to those backed by less reputed VCs.        
Several studies have examined the reputation of underwriter as a significant predictor of long-
run IPO performance. Carter et al. (1998) find that long-run market adjusted returns are less 
negative for IPOs backed by more reputable underwriters. Moreover, they also report less 
underpricing for more prestigious underwriters in line with Carter and Manaster (1990). Both 
of these results are consistent with earlier findings of Michaely and Shaw (1994) who show 
that IPOs backed by reputable underwriters are less underpriced and perform better in the 
long-run. Similarly, IPOs backed by highly reputed underwriters also show superior operating 
performance relative IPOs backed by less reputed underwriters (Jain and Kini, 1999b). Some 
recent studies report that underwriter reputation continues to be a significant predictor of 
long-run IPO performance. Dong et al. (2011) examine underwriter reputation and long-run 
IPO performance in US from 1980 to 2006. They focus on marketing, certification and 
screening and information production role of underwriters an find that higher underwriter 
quality predicts superior long-run performance. They further find that marketing and 
certification and screening are important attributes of underwriter quality in terms of post-
issue quality.  
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Recent literature has documented some other variables and issue characteristics which are 
significantly related to the performance of IPOs in the long-run. Wu and Kwok (2007), for 
example, find that global IPOs on US markets show poor long-run performance compared to 
market as well as the domestic IPOs over three years after issuance. They suggest that 
investors are optimistic about the future growth of firms engaged in global offerings and these 
expectations are corrected over time after IPO causing underperformance, which is consistent 
with the window of opportunity hypothesis. Gao and Jain (2011) examine the long-run 
performance differences between founder CEO and non-founder CEO IPOs and find weak 
evidence of superior performance for founder CEO IPOs relative to non-founder ones in 
general. However, they show significant higher returns for founder CEO IPOs compared to 
non-founder CEO IPOs in context of high technology firms. Brau et al. (2012) show the 
impact of acquisition activity on the long-run stock performance for US IPOs from 1985 to 
2003. Their results show that acquisition activity within one year of listing is negatively 
related to stock performance from one through five year holding period following first year. 
More specifically, they find that three year style adjusted abnormal returns are -15.6 percent 
for IPOs that acquire within first year of listing while abnormal returns for non-acquirers are 
5.9%. Finally, Mudambi et al. (2012) show that for a sample of UK IPOs, firms with higher 
levels of multinationality outperform domestic firms in long-run; where multinationality is 
measured as presence in markets outside UK.  
3.7 Earnings Management in IPOs 
There is a vast body of literature which looks at the motivations of earnings management, 
mitigating factors in earnings management and methodological issues in calculation of the 
earnings management. Prior literature provides evidence on motivations of using earnings 
manipulation such as meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (Degeorge et al., 1999, 
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Dechow and Dichev, 2002), avoiding debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994), increasing initial firm value (DuCharme et al., 2001), around equity offerings (Teoh et 
al., 1998c, Teoh et al., 1998a, Rangan, 1998). Another stream of research also focuses on 
identifying the factors or variables which are useful in restraining the earnings management, 
particularly in IPOs (Morsfield and Tan, 2006, Lee and Masulis, 2011, Brau and Johnson, 
2009) and SEOs (Jo et al., 2007). As the focus of this thesis is on IPOs, the discussion of 
earnings management is limited to the motivations, empirical evidence of earnings 
management in IPOs and the earnings management mitigating factors in IPOs. 
Accrual accounting is a useful tool for investors to assess the underlying economic 
performance of an entity in a period through the use of basic accounting principles. However, 
use of accounting accrual creates a difference between reported earnings and actual cash 
flows. Although, Dechow (1994) suggests that earnings tend to be smoother than cash flows 
and earnings present better information about economic performance relative to cash flows. 
Nonetheless, accrual accounting gives managers more discretion in reporting of earnings and 
managerial choices may obscure real underlying performance. In presence of discretion over 
adjustment of accruals, it becomes difficult for investors to evaluate that whether reported 
earnings are appropriate or deceptive. This is clear from the formal definition of the earnings 
management provided in the literature (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) p.368 
“Earning management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”  
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IPOs are most susceptible to the earnings management due to the unique settings of the event 
and the presence of information asymmetry between the issuer and investors. There is very 
little information about the IPO firms before going public. Lack of public information and 
trading history makes it very difficult for investors to appropriately value the firm. Moreover, 
there is no media coverage of issuing firm in period before going public (Rao, 1993). Most of 
the information about issuing firms comes from prospectus, which contains financial 
information and reported earnings for previous years. However, it is difficult for investors to 
judge that whether use of accruals reflects the true value of the company appropriately or is 
deceptive. This provides an opportunity to inside managers of issuing firms to influence 
offering price of shares through use of accounting choices which are unlikely to be detected. 
Moreover, insiders in issuing firms have strong incentive to increase the issue price of the 
offered shares. A high offer price and large proceeds have direct impact on financial position 
of the firm (in case of primary shares) and wealth of entrepreneurs (in case of secondary 
shares). By influencing offer price through reported earnings in prospectus, insiders not only 
can increase proceeds to issuing firm but also their personal wealth as well. In the presence of 
both incentive and opportunity, insiders in issuing firm are likely to engage in earnings 
management before IPO. In addition, earning management at the time of IPO is an important 
concern for the investors who can pay unrealistic price for new shares. The empirical 
evidence generally supports this conjecture and is reviewed in the next section.   
3.7.1 Empirical Evidence on Earnings Management in IPOs 
Prior literature has focused on the use of earnings management in the pre-IPO years or during 
the IPO year. Earnings management is not directly observable and different models have been 
developed to measure it. Most commonly used proxy for measurement of earnings 
management is accruals: difference between the reported earnings and cash flow from 
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operations. The models of earnings management separate the non-discretionary and 
discretionary accruals to detect earnings management; where unusually high discretionary 
accruals are considered as the evidence of upward (income increasing) earnings management.  
Friedlan (1994) examines accounting choices of issuers at the time of IPO. He asserts that 
accounting based measures are useful and frequently used in non-traded securities (IPO shares 
before going public). Given the incentives and opportunity to influence offer price as 
discusses earlier, issuers are likely to engage in upwards earnings management. He finds that 
issuing firms make income increasing discretionary accruals in the most current financial 
statements (in prospectus) before going public. In order to provide evidence that abnormal 
accruals affect valuation of firm at IPO, DuCharme et al. (2001) relate accruals management 
in the pre-IPO year to the market capitalisation of issuing firm at the IPO. They find a 
significant positive relation between the initial firm value and their proxies (managed and 
unmanaged accruals and cash flows) for earnings management. Moreover, they also relate 
issue year accruals to post-issue operating and stock return performance. Their results show 
that post-issue market-adjusted returns are negatively related to pre-IPO managed accruals. 
They suggest that investors become overly optimistic about future prospects of firms which 
are based on managed earnings and these expectations do not realise in post-IPO periods 
resulting in declining stock prices.  Although, above mentioned two studies find significant 
evidence of earnings management through aggressive accruals in pre-IPO years, Aharony et 
al. (1993) find weak evidence of earnings management in year before the IPO. They, 
however, report that earnings management, to the extent that if any, is higher in small firms 
and firms with large financial leverage. 
A number of other studies have examined the relation between IPO year abnormal accruals 
and the post-issue stock returns and operating performance. These studies generally argue that 
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issuers manage earnings upwards in pre-IPO years and year of IPO to influence the offer 
prices. Investors are systematically fooled by these inflated earnings and extrapolate earnings 
growth associated with earnings management resultantly overvaluing the issuing firms. In 
aftermarket, reversal of abnormal discretionary accruals causes decline in earnings 
disappointing market and driving valuation of these firms down. This suggests a negative 
relation between the level of discretionary accrual around IPO and the post-issue stock return 
as well as operating performance of the issuing firms. Empirical evidence generally supports 
these arguments. Teoh et al. (1998a) find higher earnings management in IPOs relative to 
non-issuing firms. They also report that unusually higher discretionary accruals in IPO year 
predict significant negative performance in three years after the IPO. More specifically, three 
year stock returns of IPO firms in the most aggressive quartile of earnings management are 20 
percent less than those of in the most conservative quartile. Teoh et al. (1998b) report similar 
finding for SEOs and find that discretionary current accrual are at peak in offer year and 
decline in years after the offering causing similar pattern in net income. They document a 
negative relation between pre-issue earnings management and post-issue stock returns and 
earnings. In a similar study on SEOs, Rangan (1998) shows results which are consistent with 
(Teoh et al., 1998b). For instance, Rangan documents that a one-standard deviation increase 
in the discretionary accruals is related with a 10 percent decline in market-adjusted returns. 
Fan (2007) finds that IPOs have the highest accruals in the year of IPO and these accruals are 
strong predictor of decline in operating performance in the post-IPO periods. Although results 
discussed above exclusively relate to US market, evidence from other countries is consistent 
with US findings. Roosenboom et al. (2003), for example, investigate earnings management 
for a sample of Dutch IPOs and report evidence of upwards earnings management in first year 
of IPO but not in pre-IPO years. They also document a negative relation between IPO year 
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discretionary current accruals (a proxy of earnings management) and three year post-IPO 
stock return performance. Recently, Alhadab et al. (2013) show that IPOs in UK engage in 
upwards earnings management in the year of IPO and post-issue years. Comparing the Main 
Market and AIM IPOs, they find that earnings management is more pronounced for AIM 
IPOs which is a less regulated market segment.  
Despite the extensive evidence that equity issuing firms (IPOs, SEOs) engage in upwards 
earnings management, a spate of recent studies has questioned this evidence (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008, Armstrong et al., 2009, Cecchini et al., 2012). For instance, using a 
sample of UK IPOs, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) show that IPO firms report more 
conservatively in the year before IPO due to higher quality reporting and market monitoring 
of being a public company. Likewise, Armstrong et al. (2009) cast doubt on the earlier 
evidence of aggressive earnings management in US IPOs. They find no evidence of earnings 
management as the discretionary accruals in IPO year are not statistically different from zero. 
They also fail to find relation between the earnings management and issue price, post-issue 
equity value and insider trading profits for IPOs refuting the incentive argument for upwards 
earnings management in equity issues. In addition, they report that negative relation between 
IPO year earnings inflation and post-issue performance is due to cash flow mispricing. 
Finally, Cecchini et al. (2012) focus on individual accrual account (allowance for 
uncollectible accounts) instead of total accruals and find that IPOs have conservative 
allowances leading to lower reported earnings. Moreover, IPO firms record large bad debt 
(and hence income decreasing) expenses relative to matched non-IPO firms. In sum, these 
studies provide evidence which is against conventional wisdom that issuing firms 
opportunistically inflate reported earnings using earnings management.  
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The literature on earnings management in IPOs has almost exclusively focused on the pre-
issue years and the year of equity issuance. However, insiders in IPOs have also incentives to 
manage earnings around the lockup expiry period (Teoh et al., 1998a). Filling this gap, 
Wongsunwai (2012) examines the earnings management in IPOs around equity issuance as 
well as around the lockup expiration. He finds that IPOs engage in accrual and real activities 
management in period immediately preceding the expiry of lockup but this manipulation is 
concentrated in IPOs backed by lower quality VCs. Although, Wongsunwai (2012) 
investigates earnings management around lockup expiry, he does not relate length of lockup 
period to the level of earnings management either at time of IPO or expiry of lockup.  
3.7.2 Mitigating Factors in Earnings Management  
There is a growing body of literature examining the mitigating factors or restraints on 
earnings management by equity issuing firms. This literature has mainly focused on the role 
of financial intermediaries and other third parties (prestigious underwriters, VCs, reputed 
auditors etc.) involved in the IPO process and role of corporate governance mechanisms 
(independent boards, CEO duality, audit committees etc.) in issuing firms (Morsfield and Tan, 
2006, Lee and Masulis, 2011, Brau and Johnson, 2009, Chen et al., 2013, Klein, 2002, Osma, 
2008). We review below some of the evidence regarding the role of third party monitors in 
mitigating earnings management in IPOs.   
Morsfield and Tan (2006) analyse the earnings management differences between VC backed 
and non-VC backed sample of US IPOs. They find that VC presence is related to lower 
abnormal accruals in the year of IPO. Moreover, they also report that lower earnings 
management in VC backed IPOs partially explains the superior return performance in VC 
backed IPOs. Brau and Johnson (2009) relate earnings management in IPOs to the presence 
and prestige of VCs, underwriters, auditors and attorneys as third party certifiers. They show 
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that earnings management is negatively related to presence of reputed underwriters, attorneys, 
auditors and VCs.  Comparing the monitoring and signalling effect of reputed third party 
certifiers, they conclude that IPO firms select prestigious certifiers to signal their quality at 
IPO. In a related study, Lee and Masulis (2011) report that VC backing, in general, does not 
restrain earnings management in IPOs. However, they find that more reputable VCs and 
underwriters are associated with lower earnings management and matching reputed VCs and 
underwriters reduces earnings management even further. Wongsunwai (2012) finds similar 
results and reports that monitoring by high quality VCs restrains earnings management in 
IPOs and around lockup expiry. More recently, Chen et al. (2013) investigate impact of 
underwriter reputation on earnings management in Chinese IPOs. They find that reputed 
underwriters restrict pre-IPO earnings management in non-state owned enterprises issuers 
only. However, they fail to find any significant impact of underwriter reputation on earnings 
management in state owned enterprises. Consistent with the evidence from IPOs, Jo et al. 
(2007) find that underwriter reputation is negatively related to earnings management in SEOs 
and SEOs with more prestigious underwriters perform better in aftermarket compared to the 
SEOs with less prestigious underwriters even after controlling for the effect of earnings 
management.    
3.8 Conclusion  
This chapter offers a comprehensive review of both theoretical and empirical literature on IPO 
lockups, survival of IPOs, long-run performance of IPOs and earnings management in IPOs. 
Theoretical explanations for the use of lockups are briefly presented and discussed. 
Theoretical literature suggests two important motivations: signalling and commitment for the 
use of lockups but the empirical results in support of these arguments are not conclusive 
(Brau et al., 2005, Brav and Gompers, 2003). Moreover, the studies on lockups have mainly 
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used firms and issue characteristics at the time of IPO to test different motivations for the use 
of (longer) lockups. Regardless of the motivation for lockups, prior research agrees that 
longer lockups are beneficial for issuing firms at the time of IPO. We extend this literature 
and explore impact of lockup length on certain IPOs aspects which have not received 
attention in previous literature. More specifically, we relate lockup length to survival, long-
run performance and earnings management in IPOs. We add to the existing IPO and lockup 
literature by showing that lockup length is an important determinant of IPO survival, 
performance and earnings management.   
Review of literature in section 3.4 shows that evidence on survival of IPOs in UK is scant. 
Although, there have been couple of recent studies on UK market, they are exclusive to the 
AIM. There exists no study on survival of IPOs on Main Market of LSE which is one of the 
world’s largest and renowned stock markets. Moreover, research on IPO survival in US has 
focused on finding the determinants of survival or failure of IPOs on the markets. However, 
the survey of literature shows that these studies have completely ignored the possible impact 
of lockup length on post-IPO survival. Given the diverse nature and heterogeneity of lockups 
on Main Market of UK, lockup length could be an important determinant of aftermarket 
survival of IPOs. Longer lockup could have important implications for strategic decisions of 
managers, particularly, in early days of IPO and these decisions might be important for 
survival of firms in long-run. We attempt to fill this critical gap in literature by examining 
IPO survival in UK and relating it to lockup length in chapter 4 of this thesis. We make 
important contribution to the survival literature by providing evidence that lockup length is an 
important determinant of IPO survival in the long term.  
The long-run performance of IPOs has puzzled academic researchers since (Ibbotson and 
Jaffe, 1975) and this literature has grown considerably after the study of US IPOs by Ritter 
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(1991). Much of US literature documents that IPOs underperform in the long-run as 
evidenced in survey of literature in section 3.5.1. Although, studies on UK also provide 
evidence of long-run IPO underperformance, results from Main Market of UK are not 
conclusive. For example, Coakley et al. (2008) and Gregory et al. (2010) fail to find 
significant underperformance of IPOs listed on Main Market. These inconsistent results (in 
comparison to US and other markets in the world) are intriguing and warrant further 
investigation. Furthermore, research on determinants of long-run performance has largely 
ignored lockup length as a potential determinant. Given the lack of attention on the role of 
lockup length in IPO performance and intriguing evidence from LSE Main Market, we 
examine long-run performance of IPOs in relation to the length of lockup period in chapter 5. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature on IPO performance by identifying that lockup 
length serves as an important signal of post-IPO performance in addition to the existing 
signals such as VC backing, underwriter reputation etc.        
The survey of literature in section 3.6 reveals that there is ample empirical evidence to 
suggest that IPO firms engage in opportunistic earnings management through abnormal 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, literature on mitigating factors in earnings management has 
generally reported positive impact of presence and prestige of third party agents (VCs, 
underwriters, auditors and attorneys) involved in IPO process on restraining earnings 
management around IPOs. Other factors examined in prior studies in deterring earnings 
management include independent boards and audit committees (Klein, 2002, Osma, 2008),   
presence of institutional investors (Chung et al., 2002) and long-term institutional investors 
(Hsu and Koh, 2005). Moreover, apart from examining earnings management around IPOs, 
there has been limited investigation of earnings management around expiry of IPO lockups 
(Wongsunwai, 2012). However, research on earnings management and its mitigating factors 
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in IPOs has largely ignored the role of lockup length in restraining earnings management 
around IPO. We fill this gap in literature by examining the role of lockup length in deterring 
earnings management at the time of IPO in chapter 6 of this thesis.  We contribute to the 
earnings management literature by showing that lockup length could be an important factor in 
mitigating the opportunistic accruals management at the time of IPO.  
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Table 3.1 Evidence on Length of Lockup Period (in days) 
This table compiles the main studies on IPO lockups in US and UK. The lockup period is in number of 
days from the date of IPO. 
 
Country Study 
Sample 
Period 
Mean Median 
Unites States Aggarwal et al.(2002) 1994-1999 188 180 
 
Arthurs et al.(2009) 
1990-1994   
2001-2005 
220 - 
 
Bradley et al. (2001) 1988-1997 224 180 
 
Brau et al. (2004) 1988-1998 230 180 
 
Brau et al.(2005) 1988-1999 164 - 
 
Brav and Gompers (2003) 1988-1996 254 180 
 
Cao et al. (2004) 1995-1999 196 180 
 
Chen et al. (2012) 1988-2003 214 180 
 Field and Hanka (2001) 1988-1997 187 - 
 
Gao and Siddiqi (2012) 1989-2004 220 180 
 
Krishnamurti and Thong (2008) 1998-2000 181 180 
 
Martin (2011) 1996-2006 185 180 
 
Yung and Zender (2010) 1988-2006 218 180 
     
United Kingdom Ahmad and Jelic (2014), MM 1990-2006 468 395 
 
Espenlaub et al. (2001), MM* 1992-1998 561 730 
 
Hoque and Lasfer (2009), MM 
and AIM** 
1999-2006 391 365 
 
Hoque (2011) 
†
, MM and AIM  1999-2006 383-714 365-730 
* Main Market 
**Alternative Investment Market  
† Hoque (2011) reports means and medians for different types of lockups: Absolute, Relative, 
Staggered etc. The reported lockup days are range of mean and median lockup periods across 
different lockup types. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of International Evidence on IPO Long-Run Performance 
 
Country Study Period 
Sample 
Size 
Long-run Performance (%) 
      
 
3 Year   5 Year 
Australia Lee et al. (1996) 1976-1989 266 -51.3 -30.9 
Brazil Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1980-1990 62 -47.0 --- 
Canada Kooli and Suret (2004) 1991-1998 445 -9.4 19.2 
Chile Aggarwal et al. (1993) 1982-1990 36 -23.7 --- 
China Chan et al. (2004) 1993-1998 609 -19.77 --- 
France Luleux and Murzyka (1997) 1988-1992 56 -29.2 --- 
Germany Ljungqvist (1997) 1970-1993 180 -12.1 --- 
 
Stehle et al. (2000) 1960-1992 187 -5.0 --- 
Greece Thomadakis et al. (2012) 1994-2002 254 -31.4 --- 
Japan Cai and Wei (1997) 1971-1992 180 -27.0 --- 
Korea Kim et al. (1995) 1985-1988 169 +91.6 --- 
Malaysia Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) 1990-2000 454 -14.2 to 17.9 --- 
Spain Álvarez and González (2005) 1987-1997 52 -28.2 -21.0 
Sweden Loughran et al. (1994) 1980-1990 162 +1.2 --- 
Switzerland Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) 1983-1989 42 -6.1 --- 
 
Drobetz et al. (2005) 1983-2000 109 -1.7 -26.2 
Thailand Allen et al. (1999) 1985-1992 150 
+10.0 to 
+27.5 
--- 
Turkey Bildik and Yilmaz (2006) 1990-2000 244 -84.5 --- 
 
Kiymaz (2000) 1990-1995 163 +44.1 --- 
Not all studies mentioned in table have been discussed in the literature review. Moreover, some studies use 
range of benchmarks, different computational methods and equal as well as value weighting schemes. In 
these cases, the most representative results are shown in the table above.   
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CHAPTER 4 LOCKUP AGREEMENTS AND SURVIVAL OF IPO 
FIRMS7 
4.1 Introduction 
Going public firms are plagued by two major problems; information asymmetry and moral 
hazard at the time of IPOs. The higher uncertainty coupled with the potential agency problems 
results in higher discounts in offering prices and less wealth appropriation by IPO firms, 
which could be detrimental to their long term growth and survival. The issuing firms can 
signal their quality in a variety of ways.
8
 IPO lockup represents one of the signalling 
mechanisms and by agreeing to longer lockups, insiders can signal quality and survival 
prospects of their firms.    
Lockups prevent insiders of firms from selling whole or some percentage of their equity 
during a certain post-IPO period. Lockups are voluntary agreements between firms’ insiders 
and underwriters, yet evidence shows that most of the firms go public with lockups in US and 
UK
9
. Even for markets which require compulsory minimum lockups (France, Germany etc.), 
insiders’ lockup periods exceed the minimum required (Goergen et al., 2006b). The extant 
literature on the motivations of lockups suggests that lockups signal issuing firm’s quality and 
serve as a “commitment device” between insiders and outside investors. Not evidenced 
earlier, however, is the fact that lockups could predict long term survival of issuing firms.              
                                                 
7
 A revised version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (Ahmad and 
Jelic, 2014). 
8
 Quality signals might include; higher ownership retention (Leland and Pyle,1977), reputed underwriters (Carter 
and Manaster, 1990), backing by venture capital (Megginson and Weiss, 1991), reputable accounting firm 
(Titman and Trueman (1986), Michaely and Shaw (1995)), underpricing (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989) and 
voluntary earnings forecasts (Clarkson et al., 1992). 
9
 For US evidence see Field and Hanka (2001), Mohan and Chen (2001), Brav and Gompers (2003) and Yung 
and Zender (2010). For UK evidence see Espenlaub et al., (2001) and Hoque (2011). 
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A number of studies (Schultz, 1993; Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000; Hamza and 
Kooli, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2011; and Espenlaub et al., 2012) have examined the 
determinants of IPO survival. However, the question of whether lockup period affects or 
improves survival of IPOs has remained an unexplored area. In this study, we focus on the 
role of lockup length in the survival of 580 LSE Main Market IPOs during the period of 
January 1990 to December 2006. We report survival rates and delisting reasons for sample 
IPOs by tracking them until the end of December 2011. Our analysis utilizes hand collect data 
on the types and length of lockups committed by the issuing firms. Finally, we use survival 
analysis that enables us to investigate the determinants of IPO survival focusing on the length 
of lockups.  
We find that 69% of the sample firms survive for at least 5 years, and median survival time is 
92 months. We also find a relatively larger percentage of PEVC (Private Equity or Venture 
Capital) backed IPOs and use of absolute expiry (calendar dates or specific period) lockups 
after the bubble years of 1999-2000. Focusing on reasons of delisting, we find that mergers 
and acquisitions account for 25% out of 31% delisting (failure) rate across different delisting 
reasons during the first five years after IPO. Over the full sample and tracking period (1990-
2011), 56% of the firms were delisted due to mergers and acquisitions (M&A).     
The results suggest that firms going public with longer lockup periods exhibit higher survival 
rates (and times) in general. We find that lockup length is positively and significantly related 
to the survival of issuing firms. For instance, results from our sensitivity analysis show that a 
12 months increase in median lockup period increases the (median) survival time of sample 
firms by 24 months. Overall, the results lend support to our hypothesis that longer lockups 
improve the survival of issuing firms. Our results also suggest a significant negative impact of 
PEVC backing on the IPO survival. 
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Our research adds further weight to the strand of literature that argues that lockup length 
signals issuing firms’ quality and helps to reduce moral hazard in aftermarket.   
Rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we provide a summary of the 
related literature and develop testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 4.4 presents the univariate analysis and survival and delisting rates for 
sample IPOs. Estimation results for our main survival model are presented in section 4.5. In 
section 4.6, we test for robustness of our results and perform some further analysis. Finally, 
section 4.7 concludes the paper.    
4.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
There is an extensive body of literature (mainly focused on US markets) on the determinants 
of long term survival of IPOs
10
. There is, however, a notable paucity of research on survival 
of UK IPOs.  Recently, studies have examined the survival of UK buyouts and IPOs in 
different contexts. Jelic (2011) examines longevity of UK buyouts and  different exit routes 
including the IPO exits on both markets of LSE, but the study does not examine survival of 
buyouts after the IPO exit. Espenlaub et al. (2012) study IPOs on second board market, AIM, 
of LSE focusing on the role of Nomads (Nominated Advisors). Vismara et al.(2012) examine  
and compare financial performance and delistings of European’s second and main board 
markets including LSE. They briefly report the delisting activity and reasons for delistings 
among different countries, and between upper and lower tier markets. We study IPOs on main 
board market (Main Market) of LSE for following reasons. First, due to its higher and 
stringent listing requirements, Official List attracts more established and mature companies 
which are signinficantly different from young and growing companies usually listed on the 
                                                 
10
 For example, Schultz (1993), Hensler et al.(1997), Jain and Kini (2000), Demers and Joos (2007), Hamza and 
Kooli (2010) and Bhattacharya et al. (2011) study the survival of IPOs in the US. Simialrly, Chancharat et al. 
(2012) and Carpentier and Suret (2011) study IPOs on Austrailian and Canadian markets respectivley. 
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AIM. Second, although volunatry in nature, most of the IPOs on Main Marker go public with 
lockups in place. Moreover, lockups of Main Market IPOs are relatively longer and are more 
diverse in terms of their characteristics (Espenlaub et al., 2001).   However, IPO frims on 
AIM which have not been independent and earning revenues for atleast two years, are 
required to have compulsory lockups for related parties and employees.
11
 We therefore 
formulate empirical predictions for the determinants of IPO survival focusing on lockup 
length.  
4.2.1 IPO Lockup Length and Survival   
Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a signalling model and show that fraction of retained 
ownership by insiders conveys a quality signal to the outsiders. Insiders in high quality firms 
can retain greater fraction of ownership after IPO to show confidence in their firms. However, 
if the insiders can sell shares immediately after the IPO, ownership retention signal may not 
be credible (Gale and Stiglitz, 1989). Courteau (1995) uses length of holding period (lockup) 
as a signal of firm quality. The commitment to holding period complements the signal 
provided by retained ownership. Entrepreneurs also use longer lockups to add credibility to 
their earnings forecasts (Chong and Ho, 2007). A lockup is a costly mechanism because it 
comes at a cost of illiquidity and non-diversification on the part of insiders’ portfolios. Since 
the information about the true value of the firm will be revealed over a period of time after 
IPO, insiders will share the risk of negative information revelation during lockup period along 
with the investors. Lockup imposes penalty on insiders for hiding negative information about 
the value of firm and serves as a commitment mechanism to regulate insiders’ actions (Brav 
and Gompers, 2003). High quality firms with better growth prospects and survival may not 
find longer lockup periods problematic. Conversely, issuing firms with poor future prospects 
                                                 
11
 AIM Rule 7, where related parties include directors, substantial shareholder and their associates.   
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and lower quality may not afford to have such longer lockups because their low quality will 
be revealed during that period before they can cash out. 
Previous evidence supports the signalling role of lockups (Brau et al., 2005; Goergen et al., 
2006b; Bessler and Kurth, 2007; Arthurs et al., 2009). For example, Arthurs et al.(2009), for a 
sample of US venture IPOs find that lockup period acts as a signal of firm quality when other 
quality signals (venture capital backing, prestigious sponsor etc.) are not available. Moreover, 
they suggest that longer lockups help ventures with negative information to increase wealth 
appropriation at the time of IPO, which in turn could be critical for their future survival. Brav 
and Gompers (2003) and Yung and Zender (2010) suggest that higher quality firms are likely 
to accept longer lockups to reduce the agency problems of IPO.  
While most of the US studies report homogeneous and standardised lockups, evidence from 
other markets is not consistent. US studies have consistently reported average lockup period 
of 180 days (Field and Hanka, 2001; Mohan and Chen, 2001; Brau et al., 2004). The most 
significant differences in terms of lockup characteristics and length are, however, observed 
between US and UK markets. Espenlaub et al. (2001) report average lockup length of 561 
days for directors of issuing firms which is much higher compared to 180 days for US firms. 
Likewise, Hoque (2011) in a recent study of IPO lockups on both (Main and AIM) markets of 
LSE, reports heterogeneity in terms of lockup length and types. For example, the average 
lockup length varies from 383 days to 714 days among different lockup types for IPOs listed 
between years 1999 and 2006. The evidence presented so far clearly indicates that firms in 
UK go public with significantly longer lockups in place. 
Length of lockup may affect decision making of managers after the IPO depending on their 
locked equity stakes (Arthurs et al., 2009). Jain and Kini (2008) find that strategic investment 
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decisions like the extent of R&D spending, capital expenditure and advertising at the time of 
IPO affect the post-issue operating performance and survival of the IPO firms. Similarly, 
strategic decisions in early post-IPO period by managers, particularly in the areas of resource 
expansion, significantly affect survival of issuing firms (Chandy and Sivasubramaniam, 
2011). It is suggested that the post-IPO strategic decisions of inside managers with longer 
lockups may have positive impact on performance and survival of IPOs. Given the significant 
role of lockup length at the time of IPO and post-IPO period, we hypothesise that IPO 
survival is positively related to lockup length.  
4.2.2 Control Variables 
Section 3.4.2 of chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the determinants of IPO survival 
identified in previous studies. We briefly review these determinants here and control for them 
in our analysis.  
Prior literature generally suggests a positive impact of size and age of issuing firm on its post-
IPO performance and survival (Schultz, 1993, Demers and Joos, 2007, Jain and Kini, 1999a, 
Ritter, 1991). Larger firms have less information asymmetry and more resources to deal with 
difficult market conditions. Moreover, firms with long operating history are less speculative 
and more established compared to newer firms. Insider ownership retention and underpricing 
have been suggested as the signals of quality (Leland and Pyle, 1977, Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989).  Hensler et al. (1997)  show that higher underpricing and insider equity retention have 
a positive effect on survival of IPOs in aftermarket. Previous literature shows that high quality 
underwriters bring better quality companies to market which are likely to have better 
performance and higher survival following the IPO (Carter et al., 1998, Demers and Joos, 
2007, Bhattacharya et al., 2011). Companies going public in hot issue markets are likely to 
perform poorly and have higher failure rates (Ritter, 1991, Demers and Joos, 2007, Kooli and 
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Meknassi, 2007). Likewise, issuing firms with higher levels of debt face more financial 
constraints and are more likely to delist (Bhattacharya et al., 2010, Chancharat et al., 2012, 
Kashefi Pour and Lasfer, 2013). Literature also shows that backing by VC and/or PE is also 
an important determinant of IPO survival; however, the results are not consistent. On one 
hand, VC backed IPOs are likely to have better survival profile due the certification, better 
monitoring and value added by VC/PE investors (Jain and Kini, 2000, Bhattacharya et al., 
2011, Chou et al., 2013). On the other hand, due to short term focus and agency conflicts of 
VCs, IPOs backed by VCs may experience higher failure rates (Chancharat et al., 2012). 
Moreover, VC backing may be a signal of quality which could attract acquirers leading to 
higher delisting rates for VC backed IPOs due to mergers and acquisitions (Vismara et al., 
2012, Kooli and Meknassi, 2007). Finally, consistent with Hensler et al. (1997) and 
Espenlaub et al. (2012), we also control for industry sectors. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data and Sample Construction 
Our sample consists of IPOs on LSE Main Market between January 1990 and December 
2006. LSE is the Europe’s biggest and one of the world’s largest stock markets. For example, 
LSE in year 2005 only, saw 354 IPOs with offering value of €18.6bn, more than the US 
exchanges combined.
12
 The data for IPO activity from 1998-2006 is available from LSE 
website. LSE data includes firm names, issue price, market capitalisation on admission, 
industry and admission date. For IPOs between 1990 and 1997, we begin with listings in 
Thomson One Banker and Perfect Filings database during the period. We find 724 IPOs on 
                                                 
12
 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006), ‘IPO Watch Europe—Review of the year 2005’   
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Main Market excluding IPOs on USM and AIM.
13
 Panel A of Table 2.2 describes the filters 
we use to construct our final sample of IPOs.  We exclude investment trusts, venture capital 
trusts (VCTs), privatisations, re-admissions, non-UK firms and firms with missing data and 
IPO prospectuses. This leaves us with a final sample of 378 IPOs during 1990-1997
14
. 
According to the LSE data, 686 IPOs were listed on Official List during the period of 1998-
2006. We repeat the same filtration process as earlier to get a final sample of 202 IPOs during 
1998-2006. Our final sample consists of 580 IPOs for the whole period of 1990-2006. We use 
Perfect Filings to collect IPO prospectuses. We hand collect most of our variable from the 
prospectuses including lockup information, sponsors, insider ownership, incorporation date 
(for calculating age of firm), market capitalisation, industry and PEVC backing. For relative 
expiry lockups, we use Perfect Filings to find the corporate announcement dates and the exact 
lockup expiry.
15
 The data for initial returns is obtained from DataStream. The dates and 
reasons of delisting of IPOs are obtained from London Share Price Database (LSPD). The 
dates and delisting reasons of sample IPOs are further cross-referenced with Perfect Filings 
database.
16
   
Out of full sample, 517 (89%) IPOs have lockups in place for at least one class of 
shareholders.  However, IPOs in certain industry sectors before year 2000 were subject to 
compulsory lockups if they do not meet certain criteria.
17
  
Panel B of Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. Sample IPOs have an 
average lockup length of 15.39 months (468 days) and lockup length is measured as the 
                                                 
13
 Gregory et al. (2010) report 629 IPOs excluding investment trusts, financial trusts and banks on the Official 
List for the same time period 1990-1997.  
14
 Our sample for period 1990-1997 is comparable to Coakley et al. (2007), who report 327 sample IPOs for 
1990-1997 after the similar filtration process.     
15
 In case of  relative lockup expiry, the expiry date of lockup is specified in relation to other company events 
like announcement of  results, publication of accounts etc. (Espenlaub et al.,2001) 
16
 We also use UK IPO data from Jelic (2011).   
17
 For details, see Espenlaub et al.(2001) p.1242   
77 
 
difference between IPO date and lockup expiration date. However, there is substantial 
variation in lockup length across sample firms with a minimum lockup of 2 months and a 
maximum of 41 months. This provides support to our earlier discussion in chapter 3 which 
shows lockups in UK are quite diverse and heterogeneous in terms of their length. The 
average size (market capitalisation) of IPO firms at the time of listing is £259.16m. There is 
also a large variation in terms of the market capitalisation of IPOs with a minimum of just 
£1.05m and a maximum of £7725m. Firms list with an average age of 17.36 years at the time 
of IPO, where age is defined as number of years between the IPO date and the date company 
was established.
18
 The oldest firm was established about 102 years before the IPO. The 
issuing firms experience average initial returns of 11.18% during the sample period. Insiders 
retain an average (median) of 24.71% (19.79%) of the post-IPO equity stake in sample issuing 
firms. The average market share of sponsors, measured as a percentage of total IPOs 
underwritten, is 2.99% with a maximum of 15.38%. PEVC backed IPOs are 51.4% of the 
total sample. The average initial return of all IPOs in three months prior to the firm’s IPO 
month is 13.32% with the highest return of 64.42% exhibited in first quarter of year 2000. 
Sample IPOs have a mean leverage ratio of 0.37.  
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
Table 4.3 breaks down IPO frequency by year of listing and by industry (based on FTSE 
Global Classification System). The IPO frequency fluctuates greatly across the sample period. 
The highest percentage (18%) of IPOs was listed in year 1994. Moreover, 71% of the IPOs 
are listed between 1990 and 1998 and listing activity falls after the bubble period of 1999-
                                                 
18
 We take company establishment date as reported in the “introduction/historical background” section of the 
prospectus.  
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2000.
19
 Most of our sample IPOs originated from Cyclical Services (general retailers, support 
services, Leisure and hotels, media and transport) and Information Technology industries. 
IPOs from Cyclical Services consistently show higher proportions across the sample years. 
IPOs in Information Technology are, however, clustered in years 1994 and 2000. Cyclical 
Services, Information technology and Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods jointly share about 61% 
of the sample IPOs.  
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
4.3.2 Methodology 
A number of studies have used survival analysis for studying post-IPO survival and 
determinants of long term survival of issuing firms (Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000 
& 2008; Carpentier and Suret, 2011, Jelic, 2011; and Espenlaub et al., 2012). Survival 
analysis is preferred over the conventional statistical methods (linear regression, binary 
dependent variable models etc.) due to a number of benefits. For example, ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression cannot handle censored observations, which is a unique 
characteristic of survival data (Jenkins, 2005). Censoring occurs when the event of interest 
(delisting of IPOs) has not yet occurred by the end of study or experiment. In our case, sample 
IPOs which are still trading (listed) by the end of December 2011 are right censored. 
Moreover, the binary dependent regression models (logit, probit etc.) do not take into account 
the timing of the events (when the event for each observation occurs). On the other hand, 
survival analysis not only allows for censoring and different time horizons, it can also handle 
the time dependent variables. 
                                                 
19
 This is partly due to exclusion of a large number of IPOs of Investment trusts, VCTs, ADRs and non-UK firms 
for the period 1998-2006 as detailed in Panel-A of Table 2. 
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In our analysis, survivors are defined as the IPO firms which remain listed on the market or 
transfer to another market. Consistent with this definition, non-survivors are IPOs which are 
delisted from the market due to administration/liquidation, mergers and acquisitions, 
permanent suspension or any other reasons. Our decision to treat market transfers as survivors 
is consistent with Espenlaub et al. (2012) and Vismara et al. (2012). On the other hand, 
treating mergers and acquisitions as non-survivors is also consistent with Jain and Kini (2000) 
and Chancharat et al. (2012), although M&A may not always be a negative delisting or death. 
The survival rates of the sample IPOs are estimated using the Kaplan-Meier (KM) method. 
The KM estimator is a non-parametric maximum likelihood method and is defined as (see 
Clark et al.,2003)    
𝑆(𝑡𝑗) = 𝑆(𝑡𝑗−1) (1 −
𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
)     (4.1) 
Where 𝑆(𝑡𝑗) is the probability of being listed at time (month)  𝑡𝑗 , 𝑆(𝑡𝑗−1) is the probability of 
being listed at time 𝑡𝑗−1, 𝑛𝑗  is the number of IPOs listed just before the time 𝑡𝑗 (also called 
risk set at 𝑡𝑗 ), 𝑑𝑗 is the number of IPOs delisted at time 𝑡𝑗.  
We use log rank test for testing the statistical differences in KM survival curves between 
various groups (across issue years and industries) and subsamples (lockup length). We also 
compare the median survival times across different groups and subsamples. Median survival 
time is the point in time at which survival probability is 0.5 (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). 
Clark et al. (2003) state that median survival time is the widely used measure instead of mean 
as survival data are often skewed and rarely normally distributed.  In context of our analysis, 
median survival time is the time in months when cumulative survival rate for sample IPOs has 
dropped to 50% (half of the IPOs have been delisted).  Following Espenlaub et al. (2012), we 
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use minimum survival time when the median survival time cannot be estimated (when 
cumulative survival rate stays above 50% by the end of study period).    
Although we use parametric (models that allow hazard to change over time) survival model as 
our main model for analysis, we also show robustness of our results by using semi-parametric 
(models with a constant hazard rate) model. Our survival model is implemented in the 
Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) form, which assumes that the effect of predictors is 
multiplicative on the survival time. The model is commonly expressed in log-linear form with 
respect to survival time as (see Bradburn et al.,2003)   
Ln(Tj) = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ⋯ + βpXp + εj    (4.2) 
where 𝛽0, … , 𝛽𝑝 are parameters to be estimated, 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑝 are covariates, and 𝜀𝑗 is the error 
term with a specific distributional form which determines the regression model. AFT models 
being the parametric models require specific underlying distribution (weibull, gamma, 
lognormal etc.).  Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) can be used to distinguish between 
different non-nested parametric models (Allison, 2010). The likelihood-ratio test or Wald test 
can be used to discriminate between the nested models. We compare different parametric 
models based on the AIC and the results show that lognormal is most appropriate model with 
the lowest AIC value
20
.   
AFT models measure the direct effect of covariates on survival time which makes the 
interpretation of results easier because the parameters measure the effect of covariates on the 
median survival time. In AFT models the covariate effects are assumed to be multiplicative 
and constant on the time scale; the covariate impacts on survival time by a constant 
                                                 
20
 The AIC values for exponential, Weibull, lognormal, log-logistic and generalised gamma models are 1323.17, 
1266.55, 1219.72, 1224.56 and 1222.02 respectively.  
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(acceleration) factor. Survival time is extended or contracted by the relative constant factor. 
The marginal effect of the covariates is measured by the exponentiated coefficients,exp(𝛽𝑖), 
called time ratios. A positive coefficient on covariate implies a time ratio of greater than 1 and 
means that increase in covariate prolongs the survival time (time to delisting). On the other 
hand a negative coefficient on the covariate results in a time ratio below 1 and indicates that 
increase in covariate is associated with lower survival time (delisting occurs quickly).   
We estimate the following specific model where natural logarithm of the time to delist 
(survival time) is presented as a linear function of the covariates: 
Ln(Tj) = β0 + β1𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + β2𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + β3𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + β4𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 +
                       β5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + β6𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + β7𝐻𝑜𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 +
                              β8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  β9 𝑃𝐸𝑉𝐶 + β10 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + εj (4.3) 
Where Ln(Tj) is natural logarithm of time to delisting or survival time and covariates are as 
defined in Table 4.1. Lockup Period is the length of lockup measured in months from date of 
IPO to lockup expiry date.  Ln (Size) is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO 
at offering price in £millions. Ln (Age) is natural logarithm of the number of years between 
IPO date and the date company was established. Initial Return is the difference of first day 
closing price and offer price as percentage of offer price. Insider Ownership is the percentage 
of post-IPO equity retained by the firms’ insiders. Sponsor Reputation for each sponsor is 
measured as the number of IPOs sponsored in the year prior to the IPO as a percentage of 
total IPOs in that year. PEVC is a dummy variable coded one for IPOs backed by PE or VC 
and zero otherwise. Hot Issue Returns is a proxy for market hotness and is defined as the 
average of initial returns of all IPOs issued in three months prior to the month of IPO. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities divided by the sum of total assets and IPO proceeds. 
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We include dummies for industry sectors based on the FTSE Global Classification as outlined 
in Table 4.1 using “non-cyclical services” sector as the base.    
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Characteristics of Sample Firms and Lockup Types 
The numbers and percentages of PEVC backed IPOs and the types of lockups across sample 
years are provided in panel A and B of Table 4.4. According to Panel A, PEVC backed IPOs 
range from 40% to 66% of the total sample during the years 1990-2000. However, the 
percentage of PEVC backed IPOs remains comparatively higher from year 2001 onwards 
with a peak of 94% in the year 2004.  Panel B shows the types of lockups at the time of IPO. 
We distinguish between three types of lockups; absolute date expiry, relative date expiry and 
combination of both types. As discussed in chapter 2, absolute date expiry lockups are set in 
terms of clear calendar dates or fixed period of time after IPO and usually provide the exact 
length of the lockup. Lockups with relative expiry dates specify the expiry in relation to some 
corporate events of the company such as announcements of results or publication of company 
accounts etc. Finding the exact lockup period and expiry date in case of relative expiry date 
lockups is difficult, if not impossible.
21
 The third type is a combination of the other two types 
and may spread over more than one period (staggered lockup). Analysis from panel B 
indicates notable difference in the use of absolute and relative date expiry lockups in years 
before and after 2000. Lockups with relative expiry dates are popular choice in the years 
1990-1999, accounting for 33% to 95% of all lockups types. However, issuing firms 
increasingly use absolute lockups or combined lockups from year 2000 onwards. For instance, 
                                                 
21
  We first collect the type of relative event (corporate announcement) of relative date lockups from the IPO 
prospectus and then use PI Navigator to find the exact date of that event to find the length of lockup period.  
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all lockups in year 2003 and 75% of the lockups in years 2005 and 2006 are with absolute 
expiry dates.   
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
4.4.2 Survival Rates and Times  
The cumulative survival rates for 1 to 5 post-IPO years across listing years and industry 
sectors are shown in Table 4.5 (panel A and B) along with the median survival time. Results 
for full sample are presented in panel C. This table is based on Kaplan Meier (KM) method 
which is a non-parametric approach of survival analysis (discussed in methodology section). 
The 1 year survival rate for sample IPOs is 99% which falls to 69% after 5 years of listing. 
This translates into a 31% delisting rate after 5 years of IPO and is comparable to the recent 
findings of (Vismara et al., 2012) who report 5 year delisting rates of 20-28% for Europe’s 
main markets. The survival rates across listing years also vary considerably. 1-year survival 
rates remain 100% except for years 1994, 1999 and 2000. The lowest survival rates are 
observed for firms listed in year 2001 with half of the IPOs delisted by 5
th
 year after the 
listing. Firms listed in years 2002 and 1991 have the highest survival rates at 93% and 89% 
respectively. However, the differences in survival rates across years are statistically 
insignificant (chi
2
:20.52, p-value: 0.198). The survival rates across industries show relatively 
less variation with minimum 5 year survival rate of 62% for Non-Cyclical Services. Highest 
survival rate of 76% is observed for the Resources sector. However, similar to the issue years, 
survival rates across industry sectors are also insignificant with a chi
2
 value of 4.71 (p-value: 
0.789).
22
  
                                                 
22
 We conduct Log Rank test for testing equality of survival rates. The log rank test (a large sample chi-square 
test) uses the observed and expected failure over the comparison groups (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005).   
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The last column of Table 4.5 shows median survival time for full sample (panel C); across 
issue years (panel A) and industry sectors (panel B). Median survival time is widely used 
measure in survival analysis and means the time at which the survival probability is 0.5. The 
median survival time for our sample IPOs is 92 months (half of the IPOs survive for 92 
months or less). The median survival time, however, varies substantially across the listing 
years. Similar to the lowest survival rates, the median survival time is lowest for IPOs issued 
in year 2001. Firms listed in year 1991 experience the highest median survival time where 
50% of the firms survive for 136 months or less. We report minimum survival times for years 
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006 where the delisting probability has not dropped below 0.5 by the 
end of study period (December 2011). Comparison of the median survival time across 
industries shows that the highest survival time of 155 months is observed for “Resources” 
while firms in “Non-Cyclical Services” experience the lowest survival time of 79 months.   
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
Table 4.6 shows a break-down of survival rates and time by different lockup lengths. Panel A 
divides lockup length in two groups; lockups greater than median and lockups less than 
median length. The survival rates and median survival times are reported across different 
industry sectors over the two lockup length groups. IPOs with lockups greater than median 
exhibit consistently higher 1, 3 and 5-yaer survival rates compared to the IPOs with lockups 
less than median. For instance, 5-year survival rate for IPOs with lockups greater than median 
lockup is 72 % relative to 67% for IPOs with lockups less than median. Similarly, survival 
rates for IPOs with lockups greater than median are higher for most of the industry sectors 
relative to IPOs with lockups less than median. The median survival time of 87 months for 
IPOs with lockups lower than median is less than 92 months reported for IPOs with lockups 
greater than median. Panel B provides survival rates and times of full sample over three 
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different lockup lengths; up to 12 months, 13 to 24 months and lockups greater than 24 
months. Consistent with the results in Panel A, survival rates are consistently higher for IPOs 
with longer lockup lengths. For instance, IPOs with lockups greater than 24 months 
experience 5-year survival rate of 77% which is higher than 67% observed for IPOs with 
lockups up to 12 months. Comparing the median survival time, we find that IPOs with 
lockups greater than 24 months have 52 months higher median survival time compared to 
IPOs with lockups up to 12 months (140 vs. 88). The log rank test also rejects the equality of 
survival rates across three lockup length groups at 5% significance level. Overall, results from 
table 4.6 lend strong support to our hypothesis that longer lockups are positively related to 
IPO survival. 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
4.4.3 Delisting Reasons and Failure Rates     
In Table 4.7, we report delisting reasons across different industry sectors over two time 
periods. Panel- A shows the numbers and percentages of survivors and delisted firms across 
different delisting reasons and industry sectors during the first five years after the IPO. Panel-
B gives the numbers and percentages of survivors and delisted firms over the full sample and 
tracking period of 1990-2011.  Survivors are the firms that continue to trade as of December 
31, 2011 or transfer to other markets (exclusively to AIM in our case). The main delisting 
reasons are Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A), Administration/Liquidation (including 
receivership and voluntary liquidations) and other delisting reasons (permanent 
suspension/cancellation of trading, other reasons etc.) Out of overall 31% delisting (failure) 
rate, M&A accounts for 25% within 5 years after the IPOs. Only 32% of all the firms listed on 
LSE Main Market during 1990-2006 are still listed by the end of December 2011.  
Administration/liquidation, receivership and cancellations account for just 6% of the delisting 
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rate during first 5 years after IPO and 12% for the full sample period. Lowest M&A delistings 
are observed for the “Resources” sector. A relatively higher percentage of firms in non-
cyclical services sector are delisted due to administration/liquidation compared to the other 
sectors. Over the full sample years, more than 60% of the firms in Basic Industries and 
Financial sectors are delisted due to M&As.  
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
Table 4.8 exhibits failure rates across delisting reasons and different lockup periods.  Panel A 
shows 1, 3 and 5-year failure rates across different delisting reasons for IPOs with lockups 
greater than and less than median lockup length. Panel B displays failure rates for three 
categories of lockup lengths; up to 12 months, 13 to 24 months and lockups greater than 24 
months across different delisting types. The 1, 3 and 5 year post-IPO failure rates due to 
mergers and acquisitions are not much different across various lengths of lockup, although 
failure rates decrease with increase in the length of lockup. However, there are striking 
differences in failure rates for more negative delisting reasons (administration/ liquidations 
and other delisting).  The failure rates for longer lengths of lockup are consistently lower than 
the failure rates for shorter lockups across the administration/ liquidations and other delisting 
reasons. For example, none of the IPOs with lockups longer than 24 months were delisted due 
to administration/ liquidations and other delisting reasons. These results provide further 
support to our conjecture that longer lockups signal firm’s quality and better survival 
prospects of the issuing firms.         
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
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4.4.4 Univariate Analysis of Survivors and Non-Survivors     
Table 4.9 provides univariate analysis and comparison of survivors and non-survivors. 
Although the average lockup length of survivor IPOs is higher by 0.689 months (about 21 
days) as compared to the Non-Survivors, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, both survivors and   non-survivors have the same median lockup period. The 
survivor IPOs are much larger in terms of their size (measured as market capitalisation at 
offering price) in comparison to the non-survivor IPOs and the differences in their means and 
medians are highly significant. The survivor IPOs have higher age, higher initial returns and 
higher levels of insider ownership compared to the non-survivors but the differences are not 
statistically significant. The leverage levels and proxies for sponsor reputation and hot issue 
markets are similar and statistically insignificant across the survivor and non-survivor IPOs.  
However, there is a higher proportion of PEVC backed IPOs among the non-survivors 
compared to the survivors and the differences are highly significant, showing a negative 
impact of PEVC backing on the post IPO survival. The only significant industry effect is in 
Resources sector where a higher percentage is among the survivors. Although Table 4.7 
shows higher survival rates and times for lockups with longer periods, the differences 
between survivors and non-survivors are not significant in terms of lockup length in Table 
4.9.       
[Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
Table 4.10 shows correlations between the variables used in the survival regressions. The 
survival/longevity of the IPO firms is positively and significantly correlated with the lockup 
length. The survival time is also positively correlated with the age and insider ownership of 
the issuing firms. The negative correlation between the leverage, PEVC, hot issue returns and 
sponsor reputation  suggest shorter survival for IPOs with higher levels of leverage, issued in 
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hot market periods and backed by PEVC and reputed sponsors. Although there are significant 
correlations between some of the variables, the correlations are not high enough to cause the 
problem of multicollinearity.    
[Insert Table 4.10 about here] 
4.5 Multivariate Analysis-Determinants of Survival  
In this section we discuss determinants of IPOs based on our survival analysis. We employ 
Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model with lognormal density distribution as the baseline 
survival function based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The estimation results 
from the AFT model are presented in Table 4.11. We present both the coefficient estimates 
and the time ratios along with the associated p-values. Time ratios are the exponentiated 
coefficients, exp (β), where β is the coefficient in AFT model. A time ratio or “acceleration 
factor” has the effect of stretching or contracting the survival time as a function of changes in 
covariates. A time ratio of above (below) one for an independent variable would mean a 
positive (negative) impact on the time to delist (survival time). Overall, our model exhibits 
reasonable explanatory power, measured by pseudo R
2
 and statistically significant likelihood 
ratio.  
4.5.1 Lockup Length           
The results from Table 4.11 show a positive impact of lockup period on survival time. The 
coefficient of lockup variable is positive and highly significant with a p-value of 0.006. The 
time ratio of 1.020 associated with lockup period means that for one unit (a month) increase in 
lockup period, survival time increases by a factor of 1.020 or by 2%. The results provide 
strong support for our hypothesis that longer lockups predict better survival of IPOs in the 
aftermarket.  
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4.5.2 Results for Control Variables 
The results regarding IPO size and its impact on post IPO survival are in with line prior 
literature which suggests that larger IPOs are likely to survive longer and have higher survival 
rates. We find a beneficial but small effect of size on aftermarket survival in line with widely 
documented size effect in earlier studies (Ritter, 1991; Schultz, 1993). A one percent increase 
in the size of IPO increases the survival time by a mere 0.1 %. Age of firm at the time of IPO 
has positive and significant impact on survival of issuing firms. Post issue survival time 
increases by 0.12% for one percent increase in the age of firm. The coefficient of initial 
returns shows a positive sign but it is statistically insignificant. Higher ownership retention by 
the insiders positively affects the survival of IPOs. However, the coefficient is weakly 
statistically significant with a small effect on survival; a one percent increase in insider 
ownership increases survival time by 0.4%. The insignificant coefficient of sponsor reputation 
shows that underwriter reputation does not affect survival and this result is not consistent with 
recent evidence by Bhattacharya et al. (2011) and Espenlaub et al.(2012) for US and UK AIM 
IPOs. The coefficient of hot issue returns is negative and statistically significant. The survival 
time decreases by 0.8% for a one percent increase in the hot issue returns. The results also 
show a negative but statistically insignificant effect of leverage on IPO survival. Surprisingly, 
we find that backing by PEVC significantly reduces the survival time of the issuing firms. 
The estimated time ratio for the variable PEVC is 0.826 which indicates that the survival time 
for IPOs backed by PEVC reduces by around 17.4% compared to IPOs without PEVC 
backing. Similarly, results from our marginal analysis suggest that predicted median survival 
time decreases by 18 months for PEVC backed compared to non-PEVC backed IPOs at 
means of all other variables. These results are counterintuitive and inconsistent with the 
earlier findings. Our results are partly in line with the finding of Kooli and Meknassi (2007) 
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and Vismara et al. (2012) who show that PEVC backed IPOs have higher probability of being 
acquired and delisted.
23
 PEVC backed firms may be more attractive to potential acquirers due 
to the positive impact of PEVC backing. An alternate explanation could be the short term 
focus and grandstanding (Gompers, 1996) by the PEVC providers which may be deleterious 
for the survival. For example, Jelic (2011) shows that a significant number of PE backed 
buyouts in UK exit early via IPOs. Our results, however, contradict with the findings of Jain 
and Kini (2000) for US IPOs.  
Lastly, we find positive and significant (although weak) industry effect on survival time of 
issuing firms in Resources sector which have much higher survival probability compared to 
the firms in base category of Non-Cyclical Services. These results are supported by our earlier 
analysis in Table 4.5 and 4.7. The results about significant industry effects are consistent with 
the findings reported in Hensler et al.(1997) and Carpentier and Suret (2011) for US and 
Canada respectively.  
Summing up, the results of survival analysis show that IPO firms with longer lockups have 
higher probability to survive and longer survival times. The positive effect of size, age and 
insider ownership and negative impact of hot markets on IPO survival is consistent with the 
earlier survival studies. Interestingly, firms backed by PEVC have shorter survival times and 
are likely to delist earlier than the non-PEVC backed firms. We fail to find significant impact 
of sponsor reputation on the post IPO survival. Our results regarding the impact of PEVC and 
sponsor reputation on IPO survival are rather counterintuitive and inconsistent with earlier 
UK evidence reported by Coakley et al. (2009). 
[Insert Table 4.11 about here] 
                                                 
23
 This is plausible as most of the delistings in our sample are due to mergers and acquisitions.  
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4.5.3 Sensitivity of Survival Time Due to Changes in Lockup Length  
Next, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the predicted median survival time in response to 
changes in lockup period based on the coefficient estimates from table 4.11. The results of 
sensitivity or simulations of survival time are reported in table 4.12. The table shows expected 
survival time, absolute change in months and percentage change in expected survival time 
when median lockup period changes first by one month and then by quarterly intervals up to 
twelve months. We evaluate predicted survival time at median (13 months) of lockup and 
means of all other variables resulting in a base median survival time of 89 months after IPO.
24
 
All changes to survival time are calculated relative to this base survival time.  
The results show a significant impact of increase in lockup period on survival time. An 
increase of 12 months in the median lockup length causes an increase of 24 months in the post 
IPO survival time (median survival time increases from 89 to 113 months). This translates 
into about 27% increase in the median survival time of the issuing firms. Similarly a decrease 
of 12 months in the median lockup length causes a 21% decline in the median survival time. 
Similar but stronger results were observed when mean instead of median of the lockup period 
was used in the analysis.       
 [Insert Table 4.12 about here] 
4.6 Robustness of Results 
4.6.1 Constant Hazard, Heterogeneity and Clustering 
In order to check robustness of our results, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model with 
the same covariates. Cox model makes no assumption about the underlying statistical 
distribution and the baseline hazard function is estimated non-parametrically. Table 4.13 
                                                 
24
  The analysis was conducted using the “margins” command in Stata 12. 
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shows that our main results remain robust to the choice of Cox model except the insider 
ownership variable and Resources sector which are no more statistically significant. We also 
account for unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) in our model which may have been caused by 
omitted variables or measurement errors (Jenkins, 2005). The introduction of frailty in 
survival model takes into account the fact that all the issuing firms in our sample might not be 
homogenous in terms of their delisting hazard. We re-estimate our AFT model with frailty 
which is introduced as an unobservable multiplicative effect and the results are reported in 
Table 4.14.Again, we find that our results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the 
ones reported earlier in Table 4.11.
25
 We also consider our results adjusting for cluster 
standard errors as we have high number of IPOs in some of the sample years. The results of 
cluster adjusted AFT model are presented in Table 4.15 and are robust to clustering based on 
IPO frequency in different years.  
[Insert Table 4.13 about here] 
[Insert Table 4.14 about here] 
[Insert Table 4.15 about here] 
4.6.2 Institutional Changes Regarding Compulsory Lockups 
Firms in certain industry sectors were required to have compulsory lockups for listing on LSE 
prior to year 2000. For example, directors and other senior employees of mineral companies 
with less than three years of trading history were subject to compulsory lockups for two years 
after the IPO. Similar restrictions were applicable to scientific research based companies 
between years 1993 and 2000. Lockups are not obligatory for these companies since January 
                                                 
25 
The p-value for likelihood ratio test of H0: θ =0 is 0.145, where θ is frailty parameter.   
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2000 but they have to include a statement in their prospectus about lockups.
26
 We, therefore, 
test for robustness of our results to the institutional changes in lockup requirements. First, we 
exclude mineral and scientific research based companies floated before year 2000 from our 
sample and results are presented in Table 4.16. Second, we exclude all companies with exact 
two years of lockups from our sample and present results in Table 4.17. Our main inferences 
are robust to excluding both types of sample firms.          
[Insert Table 4.16 about here] 
[Insert Table 4.17 about here] 
4.6.3 Alternative Measurement of Explanatory Variables 
Next we check the robustness of results to different measurements and definitions of some of 
the explanatory variables. A number of studies have reported positive impact of sponsor 
(underwriter) reputation on the long term performance and survival of IPOs (Carter et al., 
1998; Bhattacharya et al., 2011). However, we find this variable to be insignificant in our 
analysis. We use different variations of our proxy for measuring sponsor reputation. First, we 
employ a measure of sponsor reputation similar to the one used by Jelic (2011) for PE firm 
reputation. The sponsor reputation is calculated as equally weighted average of rank scores 
based on the (i) number of IPOs sponsored and (ii) the amount sponsored in £ millions during 
the sample period as a lead sponsor. Sponsor Reputation is a dummy variable coded one for 
IPOs sponsored by the Top10 sponsors and zero otherwise. Second, we follow the sponsor 
reputation measure used by Derrien and Kecskés (2007) for UK market which includes the 15 
                                                 
26
 Similar rules are applicable to innovative high growth companies since January 2000. For a detail of 
regulatory changes regarding compulsory lockups, see Espenlaub et al.(2001)  pp.1242-1243 
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global investments banks.
27
 Our results are economically and statistically robust to the new 
measures of sponsor reputation as shown in Table 4.18. 
 [Insert Table 4.18 about here] 
4.6.4 Logistic Regression Estimation 
Finally, as discussed in the methodology section, although binary dependant regression 
models (logit or probit) predict the failure event, these models do not account for the time at 
risk. We use survival models as our main method of analysis, however, in order to compare 
our results with alternative econometric techniques; we use binary logistic regression with the 
same variables as used in our main model 4.3. In case of logistic regression, dependant 
variable is a dummy variable coded one for firms delisted within 5 years after listing and zero 
otherwise. Results of logistic regression are presented in Table 4.19. Consistent with our 
earlier results, lockup length is significantly negatively related to the probability of delisting 
within 5 years following the IPO. The results regarding the control variables are also similar 
to the previous results in survival models.   
In conclusion, our main results in Table 4.11 are robust to variations in econometric 
techniques, various survival models and measurement of variables.   
4.7 Conclusion 
Prior research has documented a positive impact of lockup agreements in the going public 
process. The empirical evidence suggests that lockups can signal quality of issuers and help to 
reduce the moral hazard problem. The innovative aspect of our study is that it explores the 
relationship between lockups and the survival likelihood of IPO firms. We argue that lockup 
characteristics at the time of going public have the potential to influence the time and 
                                                 
27
 For details of Global Investment Banks, refer to Derrien and Kecskes (2007), footnote 11, p. 460  
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occurrence of post-issue failure. Survival is the primary aim of firms and represents an 
unambiguous metric of performance (Chancharat et al., 2012). Using firm survival as our 
performance measure, we focus on the role of lockup length in explaining the post-IPO firm 
survival. We control for a number of other determinants of IPO survival identified in 
literature.     
We find that 5 year survival rate for our sample IPOs is 69% and the median survival time is 
92 months. The survival time and rates vary significantly across different lockup lengths and 
firms with longer lockups have higher survival rates and durations in general. Our analysis of 
the delisting rates of sample firms reveals that mergers and acquisitions account for the 25% 
of the 31% failure (delisting) rate during the first five years after the IPO. Over the full 
sample period of 1990-2006, 56% of the firms were delisted due to mergers and acquisitions. 
Administrations and liquidations, considered to be more negative delistings, only account for 
4% of the firms delisted within 5 years after the IPO.     
Our empirical results, utilising the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model, indicate a 
statistically and economically significant effect of lockup length on the post-issue survival of 
IPOs. We find that, ceteris paribus, a 12 month increase in median lockup period increases the 
(median) survival time from 89 months to 113 months. Our results also support the positive 
impact of firm size, age and insider ownership on the post-IPO long term survival. We, 
however, report a significantly negative effect of PEVC backing on the survival of issuing 
firms. The results from our simulations suggest that the predicted median survival time 
decreases by 18 months for PEVC backed compared to Non-PEVC backed IPOs. Our results 
show some significant and positive industry effects on IPO survival. Unlike the previous 
documented evidence, we do not find significant effect of sponsor reputation and initial 
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returns on the IPO survival. Finally, our results are robust to different survival estimation 
techniques, heterogeneity and alternative specification of variables.    
Our research presents useful insights both to the issuers and the investors, who are equally 
interested in the survivability of IPOs. While the issuing firms can increase probability of 
their survival by committing to longer lockups, the investors can also gauge the long term 
prospects of the IPOs in terms of their survival from the information about lockup in IPO 
prospectuses.  
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Table 4.1 Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Lockup Period Length of Lockup period in months. 
IPO Prospectus, PI 
Navigator 
Size  Size is the market capitalisation at the offering price in 
£ millions. 
London Stock 
Exchange, IPO 
Prospectus 
Age  Age has been calculated as the difference (in years) 
between the date of IPO and the date company was 
founded. 
IPO prospectus 
Initial Returns First day closing price minus offer price divided by the 
offer price; in percentage  
London Stock 
Exchange, DataStream 
Insider 
Ownership 
Insider (directors and officers) ownership at the time of 
IPO; in percentage. 
IPO Prospectus 
Sponsor 
Reputation 
The reputation of sponsor is measured as the number of 
IPOs sponsored by a sponsor as a percentage of the 
total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO 
year, following Goergen et al. (2006) and Espenlab et 
al. (2012). 
London Stock 
Exchange, IPO 
Prospectus 
PEVC  A categorical variable that takes the value of one if the 
IPO is backed by Private Equity or Venture Capital, 
and Zero otherwise. 
IPO Prospectus  
Hot Issue Returns Average initial returns to all IPOs issued during the 
three months prior to the month of IPO, following 
Espenlaub et al. (2012).  
London Stock Exchange 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by the sum of total assets and 
issue proceeds at the date of IPO, following Demers 
and Joos (2007).   
IPO Prospectus 
Survtime The number of months between the IPO date and the 
delisting date. 
London Share Price 
Database 
Industry 
Dummies 
Binary Industry dummies based on the FTSE Global 
Industry classification indicating companies in  
Basic Industries 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 
Cyclical Services 
Financials 
General Industrials 
Information Technology 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
Non-Cyclical Services 
Resources 
London Stock 
Exchange, IPO 
Prospectus 
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Table 4.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A describes the selection filters and data limitations for our full sample of IPOs during 1990-2006. We 
estimate number of listings for the period 1990-1997 form Thomson One Banker & PI Navigator. The data for 
listing activity for the period 1998-2006 is from LSE website. We eliminate investment trusts, venture capital 
trusts (VCTs), re-admissions, Global/American Depository Receipts (G/ADRs), privatisations, market transfers, 
listings by non-UK firms and firms with missing prospectuses and other data. Panel B shows the descriptive 
statistics of sample IPOs. The variables are defined in Table 4.1. Variable Age is measured in years rounded up 
to the next highest full year.     
 Panel A: Sample Selection 
From 1990-1997   
Total estimated number of LSE Main Market Listings 724  
  -Less: Investment Trusts, Venture Capital Trusts(VCTs),re-admissions,   
   privatisations , market transfers and firms with missing data and prospectuses 
- 346  
Equals: Sample IPOs from 1990-1997  = 378 
From 1998-2006   
Total number of listings on LSE Main Market 686  
  -Less: Listings by non UK firms - 130  
-Less: Investment Trusts, Investment Entities, foreign listings, VCTs,  missing 
 data etc. 
- 354  
Equals: Sample IPOs from 1999-2006  = 202 
Total Sample IPOs from 1990-2006  = 580 
 
Panel B: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Lockup Period (Months) 15.391 13 6.213 2 41 
Size (£ millions) 259.157 64.726 712.280 1.050 7725 
Age (Years) 17.360 11 18.172 1 102 
Initial Returns (%) 11.176 6.935 18.994 -51.880 139.100 
Insider Ownership (%) 24.705 19.790 21.609 0 80.900 
Sponsor Reputation (%) 2.991 2.080 3.211 0 15.380 
Hot Issue Returns (%) 13.322 11.590 10.310 -14.430 64.420 
Leverage 0.370 0.351 0.233 0 1.398 
PEVC  0.514 1 0.500 0 1 
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Table 4.3 Sample IPOs by Industry and Year of Listing 
This table presents the distribution of 580 sample IPOs by year of listing and across Industry sectors based on FTSE Global Classification system. 
Year 
Basic 
Industries 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Cyclical 
Services 
Financials 
General 
Industrials 
Information 
Technology 
Non-
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Non-
Cyclical 
Services 
Resources Total % 
1990 0 1 4 0 1 0 1 0 2 9 1.6% 
1991 0 1 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 9 1.6% 
1992 2 4 9 0 4 2 2 0 0 23 4.0% 
1993 9 2 12 9 7 5 14 0 3 61 10.5% 
1994 10 11 28 17 6 16 12 2 3 105 18.1% 
1995 7 6 14 2 8 2 6 1 2 48 8.3% 
1996 7 5 25 4 5 7 8 4 1 66 11.4% 
1997 5 4 21 5 3 7 6 3 3 57 9.8% 
1998 1 0 19 2 3 0 7 1 1 34 5.9% 
1999 0 0 6 3 1 9 1 3 1 24 4.1% 
2000 0 0 14 6 1 34 7 2 1 65 11.2% 
2001 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 2 0 6 1.0% 
2002 0 0 6 2 0 1 2 0 3 14 2.4% 
2003 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 6 1.0% 
2004 0 2 7 1 1 2 2 2 0 17 2.9% 
2005 2 0 4 2 0 1 5 1 1 16 2.8% 
2006 1 0 7 4 1 1 4 0 2 20 3.4% 
Total 
Sample 
44 36 185 60 41 89 78 21 26 580 100% 
% 7.6% 6.2% 31.9% 10.3% 7.1% 15.3% 13.4% 3.6% 4.5% 100%   
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Table 4.4 Sample IPOs by Year of Listing, PEVC backing and Type of Lockup 
This table shows the composition of our sample in terms of PEVC backing and the types of lockups.  Panel A breaks down the sample IPOs separately for PEVC and non-
PEVC backing across listing years. Panel B reports numbers and percentages of IPOs across listing years for each lockup type . Absolute date expiry lockups are set in terms of 
clear calendar dates or certain period of time after the IPO and usually give the exact length of the lockup period. The relative date expiry lockups specify the expiry in 
relation to some corporate events like preliminary results announcements or publication of company accounts etc. Combination represents cases where both types are 
combined over different periods or different types of shareholders. 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A: PEVC Backing 
PEVC Backed # 3 4 14 40 50 25 29 23 18 10 31 4 9 2 16 10 10 
Non-PEVC 
Backed # 
6 5 9 21 55 23 37 34 16 14 34 2 5 4 1 6 10 
PEVC Backed % 33 44 61 66 48 52 44 40 53 42 48 67 64 33 94 63 50 
Non-PEVC 
Backed % 
67 56 39 34 52 48 56 60 47 58 52 33 36 67 6 38 50 
Panel B: Lockup Type 
Absolute 
Expiry # 
4 1 1 15 25 11 18 15 16 9 41 3 9 6 9 12 15 
Relative 
Expiry # 
2 5 18 35 61 30 38 30 15 12 19 2 5 0 4 0 3 
Combination 
# 
0 0 0 5 5 0 1 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 4 4 2 
Absolute 
Expiry % 
67 17 5 27 27 27 32 33 50 41 64 50 64 100 53 75 75 
Relative 
Expiry % 
33 83 95 64 67 73 67 67 47 55 30 33 36 0 24 0 15 
Combination 
% 
0 0 0 9 5 0 2 0 3 5 6 17 0 0 24 25 10 
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Table 4.5 Kaplan Meier Survival Rates 
This table shows the cumulative survival rates for sample IPOs calculated using the Kaplan Meier (KM) method 
for each of 1 to 5 years after IPO. Based on the survival rates, we also show the median survival times in months 
(Median ST). Median ST indicates the number of months after which half of the sample IPOs have been delisted 
(the cumulative survival rate has dropped below 50%). The survival rates and median survival times are reported 
separately for listing years (Panel A), industry sectors (Panel B) and for full sample (Panel C). In Panel A, 
figures in parenthesis show the minimum survival times calculated following Espenlaub et al. (2012). Minimum 
Survival Time (ST) is the time remaining from the issue year until the end of the study period (December 2011) 
and shows that cumulative survival rates up to the end of December 2011have not yet dropped below 50%.  
 
 
Full Sample 
Panel A: 
 
Cumulative Survival Rates (%)   
Issue Year Obs 1 Yr 2Yrs 3 Yrs 4Yrs 5 Yrs Median ST 
1990 9 100 100 89 89 78 109 
1991 9 100 100 89 89 89 136 
1992 23 100 96 96 87 78 92 
1993 61 100 95 92 82 75 88 
1994 105 98 93 90 81 68 85 
1995 48 100 90 81 69 63 75 
1996 66 100 92 82 73 68 105 
1997 57 100 88 79 74 67 106 
1998 34 100 88 68 65 55 71 
1999 24 96 92 87 83 83 99 
2000 65 98 92 75 69 63 75 
2001 6 100 100 83 83 50 51 
2002 14 100 100 93 93 93 (111) 
2003 6 100 100 100 100 67 (98) 
2004 17 100 94 88 76 76 (87) 
2005 16 100 88 75 56 56 71 
2006 20 100 100 95 95 85 (61) 
Panel B: Industry 
Basic Industries 44 100 95 84 80 73 85 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
36 100 100 89 75 64 75 
Cyclical 
Services 
185 99 93 84 76 67 99 
Financials 60 97 95 87 72 65 82 
General 
Industrials 
41 100 88 83 78 70 90 
Information 
Technology 
89 100 91 84 80 72 95 
Non-Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
78 99 91 82 76 73 92 
Non-Cyclical 
Services 
21 100 86 81 67 62 79 
Resources 26 100 96 92 92 76 155 
Panel C: Full Sample  
Total 580 99 93 84 77 69 92 
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Table 4.6 Kaplan Meier Survival Rates stratified by Lockup Length 
This table shows the cumulative survival rates for 517 IPOs with lockups only calculated using the Kaplan Meier 
(KM) method  for 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO. Based on the survival rates, we also show the median survival times 
in months (Median ST). Median ST indicates the number of months after which half of the sample IPOs have been 
delisted (the cumulative survival rate has dropped below 50%). The survival rates and median survival times are 
reported by dividing the IPOs into below and above median lockup length across industry sectors (Panel A) and in 
Panel B for three different lockup lengths; 0-12 months, 13-24 months and greater than 24 months. Panel B also shows 
the results of log rank test to assess the statistical significance of differences between survival curves across lockup 
lengths.    
 
Panel A:   Kaplan Meier Survival Rates by Median Lockup Length 
 
Panel B:   Kaplan Meier Survival Rates by Lockup Length 
Lockup Length 
  Cumulative Survival Rates (%)   
Obs 1Yr 2Yrs 3Yrs 4Yrs 5Yrs Median ST 
0-12 Months 231 99 94 83 74 67 88 
13-24 Months 255 100 91 86 79 71 90 
> 24 Months 31 100 94 90 87 77 140 
Log Rank Test for Equality of Survivor Function 
Chi-Square 5.95 
      P-value 0.050             
  Lockup > Median Lockup < Median 
  
 
Cum. Survival Rates 
(%) 
  
 
Cum. Survival Rates 
(%)  
Industry Obs 1Yr 3Yrs 5Yrs 
Median 
ST 
Obs 1Yr 3Yrs 5Yrs 
Median 
ST 
Basic Industries 19 100 79 63 93 17 100 94 88 107 
Cyclical Consumer 
Goods 
15 100 100 79 75 17 100 82 53 66 
Cyclical Services 80 100 89 67 93 81 99 81 70 102 
Financials 23 96 87 74 92 25 96 84 56 64 
General Industrials 24 100 83 75 101 11 100 82 64 79 
Information 
Technology 
35 100 83 71 88 50 100 84 71 98 
Non-Cyclical 
Consumer Goods 
39 100 85 77 99 36 100 81 69 75 
Non-Cyclical Services 10 100 80 70 79 11 100 82 55 71 
Resources 12 100 100 92 161 12 100 83 56 91 
  257 100 87 72 92 260 99 83 67 87 
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Table 4.7 Reasons of Delisting by Industry 
This table shows the post-IPO state of sample firms segmented by industry sectors during first five years after IPO (Panel A) and across the full sample and tracking 
period (Panel B). The numbers and percentages show the survivor firms and those delisted due to M&A, Administration/Liquidation and Other reasons. Survivors are 
defined as firms which are listed by the end of study period (December 2011) or transferred to another market.     
  
Basic 
Industries 
Cyc. 
Cons. 
Goods 
Cyc. 
Services 
Financials 
General 
Industrials 
Info. Tech. 
Non-Cyc. 
Cons. 
Goods 
Non-Cyc. 
Services 
Resources # % 
Panel A: First Five Post-IPO Years 
Survivors 32 23 125 39 29 65 57 13 20 403 69% 
 
73% 64% 68% 65% 71% 73% 73% 62% 77% 
  
Mergers & 
acquisitions 
12 11 50 19 10 17 15 6 4 144 25% 
 
27% 31% 27% 32% 24% 19% 19% 29% 15% 
  
Administration & 
Liquidation 
0 2 9 1 2 2 5 2 0 23 4% 
 
0% 6% 5% 2% 5% 2% 6% 10% 0% 
  
Other reasons 0 0 1 1 0 5 1 0 2 10 2% 
  0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 6% 1% 0% 8%     
Panel B: Full sample Period (1990-2011) 
Survivors 15 8 56 18 15 29 21 8 15 185 32% 
 
34% 22% 30% 30% 37% 33% 27% 38% 58% 
  
Mergers & 
acquisitions 
28 21 106 38 24 44 46 9 8 324 56% 
 
64% 58% 57% 63% 59% 49% 59% 43% 31% 
  
Administration & 
Liquidation 
1 6 15 2 2 9 8 4 1 48 8% 
 
2% 17% 8% 3% 5% 10% 10% 19% 4% 
  
Other reasons 0 1 8 2 0 7 3 0 2 23 4% 
 
0% 3% 4% 3% 0% 8% 4% 0% 8% 
  
Total 44 36 185 60 41 89 78 21 26 580 100%  
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Table 4.8 Delisting (Failure) Rates for IPOs by Reasons of Delisting and Different Lockup Lengths 
This table shows the failure rates, using the Kaplan-Meier (K-M) method, for sample firms across different delisting reasons and broken down by below and above median 
lockup length (Panel A) and three different lockup lengths; 0-12 months, 13-24 months and longer than 24 months (Panel B). The numbers and percentages show the survivor 
firms and those delisted due to Mergers & Acquisitions, Administration and Liquidation and Other delisting reasons. Survivors are defined as firms which continue to be 
listed by the end of study period (December 2011) or transferred to another market. 
Failure Rates 
Mergers and Acquisitions   Administration and Liquidation 
  
Other delisting 
1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs   1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs 
  
1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs 
Panel A: Failure rates by median lockup length  
Lockup < Median (%) 0.77 13.26 25.46 
 
0.00 3.80 6.31 
 
0.00 0.44 3.47 
Lockup > Median (%) 0.39 12.16 25.17 
 
0.00 0.79 3.27 
 
0.00 0.43 0.43 
Panel B: Failure rates by different lockup lengths   
0-12 Months   (%) 0.87 13.20 25.61 
 
0.00 4.28 7.10 
 
0.00 0.50 3.39 
13-24 Months (%) 0.39 12.65 25.38 
 
0.00 0.80 3.33 
 
0.00 0.43 0.90 
> 24 Months (%) 0.00 9.68 22.58   0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4.9 Univariate Analysis of Survivors and Non-Survivors 
This table show the means, medians and standard deviations of the variables defined in Table 4.1 separately for survivor IPOs and non-survivor IPOs. Survivors are 
defined as firms which are listed by the end of study period (December 2011) or transfer to another market. Non-Survivors are IPO firms which have delisted (failed) 
by end of December 2011. Equality of means is assessed using a t-test estimated under assumption of unequal variances.  Equality of medians is assessed using Man-
Whitney two sample test. ***, ** and * indicate levels of statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
Survivor IPOs Non-Survivor IPOs 
  
 
185 Obs 395 Obs Equality of 
Means 
Equality of 
Medians Variables Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. 
Lockup Period  15.853 13.000 7.301 15.164 13.000 5.601 1.083 0.174 
Size  385.196 102.8 816.405 200.126 57.55 650.648 2.936*** 4.089*** 
Age  18.162 11.410 19.823 16.985 10.460 17.359 0.693 0.552 
Initial Returns  12.056 6.54 21.491 10.764 7 17.719 0.763 0.031 
Insider Ownership  26.217 17.000 24.644 23.997 20.520 20.025 1.071 0.173 
Sponsor Repute  3.141 1.900 3.719 2.923 2.250 2.945 0.702 -0.434 
Hot Issue Returns 13.366 11.590 10.188 13.301 11.670 10.379 0.071 0.169 
Leverage 0.371 0.334 0.249 0.370 0.359 0.225 0.053 -0.523 
PEVC 0.427 0 0.496 0.554 1 0.498 -2.880*** 
 
Industry Dummies 
        
Basic Industries 0.081 0 0.274 0.073 0 0.261 0.324 
 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.043 0 0.204 0.071 0 0.257 -1.286 
 
Cyclical Services 0.303 0 0.461 0.327 0 0.470 -0.574 
 
Financials 0.097 0 0.297 0.106 0 0.309 -0.332 
 
General Industrials 0.081 0 0.274 0.066 0 0.248 0.667 
 
Information Technology 0.157 0 0.365 0.152 0 0.359 0.151 
 
Non-Cyclical Consumer 
Goods 
0.114 0 0.318 0.144 0 0.352 -1.012 
 
Non-Cyclical Services 0.043 0 0.204 0.033 0 0.179 0.62 
 
Resources 0.081 0 0.274 0.028 0 0.165 2.446**   
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Table 4.10 Correlation Matrix 
This table provides correlation coefficients across the variables used in regression model specified in equation 3. All variables are defined in Table 4.1.* indicate significance 
at 5% level or better. 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Ln Survtime 1.00 
                 
2. Lockup Period 0.14* 1.00 
                
3. Ln (Size) -0.01 -0.17* 1.00 
               
4. Ln (Age) 0.12* -0.01 0.00 1.00 
              
5. Initial Returns -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10* 1.00 
             
6. Insider Ownership 0.06 0.13* -0.22* 0.01 0.10* 1.00 
            
7. Sponsor Reputation -0.03 0.01 0.21* 0.11* -0.04 -0.08 1.00 
           
8. Hot Issue returns -0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.26* 0.11* 1.00 
          
9. Leverage -0.10* -0.07 0.16* -0.12* 0.13* 0.07 -0.07 0.06 1.00 
         
10. PEVC -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.24* -0.19* -0.11* 0.05 0.08 -0.23* 1.00 
        
11. Basic Industries 0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.09* -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.07 1.00 
       
12. Cyc. Cons. Goods 0.01 0.00 -0.13* 0.08 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.10* 0.08 -0.07 1.00 
      
13. Cyclical Services 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.16* -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.16* -0.20* -0.18* 1.00 
     
14. Financials -0.01 0.01 0.13* -0.08 -0.11* -0.09* -0.02 -0.14* -0.04 0.17* -0.10* -0.09* -0.23 1.00 
    
15. General 
Industrials 
-0.02 0.01 -0.12* 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.19* -0.09* 1.00 
   
16. Info. Tech. -0.03 -0.10* 0.07 -0.20* 0.28* 0.11* -0.03 0.12* 0.20* -0.33* -0.12* -0.11* -0.29* -0.14* -0.12* 1.00 
  
17. Non-Cyc. Cons. 
Goods 
0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.09* 0.00 0.08 0.03 -0.12* -0.11* -0.10* -0.27* -0.13* -0.11* -0.17* 1.00 
 
18. Resources 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.09* -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15* -0.07 -0.06 -0.09* -0.08* 1.00 
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Table 4.11 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Estimation Results 
This table shows the estimation results of Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. The Lognormal density 
distribution was selected based on the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are defined in 
Table 4.1. Time ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes in 
covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one 
indicates that increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R
2
 were estimated as R
2
 = 1 
– Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds to 
the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables Coeff. P-value Time Ratio 
Lockup Period  0.020*** 0.006 1.020 
Ln (Size) 0.097*** 0.008 1.102 
Ln (Age) 0.117** 0.020 1.124 
Initial Returns  0.001 0.573 1.001 
Insider Ownership 0.004* 0.090 1.004 
Sponsor Reputation  -0.016 0.253 0.984 
Hot Issue Returns -0.008** 0.047 0.992 
Leverage -0.096 0.638 0.908 
PEVC  -0.192** 0.040 0.826 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries 0.404 0.138 1.498 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.157 0.569 1.170 
Cyclical Services 0.153 0.500 1.165 
Financials -0.085 0.735 0.918 
General Industrials 0.192 0.479 1.221 
Information Technology 0.143 0.553 1.154 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.156 0.518 1.169 
Resources 0.583* 0.058 1.791 
Constant 3.548*** 0.000   
Log-likelihood -566.380 
  
LR(Prob.>chi)
2
 40.21*** 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.113 
  
Time at Risk 47065.9 
  
N 509     
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Table 4.12 Sensitivity of Survival Time to Changes in Median Lockup Period 
This table shows the actual, absolute and percentage change in the predicted median survival time as the lockup length varies by multiples of 1 to 12 months, holding all other 
variables at their mean values.  The changes to the predicted median survival time are calculated relative to the base predicted survival time at median of lockup and means of all 
other independent variables. At median (13 months) of lockup and means of all other independent variables, the predicted median survival time equals 89 months. This table is 
based on AFT coefficient estimates in Table 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable + 12 + 9 + 6 + 3 + 1  
Median 
Lockup 
- 1 - 3 - 6 - 9 - 12  
            
Expected Survival Time 
(months) 
113 106 100 94 91 89 87 84 79 75 70 
Absolute Change (months) 24 17 11 5 2 
 
-2 -5 -10 -14 -19 
Percentage Change (%) 26.7 19.4 12.5 6.1 2.0   -1.9 -5.7 -11.1 -16.2 -21.0 
109 
 
Table 4.13 Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results 
This table shows the estimation results of Cox Proportional Hazard model. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
The hazard ratio is calculated as the exponential of coefficient estimate, exp (β). A hazard ratio of above (below) 
one indicates that increase in the explanatory variable increases (reduces) the failure rate. Pseudo R
2
 were 
estimates as R
2
 = 1 – Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and 
Lo corresponds to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.      
Variables Coeff. P-value Hazard Ratio 
Lockup Period -0.024*** 0.006 0.976 
Ln (Size) -0.120*** 0.009 0.887 
Ln (Age) -0.116* 0.097 0.890 
Initial Returns 0.000 0.885 1.000 
Insider Ownership -0.003 0.293 0.997 
Sponsor Reputation 0.020 0.248 1.021 
Hot Issue Returns 0.014** 0.013 1.014 
Leverage 0.013 0.963 1.013 
PEVC 0.295** 0.019 1.343 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries -0.500 0.18 0.606 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.016 0.965 1.016 
Cyclical Services -0.192 0.534 0.825 
Financials 0.164 0.628 1.178 
General Industrials -0.222 0.539 0.801 
Information Technology -0.151 0.638 0.860 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods -0.097 0.764 0.907 
Resources -0.684 0.123 0.504 
Log-likelihood -1883.000 
  
LR(Prob>chi)
2
 38.98*** 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.093 
  
Time at Risk 47065.9 
  
N 509     
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Table 4.14 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Estimation Results with Frailty 
This table shows the estimation results of Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model with frailty. The Lognormal 
density distribution was selected based on the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are 
defined in Table 4.1. Time ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which 
changes in covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) 
one indicates that increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R
2
 were estimated as R
2
 
= 1 – Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds 
to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Variables Coeff. P-value Time Ratio 
Lockup Period  0.021*** 0.007 1.020 
Ln (Size) 0.101*** 0.007 1.106 
Ln (Age) 0.126** 0.013 1.134 
Initial Returns  0.002 0.488 1.002 
Insider Ownership 0.004* 0.071 1.004 
Sponsor Reputation  -0.017 0.245 0.983 
Hot Issue Returns -0.008* 0.059 0.992 
Leverage -0.124 0.550 0.883 
PEVC  -0.181* 0.055 0.834 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries 0.403 0.143 1.496 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.193 0.489 1.213 
Cyclical Services 0.158 0.492 1.171 
Financials -0.081 0.751 0.922 
General Industrials 0.199 0.466 1.221 
Information Technology 0.151 0.537 1.163 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.182 0.457 1.200 
Resources 0.602** 0.050 1.827 
Constant 3.548*** 0.000  30.792 
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar
2
(01) = 1.12 Prob.>=chibar
2
 = 0.145 
Log-likelihood -565.821 
  
LR(Prob.>chi)
2
 40.25*** 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.097 
  
Time at Risk 47065.9 
  
N 509     
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Table 4.15 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model with Cluster Adjusted Standard 
Errors 
This table shows the estimation results of Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model with cluster adjusted standard 
errors on the basis of number of IPOs in each year. The Lognormal density distribution was selected based on 
the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are defined in Table 4.1. Time ratios are the 
exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates accelerate or 
decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one indicates that increase in the 
covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R
2
 were estimated as R
2
 = 1 – Lu/Lo; where Lu 
corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds to the first log-
likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.      
Variables Coeff. P-value Time Ratio 
Lockup Period  0.021** 0.025 1.021 
Ln (Size) 0.097** 0.013 1.102 
Ln (Age) 0.117*** 0.000 1.124 
Initial Returns  0.001 0.408 1.001 
Insider Ownership 0.004 0.111 1.004 
Sponsor Reputation  -0.016 0.279 0.984 
Hot Issue Returns -0.008*** 0.000 0.992 
Leverage -0.096 0.669 0.908 
PEVC  -0.192* 0.095 0.826 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries 0.404 0.137 1.497 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.157 0.585 1.170 
Cyclical Services 0.153 0.591 1.165 
Financials -0.085 0.803 0.918 
General Industrials 0.192 0.554 1.211 
Information Technology 0.143 0.563 1.154 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.156 0.635 1.169 
Resources 0.583 0.115 1.791 
Constant 3.548*** 0.000  34.731 
Log-likelihood -566.381 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.111 
  
Time at Risk 47065.9 
  
N 509     
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Table 4.16 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model Excluding IPOs in Mineral and 
Scientific Research based companies before Year 2000 
This table shows the estimation results of Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model excluding all IPOs in 
mineral and scientific research based companies before year 2000. The Lognormal density distribution 
was selected based on the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are defined in Table 
4.1. Time ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes in 
covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one 
indicates that increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R
2
 were estimated as 
R
2
 = 1 – Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo 
corresponds to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
    
Variables Coeff. P-value Time Ratio 
Lockup Period  0.018** 0.012 1.019 
Ln (Size) 0.091** 0.015 1.095 
Ln (Age) 0.110** 0.034 1.116 
Initial Returns  0.001 0.522 1.002 
Insider Ownership 0.004 0.127 1.004 
Sponsor Reputation  -0.015 0.278 0.985 
Hot Issue Returns -0.009** 0.046 0.991 
Leverage -0.077 0.715 0.926 
PEVC  -0.194** 0.044 0.823 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries 0.406 0.139 1.501 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.156 0.574 1.169 
Cyclical Services 0.156 0.494 1.169 
Financials -0.082 0.747 0.921 
General Industrials 0.191 0.483 1.211 
Information Technology 0.148 0.543 1.159 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.187 0.451 1.205 
Resources 0.650 0.128 1.915 
Constant 3.614*** 0.000  37.124 
Log-likelihood -542.169 
  
LR(Prob.>chi)
2
 34.36*** 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.109 
  
Time at Risk 44634.9 
  
N 485     
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Table 4.17 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model Excluding IPOs with Two Year 
Lockups 
This table shows the estimation results of Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model excluding all IPOs in mineral 
and scientific research based companies before year 2000. The Lognormal density distribution was selected 
based on the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are defined in Table 4.1. Time ratios are 
the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates accelerate or 
decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one indicates that increase in the 
covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R
2
 were estimated as R
2
 = 1 – Lu/Lo; where Lu 
corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds to the first log-
likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.      
Variables Coeff. P-value Time Ratio 
Lockup Period  0.020** 0.013 1.020 
Ln (Size) 0.098*** 0.009 1.103 
Ln (Age) 0.115** 0.027 1.122 
Initial Returns  0.001 0.646 1.001 
Insider Ownership 0.005** 0.050 1.005 
Sponsor Reputation  -0.015 0.286 0.985 
Hot Issue Returns -0.010** 0.024 0.990 
Leverage 0.001 0.997 1.001 
PEVC  -0.150 0.127 0.861 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries 0.342 0.229 1.407 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.026 0.925 1.027 
Cyclical Services 0.054 0.819 1.055 
Financials -0.223 0.391 0.801 
General Industrials 0.044 0.873 1.045 
Information Technology 0.027 0.914 1.027 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.007 0.979 1.007 
Resources 0.432 0.205 1.541 
Constant 3.602*** 0.000  36.656 
Log-likelihood -516.534 
  
LR(Prob.>chi)
2
 38.06*** 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.106 
  
Time at Risk 42437.67 
  
N 463     
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Table 4.18 Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) Model for Alternative Measures of Sponsor 
Reputation 
This table shows the estimation results of Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model or alternative measures of 
sponsor reputation. Top 10 UW is a dummy variable coded 1 for top 10 sponsors based on reputation measure of 
Jelic (2011) and 0 otherwise. UWREP_DandK is a dummy variable coded 1 for top 15 global investment banks 
as in Derrien and Kecskés (2007) for UK and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 4.1. The 
Lognormal density distribution was selected based on the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion (AIC). Time 
ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates 
accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one indicates that 
increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R
2
 were estimated as R
2
 = 1 – Lu/Lo; 
where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds to the first 
log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively.    
Variables Coeff. 
P-
value 
Time 
Ratio 
Coeff. 
P-
value 
Time 
Ratio 
Lockup Period  0.019*** 0.007 1.020 0.019*** 0.007 1.020 
Ln (Size) 0.098** 0.010 1.103 0.090** 0.013 1.094 
Ln (Age) 0.113** 0.026 1.119 0.113** 0.025 1.120 
Initial Returns  0.001 0.557 1.001 0.001 0.555 1.001 
Insider Ownership 0.004* 0.084 1.004 0.004* 0.080 1.004 
Top 10 UW -0.061 0.525 0.940 
   
UWREP_DandK 
   
0.014 0.875 1.014 
Hot Issue Returns -0.008** 0.050 0.992 -0.008* 0.057 0.992 
Leverage -0.116 0.573 0.891 -0.103 0.615 0.902 
PEVC  -0.195** 0.036 0.823 -0.198** 0.034 0.821 
Industry Dummies 
      
Basic Industries 0.396 0.147 1.486 0.392 0.151 1.480 
Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.159 0.564 1.173 0.164 0.552 1.179 
Cyclical Services 0.156 0.492 1.169 0.153 0.499 1.166 
Financials -0.064 0.798 0.938 -0.066 0.794 0.936 
General Industrials 0.207 0.445 1.230 0.202 0.457 1.223 
Information Technology 0.153 0.528 1.165 0.144 0.552 1.155 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 0.161 0.505 1.175 0.157 0.518 1.170 
Resources 0.587* 0.057 1.798 0.582* 0.059 1.790 
Constant 3.530*** 0.000 34.119 3.536*** 0.000 34.339 
Log-likelihood -566.829 
  
-570.218 
  LR(Prob.>chi)2 39.31*** 
  
32.53** 
  Pseudo R2 0.111 
  
0.111 
  Time at Risk 47065.9 
  
47065.9 
  N 509     509     
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Table 4.19 Logistic Regression Estimation Results 
This table shows the estimation results of binary Logistic model. The dependant variable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the IPO firm delisted within five years of its IPO and zero otherwise. Regression Coefficients, P-
values of Wald test and Odds ratios are provided, where Odds ratios are exponentiated coefficients. All variables 
are defined in Table 4.1. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables Coeff. P-value Odds Ratio 
Lockup Period  -0.050*** 0.007 0.951 
Ln (Size) -0.611*** 0.000 0.543 
Ln (Age) -0.155 0.247 0.856 
Initial Returns  0.002 0.808 1.001 
Insider Ownership -0.001 0.924 0.999 
Sponsor Reputation  0.005 0.899 1.004 
Hot Issue Returns 0.030** 0.021 1.031 
Leverage -0.545 0.294 0.580 
PEVC  0.353 0.162 1.423 
Industry Dummies 
   
Basic Industries -1.217* 0.089 0.296 
Cyclical Consumer Goods -0.485 0.537 0.616 
Cyclical Services -0.729 0.234 0.482 
Financials 0.490 0.411 1.633 
General Industrials -0.946 0.200 0.388 
Information Technology -0.408 0.546 0.665 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods -0.564 0.395 0.569 
Resources -1.425* 0.054 0.240 
Constant 5.399*** 0.000  221.348 
Log Likelihood -244.161   
LR chi
2 
(17) 69.99 
  
Prob. > chi
2
 0.000   
McFadden’s R2 0.125 
  
ML (Cox-Snell) R
2
 0.128   
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) R
2
 0.193   
N 509     
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CHAPTER 5 LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF IPOS: THE ROLE 
OF LOCKUPS 
5.1 Introduction 
Long-run underperformance of IPOs has been well documented in the literature. Ritter (1991) 
and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document a strong underperformance for US IPOs over a 
three and five year period following the issuing dates. Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. 
(2000) report similar results for IPOs on the UK markets. Similar phenomenon has also been 
observed for other markets around the world.
28
 There is, however, also evidence to suggest 
that long-run underperformance is not an IPO effect per se and underperformance is 
concentrated in the small firms with low book-to-market ratios (Brav et al., 2000). Similarly, 
there are studies which document long-run IPO performance differences based on certain IPO 
characteristics. For example, Brav and Gompers (1997) report that VC backed IPOs 
outperform non-VC backed IPOs, at least, on an equal weighting return basis. Carter et al. 
(1998) report less severe underperformance for IPOs handled by more prestigious 
underwriters/sponsors. Gao and Jain (2011) find that founder led IPOs perform better in the 
long-run than non-founder led IPOs in case of high technology IPOs. While Krishnan et al. 
(2011b) find a positive impact of VC reputation on the long run IPO performance, Levis 
(2011) reports that PE backed IPOs perform better than the VC backed and other IPOs for UK 
market in three years following the IPOs. Other characteristics related to the long-run 
performance in the literature include firm age, size, initial price multiples, global offerings, 
equity retention by insiders and multinationality of issuing firm (Ritter, 1991, Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan, 2004, Wu and Kwok, 2007, Goergen et al., 2007, Mudambi et al., 2012). 
Despite these and other studies, the sources of long-run performance differences in IPOs 
                                                 
28
 See Table 3.2 in chapter 3. 
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remain unresolved. In this chapter, we relate the long run performance of IPOs to the length 
of lockup. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of lockup length in explaining three years 
stock return performance following IPO and also abnormal return performance around the 
lockup expiry dates.  
In this study, using long-run stock return performance after IPO and abnormal returns around 
lockup expiry as a measure of quality, we examine whether there is a significant difference in 
quality between IPOs with longer lockups and shorter lockups. Prior research on IPO lockups 
suggests two main motives for lockups: signal of quality and commitment device to reduce 
moral hazard. Moreover, evidence also suggests that IPOs experience significant negative 
abnormal returns around the expiry of lockups. We argue that if longer lockups signal quality 
of issuing firm, then IPOs with longer lockups should exhibit superior long-run performance. 
Over time, positive inside information and true value of the firm signalled by longer lockup 
should be realised and reflected in the stock price. Similarly, if longer lockups are used as a 
commitment device to minimise moral hazard then this should result in better long-run 
performance due to the mitigated agency costs. Likewise, if longer lockups are indicative of 
better issuer quality and reduced agency problem, IPOs with longer lockups should have 
better return performance around the lockup expiry period. Insiders of high quality firms with 
positive inside information about future prospects of firms are less likely to sell shares at 
lockup expiry. Moreover, insider sales in high quality firms around lockup expiry are more 
likely to be for portfolio diversification reasons instead of trading on private information. 
Based on these arguments, we try to answer two important questions. First, do IPOs with 
longer lockups experience superior post issue long-run performance? Second, do IPOs with 
longer lockups show better performance around lockup expiry period? 
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We test the above predictions on a sample of 268 IPOs with lockups from 1995-2006 on the 
LSE Main Market. Following is the summary of main findings of our analysis. First, we 
document that our full sample of IPOs significantly outperforms the market index and control 
firms based on size and size and book-to-market basis using equally weighted buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs). Using value weighted BHARs, however, greatly reduces the 
outperformance and statistical significance of the abnormal returns, yet, BHARs for two and 
three years holding periods are still positive. These results are not consistent with the widely 
documented long run underperformance of IPOs in the literature (Ritter, 1991, Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995). Second, we compare BHARs between IPOs with lockups longer than median 
and IPOs with lockups shorter than median. We find that IPOs with lockups longer than 
median consistently perform better than IPOs with lockups shorter than median on both equal 
and value weighting basis. We find similar results when IPOs are grouped on the basis of top 
and bottom quartile of their lockup length instead of the median. The BHARs of IPOs in top 
quartile of lockup length are constantly higher than IPOs in bottom quartile of lockup length 
irrespective of the weighting scheme used. Moreover, we find similar results when wealth 
relatives are used as a measure of long-run performance instead of the BHARs. Third, we 
check robustness of our results by employing a calendar-time portfolio approach and compare 
abnormal returns of IPOs grouped on the basis of median lockup length cut off and top and 
bottom quartile of lockup length. Comparing the abnormal returns of IPOs grouped on the 
basis of median length, we find weak evidence that IPOs with lockups longer than median 
outperform IPOs with lockups shorter than median as the results depend on the choice of 
model and portfolio period. However, results for IPO groups based on top and bottom quartile 
of lockup length are more clear-cut as calendar-time abnormal returns are consistently higher 
for IPOs in top quartile compared to the IPOs in the bottom quartile. We obtain similar results 
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when WLS regressions instead of OLS are used in calendar-time approach.  Fourth, our cross-
sectional regression analysis reveals that lockup length significantly predicts the post-issue 
long-run performance of IPOs. Our results suggest that longer lockups are positively related 
to the long-run performance and these results are robust to the different benchmarks and 
period of performance measurement. Finally, we analyse the stock returns around the lockup 
expiry for full sample of IPOs and sub-samples of IPOs based on median cut off and top and 
bottom quartiles of lockup length. Our results show no significant abnormal returns for 
shorter expiry windows of 5 and 3 days around the lockup expiry date. The abnormal returns 
for relatively longer windows (41 and 21 days) around lockup expiry are, however, 
significantly negative across all the models used. The returns are also negative and significant 
in immediate post lockup expiry periods. Comparing the abnormal returns between IPOs with 
longer lockups and shorter lockups, we find significant evidence to suggest that the severe 
underperformance around lockup expiry resides in shorter lockup IPOs. We further analyse 
the abnormal returns around lockup expiry between VC and non-VC backed IPOs and find 
that our previous results are robust even for VC and non-VC backed samples.  
Collectively, our evidence strongly supports the signalling hypothesis for IPO lockups. Our 
findings suggest that insiders in high quality IPO firms signal their quality by accepting 
longer lockups which in turn is related to superior post-IPO performance in long-run. Longer 
lockups ensure that founding entrepreneurs and key employees and managers remain with 
IPO firm for a long time after the firm has gone public. Additionally, the interests of these 
insiders are closely aligned with those of investors and continued monitoring and presence of 
these insiders adds value to the firm. Moreover, lack of significant negative performance 
around lockup expiry on part of IPOs with longer lockups further complements the signalling 
role of lockups.  
120 
 
During the period of this research, two related papers have emerged on US markets with some 
contradictory results to ours. Gao and Siddiqi (2012), for example, use long-run operating and 
stock return performance as a measure of firm quality and relate it to the lockup length for a 
sample of US IPOs. They find a negative relation between long-run stock performance and 
lockup length and conclude that longer lockups are used to control agency problem and do not 
signal firm quality.
29
 We, however, contend that there are significant differences in US and 
UK lockups in terms of their length as discussed in chapter 2 and 3. The diversity in UK 
lockups may have different implications in terms of signalling or commitment hypothesis 
compared to the US markets. Based on these institutional differences between US and UK, we 
argue that UK market provides more fertile ground to test the relationship between lockup 
length and post IPO long term performance. Moreover, substantially longer lockups in UK 
IPOs may act as a more credible quality signal relative to standard and shorter lockups in US 
markets. 
This study makes important contributions to the IPO lockups literature and long-run IPO 
underperformance literature. Prior research has identified that lockups signal quality and help 
to reduce uncertainty of firms at the time of IPO (Arthurs et al., 2009, Brau et al., 2005, 
Goergen et al., 2006b), we show that lockups not only reduce uncertainty about issuing firm 
at the time of IPO but they also predict issuing firm quality in the long run measured as stock 
return performance.  Our study is also related to the strand of literature that identifies factors 
affecting long-run IPO performance. We suggest that lockup length could potentially explain 
long-run IPO performance in addition to the VC backing and reputation (Brav and Gompers, 
1997, Krishnan et al., 2011a), underwriter reputation (Carter et al., 1998), founder CEOs (Gao 
and Jain, 2011) and management quality (Chemmanur et al., 2014) etc.  
                                                 
29
 Similarly, Cline et al. (2014) fail to find evidence that (longer) lockups signal quality in terms of superior 
long-run performance for Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the US. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised in the following way. Section 5.2 briefly reviews the 
related literature and develops testable predictions. Section 5.3 presents data, sample 
construction and the methodology. Empirical results and discussion are provided in section 
5.4. In section 5.5, we present analysis on the lockup expiration returns. Finally, section 5.6 
gives the conclusion of the chapter.    
5.2 Related literature and Testable Predictions  
There is ample evidence to suggest that IPOs underperform in the long run compared to the 
market or matched seasoned firms. Detailed review of the literature on long-run 
underperformance has been presented in chapter 3. However, literature also suggests that the 
underperformance does not seem to be evenly distributed across firms and can be 
differentiated on the basis of some IPO and issue characteristics. For example firm age, size, 
risk, founder CEO, global offerings, multinationality of IPO and earnings management in 
IPOs  etc. have been studied in the previous literature and found to have predictive power for 
the long-run IPO performance  (Ritter, 1991, Gao and Jain, 2011, Wu and Kwok, 2007, 
Mudambi et al., 2012, Teoh et al., 1998a). Research on the role of third party certification has 
also documented positive impact of this certification on long-run performance of IPOs. VC 
backing (Brav and Gompers, 1997) and backing by reputed VCs (Krishnan et al., 2011) 
improves the long run performance of IPOs. Levis (2011) reports that IPOs backed by private 
equity outperform IPOs backed by VCs and other IPOs in the UK. IPOs underwritten by more 
reputed underwriters perform better than those underwritten by less reputed underwriters 
(Carter et al., 1998, Dong et al., 2011, Chan et al., 2008).  Similarly, long run performance 
differences could be related to the signalling theories of IPO. Signalling by underpricing and 
retained ownership is among the prominent signalling models (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, 
Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989, Welch, 1989). High quality firms underprice more in order to 
122 
 
signal their better quality and in long-run underpricing is positively related to the stock return 
performance (Álvarez and González, 2005). Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a model in 
which insiders signal quality of their firm by retaining large equity stakes. However, this 
signal might not be credible as the insiders can sell overvalued shares immediately following 
the IPO (Gale and Stiglitz, 1989).  Courteau (1995) proposes that lockup length works as a 
mechanism to signal quality and private information and complements the signal provided by 
equity retention.    
Prior research suggests two main motives for lockups in equity offerings: signalling theory 
and commitment theory. Under the signalling theory, longer lockups reduce information 
asymmetry prevalent between insiders and outside investors of an IPO firm. Due to the 
significant illiquidity and non-diversification costs associated with longer lockups, insiders of 
only high quality firms will accept longer lockups to signal their positive inside information. 
Consistent with the arguments of Courteau (1995), Brau et al. (2005) develop a model and 
find empirical support for the signalling theory. The lockup length may also act as a substitute 
quality signal when other signals of quality (VC and reputed underwriter backing) are not 
present (Arthurs et al., 2009). Furthermore, Arthurs et al. (2009) find that ventures with going 
concern issues can reduce money left on the table by accepting longer lockups. Similarly, 
Chong and Ho (2007) find that lockups act as signal and add credibility to earnings forecasts 
in IPO prospectuses for a sample of IPOs in Singapore. In a recent study on UK IPOs, Ahmad 
and Jelic (2014) find that lockups predict long term survival of IPOs in the aftermarket 
whereby longer lockups are related to higher survival rates and time for IPOs. The 
commitment hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that longer lockups are used by insiders 
of firms subject to severe agency or moral hazard problems. By accepting longer lockups, 
insiders in these firms reassure investors that managers have little incentive to engage in 
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informed trading following IPO and wealth expropriation from the outside investors. Brav 
and Gompers (2003) support the commitment hypothesis and find that longer lockups are 
used to reduce moral hazard in IPOs. In a recent study of SEO lockups, Cline et al. (2014) 
find that lockups are used as a commitment mechanism to reduce moral hazard and support 
commitment hypothesis. The empirical evidence for signalling and commitment devise 
hypotheses is, at best, mixed.  
5.2.1 Lockup Length and Long-Run IPO Performance 
We argue that the signalling hypothesis predicts a superior long-run performance for IPOs 
with longer lockups. Given that a longer lockup is costly signal in terms of illiquidity and 
potential wealth losses for insiders, only insiders in high quality firms with positive 
information about the true future value of the firm will accept longer lockups. This true value 
will be revealed over time in the market and should have a positive impact on the stock return 
performance of the firm. Moreover, longer lockups also ensure that founding entrepreneurs, 
key managers and employees remain with the firm for a longer period of time and their 
contribution will add more value to firm’s performance. A superior performance on part of 
IPOs with longer lockups compared to IPOs with shorter lockups would provide support to 
the signalling explanation of lockups. Likewise, if longer lockups are in place to reduce 
agency problem, then IPOs with longer lockups should show better long-run performance due 
to the reduced agency costs in the post-IPO market. Given the beneficial impact of diverse 
and longer lockups in UK, we predict that lockup length is positively related to long-run stock 
return performance.   
5.2.2 Lockup Expiration Performance  
Market reaction to the expiry of lockups has also received considerable attention in the 
literature. Studies, mainly from US markets, have documented significant negative abnormal 
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returns around lockup expiry day (Field and Hanka, 2001, Bradley et al., 2001, Brav and 
Gompers, 2003). These findings are puzzling as information regarding the lockups and lockup 
expiry date is disclosed in IPO prospectus well before the actual expiry date and the expiry 
event is devoid of informational content. Studies outside the US markets, however, have 
failed to find significant negative abnormal returns around the lockup expiry (Espenlaub et al., 
2001, Goergen et al., 2006b) 
Insiders in IPOs firms are free to sell shares after lockup expiry, although evidence suggests 
that insiders could be released from lockups even before expiry (Brav and Gompers, 2003, 
Hoque and Lasfer, 2009). However, insiders are not likely to sell shares if they think that 
share price will go higher in future (Maremont et al., 2000). On the other hand, corporate 
insiders are more likely to sell shares at lockup expiration if they possess negative information 
about firms’ future prospects and valuation. Consequently, the trading behaviour of insiders’ 
at lockup expiry may provide market with important information about future prospects of the 
IPO firm and may affect its return performance after the lockup expiration. Prior literature 
(Chen et al., 2012, Hoque and Lasfer, 2015) suggests “portfolio diversification or liquidity 
needs” and “information selling” as the main reasons for insider sales at lockup expiry.30 If 
insider sales are motivated by portfolio diversification or liquidity needs, then these trades 
may not convey any inside information and do not necessarily affect return performance after 
lockup expiry.  Conversely, insider trades based on negative private information are likely to 
convey bad news and affect the return performance after lockup expiry. Chen et al. (2012) 
find that insider sales by top executives following lockup expiry are negatively related to 
long-run performance of IPOs supporting the information selling hypothesis. Based on the 
                                                 
30
 It would be very difficult to infer the intent or motivation of insider sales at lockup expiry. The insiders may 
not give any reason or motive for their sales and even if they declare the motive, it would be hard to verify that. 
We can only observe the action (whether insiders sell at the expiry of lockup and how much they sell) but not the 
motive of selling. Prior studies (Chen at al., 2012, Hoque and Lasfer, 2015) have used return performance after 
the lockup expiry as a proxy of information content of the insider sales.  
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above arguments, we assert that if longer lockups signal better quality and reduce moral 
hazard, then insiders’ in IPOs with longer lockups are less likely to sell shares and engage in 
informed trading at the time of lockup expiry.
31
 It is also more likely that the insiders in IPOs 
with longer lockup sell shares due to portfolio diversification reasons and their trades around 
lockup expiry do not convey any information about the future prospects of IPO firm. If the 
portfolio diversification argument for IPOs with longer lockups is correct, then insider selling 
around lockup expiry does not necessarily result in weaker return performance around and 
after lockup expiry. On the contrary, trading around lockup expiry by insiders of low quality 
firms with shorter lockups might reveal information about the future prospects of the firm. 
The insiders of low quality firms with shorter lockups are more likely to be involved in 
informed trading predicting a weak stock return performance around and after lockup expiry.  
Following Chen et al. (2012) and Filed and Hanka (2001), we examine return performance 
around and after lockup expiry for shorter and longer lockup IPOs. As longer lockups signal 
better firm quality and insiders’ commitment, we predict that IPOs with longer lockups show 
better performance at lockup expiry relative to IPOs with shorter lockups.    
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Data and Sample Construction 
Our sample consists of UK IPOs that went public on LSE Main Market between January 1995 
and December 2006. We obtain initial sample of issuing firms from new issues list available 
from LSE website for the period 1998-2006
32
. For years 1995-1997, issuing firms have been 
identified from Thomson One Banker and Perfect Filings database. In line with the existing 
                                                 
31
 Due to lack of data on insider sales, I am unable to examine the actual sales by insiders at the lockup expiry.  
32
  http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/new-issues-further-issues/new-issues-further-issues.htm LSE 
reports all new and further issues on monthly basis. But the details of Main Market IPOs are only available from 
January 1998 onwards. 
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IPO literature, we exclude all financial firms (SIC code 6xxx) including investment trusts and 
venture capital trusts (VCTs), utility firms (SIC code 49xx), foreign issuers, re-admissions 
and firms with missing prospectuses. After applying these filters, there are only 19 firms from 
1995 to 2006 which reported no lockup provision in their IPO prospectuses. As the sample of 
no lockup firms is very small, we do not attempt to compare the performance differences 
between firms with lockups and without lockups and these firms are excluded from the 
sample. Our final sample consists of 268 IPOs with lockups reported in their prospectuses. 
We use Perfect Filings database to download IPO prospectuses and hand collect variables 
such as lockup and its duration, insider ownership, VC backing, underwriter, company 
founding date etc. Relevant financial variables for IPO and control firms are from 
WorldScope database and from IPO prospectuses when information is missing in 
WorldScope. Finally, data on stock prices is collected from DataStream.        
Table 5.1 presents yearly distribution of sample IPOs from 1995 to 2006 (Panel A) and 
distribution of sample IPOs across industry sectors based on two-digit SIC codes (Panel B).  
We also show the descriptive statistics of lockup period in months across sample years and 
industry. Panel A shows the highest number of sample IPOs in year 2000, which accounts for 
one fifth of the total sample. The earlier years of our sample period also account for large 
number of IPOs. For example IPOs in years 1995, 1996 and 1997 account for about 38% for 
the total IPOs. However, the IPO activity dropped after year 2000 mainly due to the dotcom 
crisis. The mean lockup period for the sample is 15 months but there is large variation in 
mean lockup length across sample years. The longest mean lockup length is observed for 
IPOs that went public in years 1997 and 2001. The mean lockup length across sample years 
decreases after year 2000 with a mean length of 10 months in year 2003. An inspection of 
median lockup length reveals that median lockup period converges to 12 months particularly 
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in later years of sample period. In fact, seven out of twelve sample years have a median 
lockup period of 12 months.     
In panel B of Table 5.1, we observe that a large portion (28%) of our IPO sample is from 
“Computer equipment and services” sector. Other industry sectors with highest IPO frequency 
are “Retail”, “Engineering and management services” and “Chemical products” accounting 
for about 21% of the total sample. There is large variation in terms of average lockup length 
across different industry sectors. For instance, IPOs in “Transport” sector have a mean lockup 
period of 11 months while IPOs in the “Scientific instruments” and “Paper and paper 
products” sectors have average lockup periods of 19 months. Similar pattern is observed for 
median length and dispersion (Std. dev.) of lockup period across industry sectors. Overall, 
results from Table 5.1 indicate that lockups in UK are quite heterogeneous in terms of their 
length across different industries and times.   
[Insert Table 5.1 about here] 
5.3.2 Methodology 
5.3.2.1 Event-Time Approach: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns and Wealth Relatives 
Following previous IPO literature, we use BHARs to measure the long-run performance of 
our sample IPOs. BHARs are an advantageous method for IPO performance because they 
capture the return which an investor can earn over the long run and are more representative of 
an investor experience (Kothari and Warner, 1997, Barber and Lyon, 1997). In order to show 
robustness for our results, we use three different benchmarks as well as equal and value 
weighting for calculating BHARs. For each sample IPO, the listing day is defined as event 
day zero and each IPO is tracked for one, two and three years from the day after the IPO 
(event day). Consistent with previous literature (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, Brau et al., 2012), 
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a month is defined as 21 trading days, with 252 days in a year, 504 days in two years and 756 
days in three years. The BHAR of an IPO is calculated on a daily basis as; 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
− ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
                                 (5.1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 the daily is return of firm 𝑖 on the date 𝑡 and 𝑅𝑏𝑡 is the return on the respective 
benchmark on the same date. The holding period begins with the day after the IPO is listed 
(𝑡1) and ends on 𝑡2 where 𝑡2 is earlier of the end of one year (252 days), two years (504 days) 
or three years (756 days) window. If a sample firm delists before the end of holding period, 
the returns from respective benchmark are included from the delisting date until the end of 
tracking period (one, two or three years). This procedure doesn’t change the weight of each of 
the remaining IPOs and the sample size also remains the same for the whole tracking period. 
For each holding period, we compute both equal weighted and value weighted average 
BHARs for full sample and different sub-samples. For value weighted average BHARs, 
weight is the relative market capitalisation of an IPO at the offer. 
To measure benchmark returns, we use three alterative benchmarks. Our first benchmark is 
the market return where we use value weighted market index. FTSE Allshare index is used as 
a proxy for the market return. Second, we use a non-issuing control firm matched on the size 
of IPO as a benchmark. Size is defined as market capitalisation of sample firm at the end of 
IPO month. For selecting a size matched control firm, we obtain market capitalisation of all 
firms (excluding sample firms) listed on LSE from London Share Price Database (LSPD) at 
the end of every month when we have a corresponding IPO issue firm in that month. A size 
matched control firm is the firm with the closest but higher market capitalisation to the 
corresponding IPO firm. This is because the market capitalisation of the IPOs is expected to 
increase in the post-IPO period. Our final benchmark is a size and book-to-market (BM) 
matched control firm based on the method of Barber and Lyon (1997). For size and BM 
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matched control firm, we first select a sub set of all non-issuing listed firms (excluding the 
sample firms) with a market capitalisation within ±30% of the market capitalisation of the 
issuing firm in the month of IPO. This subset is selected from the firms used in our previous 
benchmark (size matched). Next, the selected firms are ranked according to their book-to-
market ratios measured in IPO year. The control firm is a firm with the closest book-to-
market ratio to that of the sample IPO firm. If a matching firm delists before the end of 
holding period, the next matched firm is included after the delisting date of original matched 
firm. 
We employ a skewness-adjusted t-test in order to mitigate the problem of positively skewed 
long run abnormal returns following Lyon et al. (1999) as: 
𝑇𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠−𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = √𝑁 [𝑆 +
1
3
𝛾𝑆2 +
1
6𝑁
𝛾]                                    (5.2) 
where  
𝑆 =
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1,𝑡2)
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)
  ,  𝛾 =
∑ [𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2)−𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1,𝑡2)]
3𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑁𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)3
 and N is the number of firms in the 
sample. 
In addition to using BHARs as a performance measure, we also adopt wealth relative (WR) as 
a performance measure in line with previous IPO studies (Ritter, 1991, Brav and Gompers, 
1997). We compute wealth relatives for one year, two years and three years using the three 
benchmarks discussed earlier for full IPO sample and different sub-samples based on lockup 
length. In accordance with Ritter (1991), the wealth relatives are estimated as: 
 
𝑊𝑅 =
1+𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝐵𝐻𝑅 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
1+𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝐻𝑅 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘
                                    (5.3) 
where BHR is the average buy-and-hold return on one, two or three year relevant portfolio of 
IPO firms and the respective benchmarks. A wealth relative greater than 1 indicates that the 
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IPO portfolio outperforms the relevant benchmark while a wealth relative of less than 1 
indicates that the IPO portfolio underperforms the relevant benchmark. Similarly, a higher 
wealth relative for a sub sample of IPOs relative to the other sub sample implies better 
performance for the former sub sample.  
5.3.2.2 Calendar-Time Factor Model Regressions 
We also use calendar time factor regressions as a further robustness test of our results. Fama 
(1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) strongly recommend the monthly calendar time 
approach for measuring the long term abnormal performance. First, monthly returns in 
calendar time are less susceptible to the bad model problem. Second, monthly portfolios take 
into account the cross-sectional dependence among the sample firms which could allow better 
statistical inferences. Third, portfolio returns do not compound spurious abnormal returns 
which could lead to biases over the longer event windows.  
In our calendar time models, we form an equally weighted portfolio of each of the two types 
of IPOs. Our first type of portfolios is based on the median length of lockup period. In this 
type we divide IPOs in two groups of portfolios: IPOs with lockups less than median lockup 
period and IPOs with lockups greater than the median lockup period. In second type, IPOs are 
divided into two groups based on their quartiles of lockup length. More specifically, IPOs 
with lockup period in bottom quartile (12 months) are grouped together and in other group 
IPOs with lockups in top quartile (18 months) are grouped together. Based on each type and 
group, we develop time series of monthly returns of IPOs which occurred in the previous T 
months (where T equals 12, 24 or 36 months). For example, a 12 monthly portfolio is 
composed of monthly returns of all firms (for different subsamples as described above) that 
had an IPO in the previous 12 months. Because this approach requires a 12 month look back 
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window, our monthly portfolio formation starts in January 1996 and extends to December 
2007
33
. So, in all of these portfolios, the number of monthly observations is 144.  
We use three regression models to test abnormal performance of IPOs in different sub 
samples after the issue.  Our first model is standard Capital Asset pricing Model (CAPM), 
second is Fama and French (1993) three factor model, and third is Carhart (1997) four factor 
model which is an extension of Fama and French (1993) model. 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡                                                       (5.4) 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                         (5.5) 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (5.6) 
where 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 =  the monthly return on an equal-weighted calendar time portfolio of IPOs of different 
sub-samples (based on median lockup length and top and bottom quartiles) in month t; 
𝑅𝑓𝑡 = the monthly return on three month Treasury Bills in month t; 
𝑅𝑚𝑡= the total return on FTSE Allshare index in moth t; thus, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the market risk 
premium; 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡= the difference in the returns of small stocks and big stocks in month t;  
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡= the difference in returns of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market   
stocks in month t; 
𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡= the difference in returns of high and low momentum stocks in moth t; 
𝛼 = the intercept term, which provides the mean monthly abnormal return on the calendar 
time portfolio. 
 
                                                 
33
 Our sample starts in January 1995 and ends in December 2006. Similarly, for a 24 month portfolio, monthly 
portfolio formation starts in January 1997 and extends to December 2008.  For 36 monthly portfolios, we start 
monthly portfolio formation in January 1998 and include monthly returns (starting from January 1998) of all 
firms which had an IPO in previous 36 months. This portfolio extends to December 2009.   
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A positive and significant intercept term, alpha, in the above models can be interpreted as 
outperformance of a sub sample of IPOs. The above stated models estimated with OLS 
technique could suffer from potential hetroskedasticity problem because the number of firms 
is unequal and keep changing every month due to the rolling nature of monthly portfolios. In 
order to solve this problem and for robustness of results, we also estimate all the above 
models using WLS. The number of firms in each monthly portfolio is used as weights in the 
WLS regressions. The monthly factors for UK are from Gregory et al. (2013)
34
.   
5.3.2.3 Cross Sectional Regressions of Long-Run IPO Performance 
This section conducts further analysis to test whether post-IPO long-run performance is 
related to lockup length after controlling for other firm and offer characteristics that may be 
attributed to long-run performance. Consistent with Chen et al. (2012), following regression 
models are estimated; 
 
𝐿𝐵𝐻𝑅 =  α + β1𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β2𝑉𝐶 + β3𝑈𝑊 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + β4𝐿𝑛( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) +
β5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + β6𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + β7 𝐼𝑅 + β8 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀                                        (5.7) 
 
𝐿𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 =  α + β1𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β2𝑉𝐶 + β3𝑈𝑊 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + β4𝐿𝑛( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) +
β5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + β6𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + β7 𝐼𝑅 + β8 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀                                         (5.8) 
 
Where 𝐿𝐵𝐻𝑅 is defined as ln(1+IPO firm’s 1, 2 or 3 years BHR) and  𝐿𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is IPO firm’s 
𝐿𝐵𝐻𝑅─ ln(1+ benchmark’s 1,2 or 3 years BHR). The benchmarks are as discussed earlier; market 
return (FTSE Allshare index), a size matched control firm, and a size and BM matched control 
firm. Our primary variable of interest is LU Months and is measured as the length of lockup 
                                                 
34
 http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/files 
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period in months. VC is a dummy variable and equals one for IPOs backed by VC/PE, and zero 
otherwise. UW Reputation is a continuous variable representing the reputation of underwriters and 
is measured as percentage of IPOs sponsored by an underwriter in the year prior to IPO. Ln 
(Assets) is the natural log of assets before IPO in £ millions and is a proxy for the size of IPO. 
Insider Ownership is the percentage of equity retained by the insiders. Ln (Age) is the natural log 
of the age of IPO measured in years from initial founding date to the IPO date. IR is the initial 
return (underpricing) calculated as the percentage difference between offer price and first day 
closing price. Finally, ROA is return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets in year before the IPO. 
The inclusion of the above mentioned control variables in our regression models are 
motivated from the previous literature on long-term performance of IPOs. For example, VC 
backing may act as certification of IPO quality and has the potential to improve long term 
performance through improved governance, increased institutional investor interest and 
greater analyst coverage (Megginson and Weiss, 1991, Brav and Gompers, 1997, Suchard, 
2009). Similarly, IPOs backed by reputed underwriters perform better in the long run due to 
better screening, certification of quality and marketing by prestigious underwriters (Carter et 
al., 1998, Dong et al., 2011). We include age and size of the firm to control for the size and 
age effect of IPOs in line with the previous literature (Gao and Jain, 2011, Wu and Kwok, 
2007, Ritter, 1991). Following Goergen et al. (2007) and Thomadakis et al. (2012), we also 
include equity retained by insiders at the time of IPO in our regression analysis. We include 
underpricing (first day returns) in regressions models because prior literature documents a 
negative relation between the underpricing and long term performance (Ritter, 1991, Houge et 
al., 2001b). Finally, we include ROA as a proxy of pre-IPO operating performance of the 
issuing firms following Gao and Jain (2011). 
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5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 BHARs and Wealth Relatives (WRs) 
In Table 5.2, we report the one, two and three years BHARs for full sample and for portfolios 
of IPOs with lockups greater than and less than the median lockup length. Results are 
presented using all three benchmarks (market return, size matched and size and BM matched 
control firm) adopted in this study. Moreover, we report both equal weighted and value 
weighted BHARs to draw a comparison between the weighting schemes. We find that our 
sample IPOs consistently outperform the market index over the one, two and three year 
holding periods when returns are equal weighted, as reported in Panel A. The returns for one, 
two and three years are 15.56%, 31.36% and 36.98% respectively and these returns are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level. Even when size and size and 
BM matched benchmarks (Panel B and C) are used, the returns are positive and statistically 
significant for at least one year holding period. Moreover, the magnitude of the returns 
decreases when we use size or size and BM matched firms. Similarly, significance levels of 
returns over different holding periods vary across the three benchmarks. For example, only 
one year returns are significant in size matched benchmark, while both one year and two years 
abnormal returns are significant when size and BM matched benchmark is used. Our results 
for full sample are in contradiction to previous studies which document significant IPO 
underperformance over the long-run for US and UK markets (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 
Ritter, 1991, Espenlaub et al., 2000) but are consistent with the recent findings of Gregory et 
al. (2010) and Coakley et al. (2008) for LSE Main Market. These results for full sample of 
IPOs are, however, different in at least three ways when value weighting is used. First, one 
year abnormal returns become negative across all the benchmarks indicating 
underperformance relevant to the benchmarks. For example, we report a negative size and 
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BM adjusted return of -8.42% for the first year after the IPO. Second, although the mean 
abnormal returns for two and three years are positive across all three benchmarks, their 
magnitude is less than that of equal weighted returns. Finally, none of the mean abnormal 
returns are significant using the value weighting scheme. This still is consistent with our 
previous finding of a lack of significant underperformance for our sample IPOs, in case of 
equal weighted abnormal returns. Moreover, our results of a reduced degree and significance 
of abnormal long run performance when using value weighting are consistent with previous 
IPO literature (Brav et al., 2000, Brav and Gompers, 1997, Gao and Jain, 2011, Wu and 
Kwok, 2007).  
Next, we discuss the abnormal performance differences between our portfolios of IPOs. We 
stratify full sample IPOs in two portfolios based on median lockup length (12.34 months) of 
our full sample as discussed in previous section. First portfolio comprises of all IPOs with 
lockups longer than median lockup length and second portfolio consists of all IPOs with 
lockups shorter than median lockup length. Columns 3-7 of Table 5.2 present mean BHARs 
for these two portfolios. A comparison of the two portfolios reveals that IPOs with lockups 
longer than median length consistently perform better than IPOs with lockups shorter than 
median length across all three benchmarks and for all holding periods (except three year 
returns for size and BM matched firms). For instance, the one year equal weighted abnormal 
return for IPOs with lockups longer than median are significantly different from zero at 1% 
level and are 24.13%, 24.63% and 19.66% respectively for market adjusted, size matched and 
size and BM matched firms. On the other hand, one year equal weighted BHARs for IPOs 
with lockups shorter than median are 6.99%, -1.63% and 3.43% respectively for three 
benchmarks and are not significantly different from zero. This shows that although IPOs with 
lockups shorter than median do not significantly underperform, IPOs with lockups longer than 
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median have higher abnormal returns and significantly outperform their respective 
benchmarks. Similar pattern is observed for two and three year holding periods across all the 
benchmarks. When we compare the value weighted returns, the performance difference 
between our portfolios is even more pronounced. The abnormal returns of IPOs with lockup 
longer than median are consistently higher than the returns of IPOs with lockups shorter than 
median for all the benchmarks and holding periods. Moreover, four out of the nine value 
weighted BHARs for IPOs with lockups longer than median are significantly different from 
zero, which is also in contrast with the full sample as none of the value weighted returns for 
full sample are statistically significant. For IPOs with lockups shorter than median, four out of 
nine value weighted BHARs are negative and one year BHAR for size matched benchmark is 
also statistically significant, which show significant underperformance relative to the 
benchmark. These results also show that underperformance in case of value weighting for full 
sample is mainly driven by poor performance of IPOs with lockups shorter than median. Our 
overall results from Table 5.2 show that portfolio of IPOs with lockups longer than median 
outperforms the various benchmarks used in this study. On the other hand, IPOs with lockups 
shorter than median have some negative BHARs although statistically insignificant (except 
for one year BHAR in case of size matched benchmark), and these BHARs are generally 
lower than BHARs of other portfolio (IPOs with lockups longer than median). In sum, IPOs 
with lockups shorter than median do not perform as well as IPOs with lockups longer than 
median and there is also evidence of underperformance relative benchmarks in case of former 
IPO portfolio. 
[Insert Table 5.2 about here] 
In order to further check the robustness of our results, we form two portfolios of IPOs based 
on bottom and top quartile of lockup length. More specifically, we combine all IPOs with 
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lockups in the top quartile (18 months) of lockup duration in one portfolio. In the next 
portfolio, we combine all IPOs with lockups in the bottom quartile (12 months) of lockup 
duration. So our two portfolios are respectively, IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months and 
IPOs with lockups shorter than or equal to 12 months. In Table 5.3, we compare long-run 
performance of these two portfolios based on three benchmarks already discussed. Again, 
results are presented for both equal weighting and value weighting. We would expect stronger 
and more robust performance differences between these two portfolios (compared to the 
earlier cut off based on median lockup length) as the lockup duration difference between the 
two portfolios has been further widened. In line with our expectation, we find that 
performance differences between our two portfolios (based on quartile cut offs) are even more 
pronounced. IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months consistently outperform the relevant 
benchmarks and the BHARs for this portfolio are significantly different form zero in most of 
the cases (7 out of 9 BHARs are significant at 1% or 5% level). For example, we observe a 
60.12% statistically significant abnormal return for two years holding period when a size 
matched firm is used a benchmark. Similar, pattern emerges when value weighting is used. 
All the returns (across benchmarks and for different holding periods) are positive and two and 
three year returns for size and BM matched benchmark are significantly different from zero. 
For IPOs with lockups less than or equal to 12 months, we find that although these IPOs do 
not underperform the relevant benchmarks, the returns are not significantly different from 
zero with the exception of three year BHAR for market adjusted benchmark. Again value 
weighting reduces the size of BHARs and almost half the returns turn negative although 
statistically insignificant, except one year return for size matched benchmark which is 
significantly negative. Overall, we find evidence of superior long run performance on the part 
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of IPOs with longer lockups relative to the IPOs with shorter lockups, with the caveat that the 
significance of results depends on the weighting scheme and the choice of benchmark.  
[Insert Table 5.3 about here] 
Table 5.4 presents results of wealth relatives for full sample and different sub samples based 
on median lockup length and top and bottom quartiles of lockup length. The wealth relatives 
of full sample for different holding periods are above one across three benchmarks which 
shows that overall IPO sample outperforms the relevant benchmarks. A comparison of wealth 
relatives between IPOs with lockups longer that median and IPOs with lockup shorter than 
median shows that the wealth relatives for former group are consistently higher than the latter 
group. Similar results are observed for IPOs with lockups greater than 18 months and IPOs 
with lockups less than or equal to 12 months, which further supports that longer lockup IPOs 
perform better than the shorter lockup IPOs. Moreover, these results are also consistent with 
the results of BHAR reported in Table 5.2.    
[Insert Table 5.4 about here] 
5.4.2 Factor Regression Models 
 In Table 5.5, we report the results of CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three factor model and 
Carthart’s (1997) four factor model using OLS for monthly portfolios of IPOs with lockups 
longer than median and IPOs with lockups shorter than median. The results for a 12-, 24- and 
36-month portfolio are reported in panel A, B and C respectively. As discussed in the 
methodology section, a 12-, 24- ad 36-month portfolio includes all the IPOs which occurred 
during the last 12, 24 and 36 month respectively. In Panel A, we find that the coefficient of 
intercept (alpha) is positive and statistically significant in all three models for IPOs with 
lockups longer than median. Similarly, for IPO with lockups shorter than median, the alpha is 
positive in all three models but significant only in three- and four-factor models. Moreover, 
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the magnitude of alpha is higher for IPOs with lockups longer than median for CAPM and 
four-factor models than IPOs with lockup shorter than median but lower in case of three-
factor model. These results suggest a weak evidence of better return performance for IPOs 
with longer lockups compared to shorter lockups in case of 12-month portfolio. The results 
for a 24-month portfolio are reported in Panel B of Table 5.5. We find that the intercept is 
positive, although insignificant, in all models for IPOs with lockups longer than median. For 
IPOs with lockups shorter than median, the intercept term is negative for CAPM model but it 
is positive for three-and four-factor models. We, however, find that intercept terms for IPOs 
with lockup longer than median are consistently higher than that for IPOs with lockups 
shorter than median, which shows better performance for the former group of IPOs. Panel C 
of Table 5.5 reports the results of a 36-month portfolio. We find that the intercept term is 
positive in all models for both groups of IPOs and none of these intercepts are statistically 
significant. Unlike the results for 12-and 24-month portfolios, there is no evidence of superior 
performance on part of IPOs with longer lockups compared to the IPOs with shorter lockups.   
[Insert Table 5.5 about here] 
In order to test for the robustness of our results, we re-estimate all the factor regression 
models in Table 5.5 using the WLS regressions. The results of WLS regressions are presented 
in Table 5.6. Similar to the OLS results for 12-month portfolio, in panel A we find that IPOs 
with lockups longer than median outperform the IPOs with lockups shorter than median when 
CAPM is used, although the intercept term is not statistically significant in either of these two 
portfolio groups. However, results from other two models (FF3F and FF4F) show significant 
intercept terms and better performance for IPOs with lockups shorter than median compared 
to the IPOs with lockups longer than median. However, results for 24-month portfolio in 
panel B clearly indicate IPOs with lockups shorter than median perform poorly as compared 
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to the IPOs with lockups longer than median as the intercept term is negative in all three 
models and significant in case of CAPM. On the other hand, intercept term is only negative in 
case of CAPM and positive, although statistically insignificant, for other two models for IPOs 
with lockups longer than median. The results from Panel C for 36-month portfolio also show 
a better performance for IPOs with lockups longer than median as intercept terms in all three 
models are positive and higher than that of IPOs with lockups shorter than median.     
[Insert Table 5.6 about here] 
Overall results from Table 5.5 and 5.6 show a weak evidence of better performance on the 
part of the IPOs with lockups longer than median compared to the IPOs with lockups shorter 
than median. Although statistically insignificant, the mean monthly returns measured by 
intercept terms for 24- and 36-month portfolios of IPOs with lockups longer than median are 
positive and higher than the intercept terms of IPOs with lockups shorter than median. The 
results for 12-month portfolio are, however, inconsistent for some models as IPOs with 
lockups longer than median underperform as compared the IPOs with lockups shorter than 
median. But this is consistent with our earlier discussion that dividing IPOs on the basis of 
median might not show strong performance differences between IPOs with lockups longer 
than and shorter than median lockup length. 
In order to provide more robust evidence of our earlier results, we next divide IPOs on the 
basis of quartile of their lockup length. We compare the performance of IPOs in the bottom 
quartile of their lockup length with the IPOs from top quartile of lockup length. Effectively, 
our first portfolio consists of IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months (top quartile) and our 
second portfolio consists of all IPOs with lockup shorter than or equal to 12 months (bottom 
quartile). We believe that dividing IPOs based on the quartiles of their lockup length would 
provide more robust results for performance differences between longer and shorter lockup 
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IPOs. The results of OLS regression models for both groups of IPOs are presented in Table 
5.7 using three models earlier discussed. Evaluating the results of 12-month portfolio from 
Panel A of table 5.7, we find that the intercept terms of IPOs with lockup longer than 18 
months are statistically significant and consistently higher than the intercepts of IPOs with 
lockups shorter than or equal to 12 months. For IPOs with lockups shorter than or equal to 12 
months, the intercepts are significant for three and four factor models while insignificant for 
the CAPM model. These results clearly indicate that IPOs with longer lockups perform better 
than IPOs with shorter lockups for a 12-month calendar portfolio. Similar results are observed 
for a 24-month portfolio in Panel B where, the intercept term is positive and statistically 
significant in two out of three models for IPOs in longer lockup group. Further, the size of 
intercept terms is larger relative to those for IPOs in shorter lockup group. For IPOs in shorter 
lockup group, all intercept terms are statistically insignificant and positive in two out of three 
models. Finally, for 36-month portfolio for IPOs in both groups, there is clear evidence that 
IPOs in longer lockup group consistently perform better than IPOs in shorter lockup group. 
For instance, intercepts in all three models for IPOs in longer lockup groups are positive, 
statistically significant and consistently higher relative to the intercepts for IPOs in the shorter 
lockup group. On the other hand, although positive, only one out of three intercepts in shorter 
IPO group is significant at 10% level. In Table 5.8, we re-estimate all models using the WLS 
regressions for IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months and IPOs with lockups shorter than 
or equal to 12 months. Consistent with earlier results reported in Table 5.7, we find that IPOs 
in longer lockup group show superior performance than IPOs in shorter lockup group using 
WLS regressions. For example, intercept terms for IPOs in longer lockup group are 
consistently higher than those in shorter lockup group across all models and portfolio 
formation periods (12-, 24 and 36-months). The intercept terms are significant in six out of 
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nine regression models for IPOs in the longer lockup group. However, for IPOs in the shorter 
lockup group, the intercepts are positive in five out of nine models but significant only in two 
models.  
[Insert Table 5.7 about here] 
[Insert Table 5.8 about here] 
The overall results from our factor models provide evidence that IPOs with longer lockups 
generally perform better than IPOs with shorter lockups using different factor models and 
portfolio formation periods. When IPOs are divided into two portfolio groups based on their 
median lockup length, IPOs with lockups longer than median have higher excess returns 
relative to IPOs with lockups shorter than median for 24- and 36-month portfolios. The results 
for 12-month portfolio, though, depend on the model used. We, therefore, find weak evidence 
of superior long run post-IPO performance for longer lockup IPOs relative to shorter lockup 
IPOs when median cut-off is used. However, when IPO are grouped on the basis of top and 
bottom quartiles of lockup length, we find that the intercept terms for IPOs with lockups in 
the top quartile (longer than 18 months) are consistently positive and significant irrespective 
of the factor model, weighting scheme or the portfolio period. On the other hand, intercept 
terms for IPO with lockups in the bottom quartile (shorter than or equal to 12 month) are 
mostly negative and statistically insignificant. As such, we find strong evidence to suggest 
that IPOs with longer lockups show better post-IPO performance relative the IPOs with 
shorter lockups for calendar time factor model regressions. Moreover, these results are 
consistent with our earlier analysis using event-time approach.       
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5.4.3 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Long-Run Performance 
Next, we conduct a multivariate analysis to further test the robustness of our results. We use 
raw IPO return (BHR), market adjusted BHAR, size matched firm adjusted BHAR and a size 
and BM matched firm adjusted BHAR as the dependant variables in our different model 
specifications. We run regression models using one, two and three year returns respectively in 
all models.  
In Table 5.9, we present the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the cross-sectional 
regressions. The mean (median) length of lockup period is 15.205 (12.367) months for our 
sample of IPOs. More than half (56.3%) of the IPOs have venture capital/private equity 
backing. The average market share of the underwriter based on the number of IPOs sponsored 
in the preceding year is 2.36%. The mean pre-IPO year total assets for sample IPOs are 
£195.451 million with a median of just £22.637 million. Due to the highly skewed 
distribution of total assets, we use natural log of total assets in all our regression models. 
Insiders retain an average of 24.646% of post-IPO equity in IPO firms. The average age of the 
issuing firm is 15.73 years with a median of 9.56 years, where age is measured as difference 
in years between the IPO date and company founding date. IPO firms experience an average 
first day returns of 12.017% over the sample period. The ROA for the sample is -25.7% with 
a median value of 7.00%.           
[Insert Table 5.9 about here] 
 Table 5.10 reports the results of regression models when raw log returns (LBHRs) are used 
for one, two and three post-IPO years. Consistent with our earlier findings using event time 
and calendar time methodology, length of lockup is positively and significantly related to the 
long-run performance of IPOs irrespective of the holding period used. Among other control 
variables, ROA is significant in all three models showing that profitability at the time of IPO 
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is a significant predictor of the post-IPO stock return performance and is consistent with the 
findings of Gao and Jain (2011). Assets, our proxy for size of the firm is positive and 
significant in model (2) and (3) indicating that large firms are likely to perform better after the 
IPO. Age of the IPO firm is also a significant predictor of the post-IPO return performance. 
For instance the coefficient of Age is positive for all three models and statistically significant 
for two and three year holding period reruns, consistent with other studies (Dong et al., 2011, 
Ritter, 1991). The coefficients of VC and UW Reputation are negative but statistically 
insignificant showing the negative impact of VC backing and reputed underwriters on the 
post-IPO long run performance.     
[Insert Table 5.10 about here] 
Regression results for the abnormal returns (LBHARs) using market adjusted, size matched 
control firm and a size and BM matched control form benchmarks are presented in Tables 
5.11,5.12 and 5.13 respectively. Moreover, we estimate the regressions for one, two and three 
year holding period abnormal returns. Consistent with our prediction, lockup length is 
positively and significantly related to the abnormal log returns in all three holding periods and 
across all the benchmarks. For instance, coefficient of Lu Months is significant at either 1% or 
5% in Table 5.11 and 5.12. Using size and BM matched benchmark reduces the statistical 
significance of results in Table 5.13, yet Lu Months is significant at 10% for one and two year 
holding period returns and significant at 5% for the three year holding period. Overall, we 
find a consistent evidence to suggest that the length of lockup has a positive impact on post-
IPO long-run performance of IPOs and our results are robust to the choice of holding period 
and benchmark. The results regarding other control variables are also consistent across the 
different regression models. ROA, for example, has a consistently positive and significant 
coefficient across all the regressions. Similarly, size measured by the log of total assets has a 
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positive impact on two and three year holding period abnormal returns with a varying levels 
of statistical significance. The coefficient of age is also positive and significant at least for 
market adjusted and size matched firm adjusted benchmarks. Rest of the control variables are 
generally insignificant across different model specifications.  
[Insert Table 5.11 about here] 
[Insert Table 5.12 about here] 
[Insert Table 5.13 about here] 
5.5 Lockup Expiry Returns  
5.5.1 Methodology 
In this section, we analyse return performance of sample IPOs around lockup expiry day by 
conducting a standard event study. The lockup expiry day is taken as day zero, and 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated over several short and long 
windows around the lockup expiry day.  We calculate CAARs for 41 days (-20, +20), 21 days 
(-10, +10), 5 days (-20, +2) and 3 days (-1, +1) around the lockup expiry day following 
existing studies on market reaction to lockup expiration (Field and Hanka, 2001, Brav and 
Gompers, 2003, Espenlaub et al., 2001). We also calculate abnormal returns on the day of 
lockup expiry (day 0) and for two post lockup expiry windows of 9 days (+2, +10) and 19 
days (+2, +20).  
Prior studies on market reaction to the lockup expiration have mostly used a single model 
approach to calculate the abnormal returns. For example, Field and Hanka (2001) and Brav 
and Gompers (2003) use a market-adjusted model to calculate the abnormal returns around 
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lockup expiry day
35
. Market-adjusted model is easy to implement in the sense that it does not 
require any model parameters to be estimated from the pre-event return data. Brau et al. 
(2004) use a market model with the CRSP equal weighted index as the proxy for market 
return. As the market model requires model parameters to be estimated from pre-event data, 
Brau et al. (2004) use data beginning at 90 days prior and ending at 11 days prior to the 
lockup expiry for calculating the estimated betas. Similar models have been used in the 
lockup expiry return analysis in the UK studies. For instance, Hoque and Lasfer (2009) and 
Hoque (2011) use market-adjusted and market model respectively for UK IPOs. Unlike these 
studies, we use a multi model approach to examine the market reaction around lockup expiry 
day in order to provide more robust results. We calculate abnormal returns for the IPOs 
relative to three different models. Our first model is the simple market-adjusted model, where 
return on FTSE Allshare index is used as a proxy for market return. Our second model is a 
standard CAPM model and third model is Fama and French (1993) three factor model. As 
these two models require estimation of the model parameters from the pre-event data, we use 
an estimation window starting at 240 days prior to and ending at 21 days prior to the lockup 
expiry date for our main 41 day event window.
36
 Due to the longer lockup length for UK 
IPOs, we are able to use this long estimation window for most of our IPO sample
37
. Below we 
explain the calculation for abnormal returns, cumulative average abnormal returns and the 
estimation of expected or normal returns using three models described earlier.   
The Abnormal Return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) for individual security and event date is defined as the 
difference between the realised return and the expected return; 
                                                 
35
 Filed and Hanka (2001), however, also use market model and raw returns analysis but don not report the 
results for these models.  
36
 Similarly, the estimation window for 21 day event window is -240 to -11 days relative to lockup expiry and so 
on for rest of the shorter windows.  
37
 There are only 17 IPOs for which we use shorter estimation window as their lockup period is shorter than the 
240 day estimation window.  
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𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)                     (5.9) 
Cumulating the abnormal returns across time gives the cumulative abnormal return; 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜏2
𝑡=𝜏1
                          (5.10) 
The cross-sectional average for cumulative abnormal returns is; 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1                           (5.11) 
We use three commonly employed models in literature to estimate expected or normal return 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡): market-adjusted model, CAPM and Fama and French (1993) three factor model 
(FF3F). For market-adjusted model, we use FTSE Allshare index to proxy the daily market 
returns. For CAPM and FF3F, we use -240 to -21 days relative to the lockup expiry day (0) as 
the estimation window to estimate model parameters.  
More specifically the Abnormal Return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is calculated as; 
For market-adjusted model; 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡        (5.12) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 the daily is return on security 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the daily return on FTSE 
Allshare index on day 𝑡.  
For CAPM; 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡)]             (5.13) 
Where 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the return on three month Treasury bill on day  𝑡 and 𝛽𝑖 is the CAPM beta 
estimated by an OLS time series regression of daily excess returns (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) of security 𝑖 on 
the market risk premium (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) over the estimation period (-240 to -21 days).   
For Fama and French (1993) three factor model; 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − [𝑅𝑓𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + 𝛿𝑖(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡)]          (5.14) 
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where  𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖and 𝛿𝑖 are estimated by OLS regression of security 𝑖′𝑠 daily excess return on the 
daily market excess return, size and book-to-market factors over the estimation period. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  
and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 are Fama and French size and book-to-market factor returns where 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the 
small minus big portfolio return on day 𝑡 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the high minus low book-to-market 
portfolio return on day 𝑡. The daily return factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). 
The cross-sectional t-test of the CAAR is calculated as: 
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2)
?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝜏
                          (5.15) 
Under the null hypothesis, the CAAR is equal to zero. The variance estimator for this 
statistics is based on the cross-section of abnormal returns: 
?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁(𝑁−𝑑)
 ∑ [𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) −
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2)]
2            (5.16) 
5.5.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 5.14 presents the results of event study around the lockup expiry for full sample of 
IPOs using different windows discussed earlier. The mean CAAR and t-statistic are presented 
for market-adjusted model, CAPM and Fama and French three factor model. We find that our 
sample IPOs experience negative returns around wider lockup expiry windows of 41 (-20, 
+20) and 21 (-10, +10) days. These results are statistically significant for market-adjusted and 
CAPM models. For instance, mean CAARs of -3.49% and -1.97% are observed for 41 and 21 
day windows using the CAPM and both returns are statistically significant at 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Similarly, we find significant negative returns for post lockup expiry 
windows of (+2, +10) and (+2, +20) days across all the models. Our results provide evidence 
of poor performance around wider lockup expiry windows. However, we do not find poor 
performance in our sample around the shorter lockup expiry windows. For example, the 
CAARs for 3 (-1, +1) and 5 (-2, +2) day windows around the lockup expiry are generally 
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positive although statistically insignificant across different models. Moreover, average 
CAARs on the day of lockup expiry (day 0) are also positive but statistically insignificant. 
This shows that sample IPOs do not perform poorly for the shorter windows around the 
lockup expiry. Our results for short lockup expiry windows are inconsistent with the earlier 
documented evidence for the US and UK markets (Field and Hanka, 2001, Brav and 
Gompers, 2003, Hoque and Lasfer, 2009). For example, Field and Hanka (2001) report a 
significant abnormal return of -1.5% for 3 day window around the lockup expiration date for 
US IPOs. The lack of negative performance around the shorter lockup expiry windows in our 
IPOs is, however, consistent with the findings of Espenlaub et al. (2001) for UK IPOs. 
Although, Espenlaub et al. (2001) report negative CAARs around shorter lockup expiry 
windows, none of their abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. Overall, we 
find significant negative performance for wider windows (41 and 21 days) around lockup 
expiry, though our results for shorter lockup expiry windows exhibit lack of negative 
performance for sample IPOs which is inconsistent with earlier reported evidence (as 
discussed above).        
[Insert Table 5.14 about here] 
Next, we divide our sample IPOs in groups based on their lockup length and examine their 
performance around lockup expiry. In line with our earlier analysis on long-run performance 
in previous section, IPOs are grouped on the basis of median as well as top and bottom 
quartile of lockup period. In Table 5.15, we compare mean CAARs for IPOs with lockups 
longer than median and IPOs with lockups shorter than median for different windows using 
market-adjusted, CAPM and FF3F models. The results reveal that IPOs with lockups shorter 
than median experience significant negative CAARs around lockup expiry dates. For instance, 
the mean CAARs for 41 and 21 days around lockup expiry for IPOs with lockups shorter than 
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median range from -5.89% to -3.17% across all models. Moreover, these CAARs are 
statistically significant at 1% or 5% level for different models. On the other hand, for IPOs 
with lockups longer than median, mean CAARs range from -1.51% to 1.87% for 41 and 21 
day windows around lockup expiry and none of these CAARs are significantly different from 
zero. Similar results are reported for post lockup expiry windows (+2, +10 and +2, +20) 
where we find high negative and significant CAARs for IPOs with lockups shorter than 
median compared to IPOs with lockups longer than median. We observe similar results for 
shorter windows around lockup expiry as mean CAARs are higher for IPOs with lockups 
longer than median relative to IPOs with lockups shorter than median although none of these 
CAARs are statistically significant. However, inconsistent with other event windows, CAARs 
for IPOs with lockups shorter than median are higher compared to the CAARs for IPOs with 
lockups longer than median.  Overall, most of the CAARs for market-adjusted and FF3F 
model are positive for IPOs with lockups longer than median for most of the event windows. 
For instance, we observe positive CAARs for six out of seven event windows in case of FF3F 
model and four out of seven event windows in case of market-adjusted model for IPOs with 
lockups longer than median. As such, based on event study results from Table 5.15, we find 
evidence that IPOs with shorter lockups experience significant negative returns around 
lockups expiry date relative to IPOs with longer lockups where returns are insignificantly 
negative or positive. Furthermore, returns for IPOs with longer lockups are consistently larger 
than that of IPOs with shorter lockups. Our results clearly suggest that IPOs with longer 
lockups experience better return performance around lockup expiry in line with our 
expectation.                            
[Insert Table 5.15 about here] 
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In Table 5.16, we provide a comparison of return performance of IPOs with lockup longer 
than 18 months versus IPOs with lockups shorter than or equal to 12 months around different 
lockup expiry windows. Consistent with our results in Table 5.15, IPOs with longer lockups 
continue to show superior performance than IPOs with shorter lockups. It is also important to 
note that the negative performance on part of IPOs with lockups shorter than or equal to 12 
months has become more severe compared to the results in Table 5.15
38
. For example, using 
FF3F model  in Table 5.16, the mean CAARs for two sub-samples of IPOs for 41 day 
window are 2.97% (lockups >18 months) and a statistically significant -4.93% (lockups ≤ 12 
months) compared to 1.87% (lockups > median) and significant -4.69% (lockups < median) in 
Table 5.15. We also find that most of the CAARs for IPOs with lockups longer than 18 
months are positive although insignificantly different from zero
39
. Whereas, the mean CAARs 
are mostly negative and significantly different from zero at least for wider event windows 
around lockup expiry in case of IPOs with lockup shorter than or equal to 12 months.    
[Insert Table 5.16 about here]      
Overall, results from Table 5.15 and 5.16 provide a strong evidence of better return 
performance around lockup expiry for IPOs with longer lockups relative to IPOs with shorter 
lockup. The results also reveal that the significant negative returns performance around wider 
lockup expiry windows (41 and 21 days) and for post-lockup expiry windows (+2, +10 and 
+2, +20) in full sample (Table 5.14) is mainly driven by IPOs with shorter lockups. Finally, 
our results are robust to choice of different expected return models and shorter and wider 
windows around lockup expiry.  
                                                 
38
 It is expected because in Table 5.16 we are comparing the performance of IPOs in two extreme quartiles of 
lockup length (top and bottom quartile).    
39
 However, the CAARs for 5 day window (-2, +2) are 2.01 and statistically significant at 10% in FF3F model 
for IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months. 
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5.5.3 Robustness of the Results on Lockup Expiry Returns 
Prior research on return performance around lockup expiry provides evidence that VC/PE 
backed IPOs exhibit severe negative performance compared to the non VC/PE backed IPOs. 
Field and Hanka (2001), for example, find that the three-day abnormal return in VC backed 
firms is  three times larger than in non VC backed companies (-2.3% vs -0.8%). They attribute 
this severe negative performance to more aggressive selling by venture capitalists at the time 
of lockup expiry. Similarly, Brau et al. (2004) argue that VCs are less likely to hold their 
shares in long-run than other insiders and find a negative relation between the VC presence 
and abnormal returns around lockup expiry. Bradley et al. (2001) also report that losses 
around lockup expiry in their sample are concentrated in VC backed IPOs. Espenlaub et al. 
(2003) report similar results for the UK IPOs and find that CAARs for VC backed IPOs are 
lower than that of non-VC backed IPOs for most of their short event windows around lockup 
expiry day. In order to provide more robustness for our results, we extend the analysis in 
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 and further classify IPOs into VC backed and non-VC backed. In panel 
A of Table 5.17, we first classify IPOs based on their VC/PE backing status and then within 
each sub-sample IPOs are further divided into two groups: IPOs with lockups shorter than 
median and IPOs with lockup longer than median. Panel B reports the comparative CAARs 
for IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months and IPOs with lockups shorter than or equal to 
12 months for each of the VC backed and non-VC backed IPOs. We find that IPOs with 
lockups shorter than median have significant lower returns compared to IPOs with lockups 
longer than median regardless of their VC backing status. IPOs with longer lockups 
consistently perform better around lockup expiry in both VC backed and non-VC backed sub-
samples. The results from Panel B show the similar performance differences between IPOs 
with lockups longer than 18 months and IPOs with lockups shorter than or equal to 12 months 
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across both VC backed and non-VC backed sub-samples. IPOs with lockup shorter than or 
equal to 12 months are the worst performers regardless of their VC/PE backing status. A 
comparison of the IPOs in the longer lockup groups across VC and non VC backed IPOs 
reveals that most of the CAARs for different event windows are positive although none of the 
CAARs in these groups are significantly different from zero. This shows that longer lockups 
reduce negative performance in VC as well as non-VC backed IPOs alike. On the other hand, 
comparing IPOs in shorter lockup groups across VC and non-VC backed IPOs shows that 
most of the CAARs for different event windows are negative and statistically significant. 
Results regarding the level of underperformance between VC and non-VC backed IPOs with 
shorter lockups are, however, inconsistent and depend on the model used. Finally, results also 
show that there are more statistically significant negative CAARs in VC backed sample 
relative to non-VC backed sample in shorter lockup groups. This suggests that VC backed 
IPOs with shorter lockups suffer more compared to the non VC backed IPOs. In sum, results 
from Table 5.17 provide evidence that longer lockups help to reduce negative return 
performance around lockup expiry even in VC backed IPOs and lend more robustness to our 
earlier analysis.  
[Insert Table 5.17 about here] 
5.6 Conclusion 
The literature on lockup agreements has largely focused on the motivations of lockups at the 
time of IPOs and market reaction to the expiry of the lockups. Two competing hypothesis for 
the existence of (longer) lockups are suggested in the prior literature. Signalling hypothesis 
argues that longer lockups signal firm quality, while commitment hypothesis suggest that 
longer lockups help to reduce moral hazard or agency problem.  However, the role of lockups 
beyond IPO and particularly in relation to the long run post-IPO performance has received 
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little attention.  Recently two studies have attempted to fill this gap by relating lockup length 
with post issue performance of IPOs and SEOs in US. Both the studies find support for the 
commitment hypothesis and suggest that lockups are not indicative of issuer quality.    
In this study, we argue that there are significant institutional differences in US and UK in 
terms of lockups and the relation between lockup length and post- IPO long-run performance 
merits further investigation. The relatively longer and diverse lockups in UK compared to the 
US markets may serve as a more credible signal of quality and a prolonged involvement and 
monitoring of insiders may also reduce agency problems resulting in better long-run 
performance of IPOs. Therefore, we predict that lockup length is positively related to post-
IPO long-run performance. Furthermore, we also expect that IPOs with longer lockups show 
better return performance around lockup expiry compared to IPOs with shorter lockups. 
Using both event-time and calendar-time approaches to long-run IPO performance, we 
document several interesting results. We find that, in contrast to the extant literature on IPO 
underperformance, our sample IPOs outperform the benchmarks, at least on equal weighted 
return basis in event time analysis using BHARs and wealth relatives. A comparative analysis 
of BHARs between IPOs with longer lockups and shorter lockups reveals that IPOs with 
longer lockups consistently perform better than IPOs with shorter lockups irrespective of the 
benchmark and weighting scheme. Similar results are observed when long-run performance is 
measured on the basis of wealth relatives. Comparing long-run performance in calendar-time 
approach using different factor models and regression techniques also reveals that portfolios 
of IPOs with longer lockups consistently earn higher abnormal returns relative to that of 
shorter lockups. Our cross-sectional regressions provide further support to these results and 
we document a positive and significant relation between lookup length and long-run IPO 
performance. These results clearly suggest that lockup length signals firm quality which is 
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evident from superior long-run performance on the part of IPOs with longer lockups and 
provide support to our prediction.  
We also analyse stock return performance around lockup expiry dates for IPOs with longer 
and shorter lockups. Our results show that IPOs with shorter lockups experience significant 
negative abnormal returns around relatively longer expiry windows. On the other hand, 
abnormal returns for IPOs with longer lockups, although negative, are statistically 
insignificant. These results are robust to different models specifications and sub-samples of 
VC and non-VC backed IPOs. These results provide further support to our expectation that 
high quality IPOs are less likely to suffer negative performance around lockup expiry.  
Our study adds to the literature on determinants of long run IPO performance and shows that 
lockup length is an important yet relatively ignored factor in long run performance studies. 
Although one can argue that in a rational and efficient market, the signalling effect of lockups 
should be quickly absorbed in the valuations and there should not be performance differences 
between shorter and longer lockup IPOs. However, our evidence suggests that investors do 
not fully understand and incorporate the true value of longer lockup signal instantaneously but 
only gradually over time (as the positive information is realised in terms of firm 
performance). This would imply higher future stock returns for firms with longer lockups.      
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Table 5.1 Sample Distribution 
This table presents distribution of sample IPOs across years and industry groups. Panel A presents sample 
distribution and Lockup period in months across offer years. Panel B gives the industry distribution of sample 
IPOs and Lockup period. The mean, median and standard deviation of lockup period in months is shown across 
offer years and industry sectors.    
Panel A: Time distribution           
      Lockup Months 
Year Freq. % Mean Median Std. dev. 
1995 27 10.07 18 16 7 
1996 40 14.93 17 16 5 
1997 36 13.43 19 18 6 
1998 27 10.07 15 14 6 
1999 18 6.72 14 12 5 
2000 54 20.15 12 12 5 
2001 6 2.24 19 20 6 
2002 12 4.48 11 12 4 
2003 5 1.87 10 12 3 
2004 15 5.60 13 12 3 
2005 14 5.22 15 12 7 
2006 14 5.22 15 12 7 
Total 268 100 15 12 6 
Panel B: Industry (SIC) distribution  
        Lockup Months 
Industry Two-digit SIC Freq. % Mean Median Std. dev. 
Oil and Gas 13 10 3.73 16 13 7 
Paper and Paper Products 24-27 7 2.61 19 12 11 
Chemical Products 28 17 6.34 18 17 6 
Electronic Equipment 36 13 4.85 12 12 3 
Scientific Instruments 38 13 4.85 19 17 8 
Communications 48 16 5.97 12 12 5 
Durable Goods 50 15 5.60 15 15 4 
Computer Equipment and Services 35,73 75 27.99 15 12 6 
Engineering and Management 
Services 
87 20 7.46 17 16 6 
Retail 53,54,56,57,59 20 7.46 14 13 5 
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 6 2.24 15 13 5 
Transportation 
37,39,40-
42,44,45 
6 2.24 11 12 3 
All Others 
 
50 18.66 15 13 6  
Total 
 
268 100 15 12 6 
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Table 5.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the one, two and three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for full sample and IPOs 
stratified by the median lockup length. The sample consists of 268 IPOs with lockups between 1995 and 2006 on 
LSE Main Market. The equal weighted (EW) and value weighted (VW) buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
reported using three benchmarks; market index (FTSE AllShare) in Panel A, Size matched firms in Panel B, and 
Size and Book to Market (BM) matched firms in Panel C. For value weighted returns, weights are based on the 
market capitalisation of the IPOs. The holding period begins from 1
st
 day after the day of issuance. The skewness 
adjusted test statistics are reported within brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels 
respectively.   
Holding Full Sample  
Lockup > Median  
 
Lockup < Median  
Period EW (%) VW (%)   EW (%) VW (%)   EW (%) VW (%) 
Panel A: Market Return 
One Year 15.56*** -6.50 
 
24.13*** 9.72 
 
6.99 -10.15 
 
[3.54] [-1.10] 
 
[3.68] [1.34] 
 
[1.22] [-1.43] 
Two Years 31.36*** 9.11 
 
43.47*** 28.79** 
 
19.25 4.68 
 
[3.29] [0.85] 
 
[3.24] [2.03] 
 
[1.42] [0.37] 
Three Years 36.98*** 18.22 
 
43.09*** 35.01** 
 
30.87 14.44 
  [3.22] [1.42] 
 
[2.97] [2.35] 
 
[1.61] [0.74] 
Panel B: Size Matched Firms 
One Year 11.50** -9.35 
 24.63*** 11.66  
-1.63 -14.09* 
 
[2.09] [-1.42] 
 
[3.24] [1.45] 
 
[-0.20] [-1.70] 
Two Years 19.16 4.48 
 37.77** 31.87*  
0.54 -1.70 
 
[1.46] [0.35] 
 
[2.02] [1.69] 
 
[0.09] [-0.02] 
Three Years 19.65 10.97 
 27.98 36.6*  
11.33 5.19 
  [1.26] [0.69]   [1.31] [1.71]   [0.53] [0.29] 
Panel C: Size and BM Matched Firms 
One Year 11.55** -8.42 
 
19.66** 3.04 
 
3.43 -11.00 
 
[1.98] [-1.31] 
 
[2.06] [0.32] 
 
[0.52] [-1.45] 
Two Years 24.84** 4.68 
 
35.87** 18.1 
 
13.81 1.65 
 
[2.35] [0.43] 
 
[2.33] [1.13] 
 
[0.97] [0.18] 
Three Years 18.01 15.63 
 
9.16 16.95 
 
26.86 15.33 
 
[1.36] [1.17] 
 
[0.52] [0.95] 
 
[1.40] [0.79] 
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Table 5.3 Buy-and Hold Abnormal Returns for Different Lockup Lengths 
This table presents the one, two and three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for IPOs with lockups 
greater than 18 months and IPOs with lockups less than or equal to 12 months.  The sample consists of 268 IPOs 
with lockups between 1995 and 2006 on the LSE Main Market. The equal weighted (EW) and value weighted 
(VW) buy-and-hold abnormal returns are reported using three benchmarks; market index (FTSE AllShare) in 
Panel A, Size matched firms in Panel B, and Size and Book to Market (BM) matched firms in Panel C. For value 
weighted returns, weights are based on the market capitalisation of the IPOs. The holding period begins from the 
1
st
 day after the day of issuance. The skewness adjusted test statistics are reported within brackets. ***, ** and * 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively.   
Holding Lockup > 18 months  
Lockup ≤ 12 months 
Period EW (%) VW (%)   EW (%) VW (%) 
Panel A: Market Return  
One Year 38.52*** 14.05 
 
7.26 -10.14 
 
[3.91] [1.23] 
 
[1.25] [-1.40] 
Two Years 55.07*** 20.82 
 
20.98 5.02 
 
[2.62] [0.91] 
 
[1.54] [0.39] 
Three Years 44.32** 25.42 
 
33.14* 14.9 
  [1.97] [1.08]   [1.72] [0.75] 
Panel B: Size Matched Firms  
One Year 42.35*** 15.6 
 
-1.63 -14.11* 
 
[3.90] [1.26] 
 
[-0.20] [-1.67] 
Two Years 60.12** 25.68 
 
1.36 -1.49 
 
[2.58] [1.02] 
 
[0.13] [-0.01] 
Three Years 39.99 29.8 
 
12.5 5.49 
  [1.51] [1.11]   [0.57] [0.31] 
Panel C: Size and BM Matched Firms 
One Year 27.16*** 14.26 
 
3.47 -11.03 
 
[2.82] [1.45] 
 
[0.51] [-1.43] 
Two Years 38.9** 39.69** 
 
14.88 1.89 
 
[2.01] [2.06] 
 
[1.03] [0.19] 
Three Years 29.55 40.78* 
 
28.11 15.6 
 
[1.28] [1.76] 
 
[1.45] [0.79] 
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Table 5.4 Wealth Relatives for Full Sample and Different Lockup Lengths 
This table reports the one, two and three-year Wealth Relatives for full sample, sub-sample stratified by the median lockup length, and  IPOs with lockups greater than 18 
months and IPOs with lockups less than and equal to 12 months.  The sample consists of 268 IPOs with lockups between 1995 and 2006 on LSE Main Market. The equal 
weighted Wealth Relatives are reported using three benchmarks; market index (FTSE AllShare) in Panel A, Size matched firms in Panel B, and Size and Book to Market 
(BM) matched firms in Panel C. The holding period begins from the 1
st
 day after the day of issuance. 
Holding Wealth Relatives 
Period Full Sample  
Lockup > Median Lockup < Median 
 
Lockup > 18 months Lockup ≤  12 months 
Panel A: Market Return  
One Year 1.15 
 
1.22 1.07 
 
1.35 1.07 
 
       
Two Years 1.28 
 
1.37 1.19 
 
1.46 1.20 
 
       
Three Years 1.33 
 
1.35 1.30 
 
1.36 1.33 
Panel B: Size Matched Firms 
One Year 1.10 
 
1.23 0.99 
 
1.40 0.99 
 
       
Two Years 1.16 
 
1.31 1.00 
 
1.53 1.01 
 
       
Three Years 1.15   1.20 1.09   1.31 1.10 
Panel C: Size and BM Matched Firms 
One Year 1.11 
 
1.17 1.03 
 
1.32 1.03 
 
       
Two Years 1.21 
 
1.29 1.13 
 
1.36 1.14 
 
       
Three Years 1.14 
 
1.25 1.06 
 
1.27 1.22 
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Table 5.5 OLS Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions for Lockups Stratified by Medians 
This table presents regression results of calendar-time monthly abnormal returns using Capital Asset pricing 
Model (CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3F) and Carhart (1997) extension of Fama and 
French (1993) model (FF4F). For each calendar month, return on a 12-, 24 and 36-month portfolio is calculated 
for IPOs with lockups greater than median and IPOs with lockups less than median. The ordinary least square 
(OLS) time series regressions in each model are estimated with portfolio excess return as dependant variable, 
where portfolio excess return is the return on a 12-, 24- or 36-month portfolio of IPOs minus the risk free return. 
The Intercept shows the average monthly abnormal return on each portfolio. (Rm - Rf) is the excess return on the 
market portfolio, SMB is the difference in the returns of portfolios of small and large stocks, HML is the 
difference in the returns of portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks and UMD is the difference in 
returns of portfolios of high and low momentum stocks. The factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). The t-
statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
  Lockup > Median    Lockup < Median  
  CAPM FF3F FF4F   CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel A: 12 months Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0124* 0.0146** 0.015** 
 
0.0103 0.015*** 0.0137** 
 
[1.90] [2.85] [2.49] 
 
[1.50] [2.88] [2.49] 
Rm - Rf 1.055*** 0.956*** 0.947***  
1.409*** 1.264*** 1.292*** 
 
[6.32] [6.65] [6.29] 
 
[7.68] [9.20] [9.01] 
SMB 
 
0.621*** 0.618*** 
  
0.652*** 0.657*** 
  
[3.47] [3.44] 
  
[4.03] [4.05] 
HML 
 
-0.605*** -0.625*** 
  
-1.081*** -1.011*** 
  
[-4.37] [-3.59] 
  
[-8.19] [-6.17] 
UMD 
  
-0.027 
   
0.094 
   
[-0.20] 
   
[0.71] 
Adj. R
2
 0.24 0.44 0.45 
 
0.29 0.61 0.62 
Panel B: 24 Month Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0036 0.0042 0.0076 
 
-0.0017 0.0009 0.0007 
 
[0.57] [0.73] [1.30] 
 
[-0.30] [0.23] [0.16] 
Rm - Rf 0.924*** 0.843*** 0.777***  
1.140*** 1.063*** 1.068*** 
 
[6.30] [6.30] [5.73] 
 
[8.37] [10.38] [10.12] 
SMB 
 
0.781*** 0.753*** 
  
0.731*** 0.733*** 
  
[4.70] [4.57] 
  
[5.84] [5.82] 
HML 
 
-0.277** -0.471*** 
  
-0.765*** -0.751*** 
  
[-2.02] [-2.88] 
  
[-7.29] [-5.90] 
UMD 
  
-0.271** 
   
0.019 
   
[-2.11] 
   
[0.19] 
Adj. R
2
 0.22 0.36 0.40 
 
0.32 0.62 0.63 
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Table 5.5: Continued. 
  Lockup > Median    Lockup < Median  
  CAPM FF3F FF4F   CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel C: 36 Month Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0015 0.0001 0.0009 
 
0.0054 0.0061 0.0083 
 
[0.29] [0.02] [0.18] 
 
[0.88] [1.20] [1.60] 
Rm - Rf 0.702*** 0.586*** 0.562***  
0.986*** 0.906*** 0.841*** 
 
[6.02] [5.26] [4.85] 
 
[7.07] [7.60] [6.86] 
SMB 
 
0.644*** 0.624*** 
  
0.762*** 0.711*** 
  
[4.92] [4.68] 
  
[5.51] [5.11] 
HML 
 
-0.551 -0.118 
  
-0.581*** -0.751*** 
  
[-0.50] [-0.86] 
  
[-4.90] [-5.17] 
UMD 
  
-0.080 
   
-0.217** 
   
[-0.78] 
   
[-1.98] 
Adj. R
2
 0.21 0.31 0.34 
 
0.26 0.49 0.51 
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Table 5.6 WLS Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions for Lockups Stratified by Medians 
This table presents regression results of calendar-time monthly abnormal returns using Capital Asset pricing 
Model (CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3F) and Carhart (1997) extension of Fama and 
French (1993) model (FF4F). For each calendar month, return on a 12-, 24 and 36-month portfolio is calculated 
for IPOs with lockups greater than median and IPOs with lockups less than median. The weighted least square 
(WLS) time series regressions in each model are estimated with portfolio excess return as dependant variable, 
where portfolio excess return is the return on a 12-, 24- or 36-month portfolio of IPOs minus the risk free return. 
The number of firms in each portfolio every month is used as the weight. The Intercept shows the average 
monthly abnormal return on each portfolio. (Rm - Rf) is the excess return on the market portfolio, SMB is the 
difference in the returns of portfolios of small and large stocks, HML is the difference in the returns of portfolios 
of high and low book-to-market stocks and UMD is the difference in returns of portfolios of high and low 
momentum stocks. The factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). The t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 
Lockup > Median  
 
Lockup < Median  
  CAPM FF3F FF4F   CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel A: 12 months Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0059 0.0108** 0.0126*** 
 
-0.0001 0.0136** 0.0151*** 
 
[1.14] [2.49] [2.70] 
 
[-0.01] [2.56] [2.72] 
Rm - Rf 0.889*** 0.811*** 0.790***  
1.747*** 1.360*** 1.318*** 
 
[6.50] [7.02] [6.74] 
 
[9.32] [9.93] [9.11] 
SMB 
 
0.765*** 0.743*** 
  
0.453*** 0.459*** 
  
[5.44] [5.23] 
  
[2.72] [2.75] 
HML 
 
-0.454*** -0.546*** 
  
-1.114*** -1.185*** 
  
[-3.67] [-3.59] 
  
[-9.23] [-8.23] 
UMD 
  
-0.118 
   
-0.101 
   
[-1.03] 
   
[-0.91] 
Adj. R
2
 0.25 0.48 0.49 
 
0.37 0.68 0.69 
Panel B: 24 Month Portfolio 
Intercept -0.0042 0.0005 0.0032 
 
-0.0102* -0.0045 -0.0004 
 
[-0.87] [0.13] [0.83] 
 
[-1.71] [-1.00] [-0.09] 
Rm - Rf 0.789*** 0.711*** 0.677***  
1.425*** 1.184*** 1.097*** 
 
[7.07] [8.36] [7.95] 
 
[9.77] [10.89] [9.72] 
SMB 
 
0.926*** 0.889*** 
  
0.736*** 0.729*** 
  
[8.79] [8.45] 
  
[5.65] [5.69] 
HML 
 
-0.283*** -0.444*** 
  
-0.747*** -0.907*** 
  
[-3.17] [-3.92] 
  
[-7.31] [-7.52] 
UMD 
  
-0.203** 
   
-0.227* 
   
[-2.25] 
   
[-2.40] 
Adj. R
2
 0.26 0.58 0.60 
 
0.40 0.68 0.69 
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Table 5.6: Continued. 
 
Lockup > Median  
 
Lockup < Median  
  CAPM FF3F FF4F   CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel C: 36 Month Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0055 0.0032 0.0044 
 
-0.0037 -0.0021 0.0016 
 
[1.16] [0.79] [1.11] 
 
[-0.65] [-0.47] [0.35] 
Rm - Rf 0.692*** 0.625*** 0.570***  
1.201*** 1.047*** 0.937*** 
 
[6.30] [6.63] [6.03] 
 
[9.02] [10.10] [8.69] 
SMB 
 
0.692*** 0.681*** 
  
0.813*** 0.794*** 
  
[6.07] [6.09] 
  
[6.25] [6.26] 
HML 
 
-0.071 -0.265** 
  
-0.503*** -0.708*** 
  
[-0.96] [-2.55] 
  
[-5.19] [-6.02] 
UMD 
  
-0.229** 
   
-0.272*** 
   
[-2.61] 
   
[-2.93] 
Adj. R
2
 0.22 0.43 0.45 
 
0.36 0.62 0.64 
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Table 5.7 OLS Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions for Lockups Stratified by Top and 
Bottom Quartile of Lockup Length 
This table presents regression results of calendar-time monthly abnormal returns using Capital Asset pricing 
Model (CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3F) and Carhart (1997) extension of Fama and 
French (1993) model (FF4F). For each calendar month, return on a 12-, 24- and 36-month portfolio is calculated 
for IPOs with lockups greater than 18 months and IPOs with lockups less than or equal to 12 months. The 
ordinary least square (OLS) time series regressions in each model are estimated with portfolio excess return as 
dependant variable, where portfolio excess return is the return on a 12-, 24- or 36-month portfolio of IPOs minus 
the risk free return. The Intercept shows the average monthly abnormal return on each portfolio. (Rm - Rf) is the 
excess return on the market portfolio, SMB is the difference in the returns of portfolios of small and large stocks, 
HML is the difference in the returns of portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks and UMD is the 
difference in returns of portfolios of high and low momentum stocks. The factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). 
The t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
  Lockup >18 month   Lockup ≤ 12 Months 
  CAPM FF3F FF4F   CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel A: 12 months Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0192*** 0.0196*** 0.022*** 
 
0.0109 0.0155*** 0.0142** 
 
[3.08] [3.71] [3.92] 
 
[1.57] [2.98] [2.57] 
Rm - Rf 0.951*** 0.764*** 0.803***  
1.421*** 1.274*** 1.304*** 
 
[5.85] [6.22] [5.72] 
 
[7.74] [9.28] [9.11] 
SMB 
 
0.765*** 0.760*** 
  
0.652*** 0.658*** 
  
[4.47] [4.45] 
  
[4.03] [4.06] 
HML 
 
-0.411*** -0.527*** 
  
-0.079*** -1.006*** 
  
[-3.24] [-3.34] 
  
[-8.19] [-6.14] 
UMD 
  
-0.160 
   
0.100 
   
[-1.23] 
   
[0.76] 
Adj. R
2
 0.23 0.47 0.49 
 
0.29 0.61 0.61 
Panel B: 24 Month Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0094 0.0101* 0.0131** 
 
-0.0019 0.0017 0.0015 
 
[1.41] [1.80] [2.28] 
 
[-0.17] [0.40] [0.34] 
Rm - Rf 0.868*** 0.758*** 0.692***  
1.147*** 1.071*** 1.074*** 
 
[5.29] [5.65] [5.01] 
 
[8.40] [10.42] [10.15] 
SMB 
 
0.971*** 0.953*** 
  
0.733*** 0.734*** 
  
[5.97] [5.90] 
  
[5.84] [5.81] 
HML 
 
-0.427*** -0.597*** 
  
-0.766*** -0.755*** 
  
[-3.29] [-3.70] 
  
[-7.29] [-5.91] 
UMD 
  
-0.223* 
   
0.016 
   
[-1.75] 
   
[0.16] 
Adj. R
2
 0.18 0.46 0.47 
 
0.33 0.63 0.63 
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Table 5.7: Continued. 
  Lockup >18 month   Lockup ≤ 12 Months 
  CAPM FF3F FF4F 
 
CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel C: 36 Month Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0115** 0.0107** 0.0125** 
 
0.0061 0.0068 0.0089* 
 
[1.98] [2.01] [2.27] 
 
[0.99] [1.35] [1.72] 
Rm - Rf 0.705*** 0.604*** 0.566***  
1.006*** 0.927*** 0.487** 
 
[5.18] [4.81] [4.39] 
 
[7.18] [7.75] [7.02] 
SMB 
 
0.798*** 0.784*** 
  
0.765*** 0.717*** 
  
[5.16] [5.06] 
  
[5.52] [5.13] 
HML 
 
-0.056 -0.162 
  
-0.589*** -0.748*** 
  
[-0.44] [-1.06] 
  
[-4.95] [-5.14] 
UMD 
  
-0.149 
   
-0.205* 
   
[-1.23] 
   
[-1.86] 
Adj. R
2
 0.16 0.31 0.33 
 
0.26 0.49 0.50 
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Table 5.8 WLS Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions for Lockups Stratified by Top and 
Bottom Quartile of Lockup Length 
This table presents regression results of calendar-time monthly abnormal returns using Capital Asset pricing 
Model (CAPM), Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3F) and Carhart (1997) extension of Fama and 
French (1993) model (FF4F). For each calendar month, return on a 12-, 24- and 36-month portfolio is calculated 
for IPOs with lockups greater than 18 months and IPOs with lockups less than or equal to 12 months. The 
weighted least square (WLS) time series regressions in each model are estimated with portfolio excess return as 
dependant variable, where portfolio excess return is the return on a 12-, 24- or 36-month portfolio of IPOs minus 
the risk free return. The number of firms in each portfolio every month is used as the weight. The Intercept 
shows the average monthly abnormal return on each portfolio. (Rm - Rf) is the excess return on the market 
portfolio, SMB is the difference in the returns of portfolios of small and large stocks, HML is the difference in 
the returns of portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks and UMD is the difference in returns of 
portfolios of high and low momentum stocks. The factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). The t-statistics are in 
brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively 
 
Lockup >18 month 
 
Lockup ≤ 12 Months 
  CAPM FF3F FF4F  
CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel A: 12 months Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0122** 0.0154*** 0.0182*** 
 
0.0003 0.0141** 0.0155*** 
 
[2.13] [3.35] [3.75] 
 
[0.04] [2.64] [2.77] 
Rm - Rf 0.798*** 0.732*** 0.709***  
1.759*** 1.373*** 1.333*** 
 
[5.15] [5.77] [5.61] 
 
[9.38] [10.02] [9.20] 
SMB 
 
0.873*** 0.843*** 
  
0.453*** 0.459*** 
  
[5.81] [5.61] 
  
[2.72] [2.75] 
HML 
 
-0.379*** -0.536*** 
  
-1.114*** -1.181*** 
  
[-3.01] [-3.44] 
  
[-9.24] [-8.21] 
UMD 
  
-0.204* 
   
-0.095 
   
[-1.69] 
   
[-0.86] 
Adj. R
2
 0.19 0.48 0.50 
 
0.38 0.68 0.69 
Panel B: 24 Month Portfolio 
Intercept -0.0051 0.0001 0.0029 
 
-0.0093 -0.0035 0.0004 
 
[-1.00] [0.03] [0.75] 
 
[-1.55] [-0.80] [0.09] 
Rm - Rf 0.710*** 0.624*** 0.591***  
1.453*** 1.208*** 1.119*** 
 
[5.67] [7.14] [6.79] 
 
[9.89] [11.05] [9.84] 
SMB 
 
1.044*** 1.005*** 
  
0.727*** 0.721*** 
  
[9.67] [9.38] 
  
[5.54] [5.59] 
HML 
 
-0.346*** -0.522*** 
  
-0.756*** -0.916*** 
  
[-3.85] [-4.54] 
  
[-7.39] [-7.60] 
UMD 
  
-0.219* 
   
-0.228** 
   
[-2.39] 
   
[-2.40] 
Adj. R
2
 0.20 0.62 0.63 
 
0.41 0.68 0.69 
 
167 
 
Table 5.8: Continued. 
 
Lockup >18 month 
 
Lockup ≤ 12 Months 
  CAPM FF3F FF4F 
 
CAPM FF3F FF4F 
Panel C: 36 Month Portfolio 
Intercept 0.0011* 0.0075* 0.0089** 
 
-0.0032 -0.0015 0.0022 
 
[1.96] [1.70] [2.08] 
 
[-0.55] [-0.32] [0.47] 
Rm - Rf 0.699*** 0.638*** 0.574***  
1.221*** 1.068*** 0.958*** 
 
[5.98] [6.23] [5.67] 
 
[9.13] [10.23] [8.80] 
SMB 
 
0.688*** 0.682*** 
  
0.817*** 0.799*** 
  
[5.54] [5.67] 
  
[6.23] [6.24] 
HML 
 
-0.036 -0.287** 
  
-0.506*** -0.706*** 
  
[-0.46] [-2.61] 
  
[-5.16] [-5.95] 
UMD 
  
-0.296*** 
   
-0.267*** 
   
[-3.17] 
   
[-2.85] 
Adj. R
2
 0.21 0.40 0.44 
 
0.36 0.62 0.64 
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Table 5.9 Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Regression Models 
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression analyses. LU Months is the length of 
lockup period in months. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital/private 
equity, and zero otherwise. UW Reputation is underwriter reputation measured as the number of IPOs sponsored 
by an underwriter as a percentage of the total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO year. Assets is the 
total assets before IPO in £ millions. Insider Ownership is percentage of post-IPO equity retained by the 
directors and officers. Age is IPO firm age calculated as the difference (in years) between the date of IPO and the 
date company was founded. IR is initial returns calculated as first day closing price minus offer price divided by 
the offer price. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets in the year before IPO.  
 
Variable Mean Median First Quartile Third Quartile Std. Dev. 
LU Months 15.205 12.367 12.000 18.000 6.022 
VC 0.563 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.497 
UW Reputation (%) 2.360 2.410 1.030 3.185 1.377 
Assets 195.451 22.637 9.575 100.643 570.040 
Insider Ownership (%) 24.646 19.800 5.370 40.850 21.980 
Age (years) 15.727 9.558 5.808 16.790 18.277 
IR (%) 12.017 7.974 1.460 17.522 18.019 
ROA -0.257 0.070 -0.080 0.170 1.380 
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Table 5.10 Cross-Sectional Regressions of BHR of IPO Firms   
This table presents the results of cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for raw buy-and-hold 
returns (BHRs) of IPOs. The dependant variables are LBHR1=ln(1+IPO firm’s 1-year BHR), LBHR2=ln(1+IPO 
firm’s 2-year BHR) and LBHR3=ln(1+IPO firm’s 3-year BHR) respectively. LU Months is the length of lockup 
period in months. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital/private equity, 
and zero otherwise. UW Reputation is underwriter reputation measured as the number of IPOs sponsored by an 
underwriter as a percentage of the total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO year. Assets is the 
natural log of total assets before IPO in £ millions. Insider Ownership is percentage of post-IPO equity retained 
by the directors and officers. Age is the natural log of IPO firm age calculated as the difference (in years) 
between the date of IPO and the date company was founded. IR is initial returns calculated as first day closing 
price minus offer price divided by the offer price. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets in the year before IPO. The t-values in brackets are corrected using hetroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors (White, 1980). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 Raw Log Returns 
Variables 
LBHR1 
(1) 
LBHR2 
(2) 
LBHR3 
(3) 
LU Months 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 
 (3.80) (3.08) (3.30) 
VC -0.072 -0.040 0.115 
 (-0.69) (-0.23) (0.61) 
UW Reputation -0.016 -0.018 -0.075 
 (-0.46) (-0.33) (-1.10) 
Assets 0.026 0.084* 0.107* 
 (0.83) (1.79) (1.92) 
Insider Ownership -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.47) (-0.89) (-0.89) 
Age 0.039 0.206*** 0.312*** 
 (0.86) (2.64) (3.03) 
IR 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (1.18) (-0.11) (-0.44) 
ROA 0.173*** 0.284*** 0.246*** 
 (2.96) (4.73) (3.31) 
Constant -0.577** -1.489*** -1.959*** 
 (-2.17) (-3.34) (-4.04) 
N 268 268 268 
Adjusted R
2
 0.139 0.180 0.177 
F-Statistic 4.206 8.928 7.519 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.11 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Market Adjusted BHAR of IPO Firms   
This table presents the results of cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for market adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of IPOs. The dependant variables are LBHAR1=IPO firm’s 
LBHR1ln(1+market index 1-year BHR), LBHAR2=IPO firm’s LBHR2ln(1+market index 2-year BHR) and 
LBHAR3=IPO firm’s LBHR3ln(1+market index 3-year BHR) respectively, where market index is the FTSE 
Allshare index. LU Months is the length of lockup period in months. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
IPO is backed by venture capital/private equity, and zero otherwise. UW Reputation is underwriter reputation 
measured as the number of IPOs sponsored by an underwriter as a percentage of the total number of IPOs during 
the year prior to the IPO year. Assets is the natural log of total assets before IPO in £ millions. Insider Ownership 
is percentage of post-IPO equity retained by the directors and officers. Age is the natural log of IPO firm age 
calculated as the difference (in years) between the date of IPO and the date company was founded. IR is initial 
returns calculated as first day closing price minus offer price divided by the offer price. ROA is earnings before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets in the year before IPO. The t-values in brackets are corrected using 
hetroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White, 1980). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant 
levels respectively. 
 Abnormal Log Returns-Market Adjusted 
Variables 
LBHAR1 
(1) 
LBHAR2 
(2) 
LBHAR3 
(3) 
LU Months 0.023*** 0.029** 0.031** 
 (3.08) (2.42) (2.44) 
VC -0.062 -0.026 0.102 
 (-0.63) (-0.17) (0.59) 
UW Reputation -0.008 -0.005 -0.057 
 (-0.25) (-0.10) (-0.92) 
Assets 0.026 0.092** 0.110** 
 (0.92) (2.16) (2.24) 
Insider Ownership -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.36) 
Age 0.030 0.157** 0.242** 
 (0.68) (2.13) (2.57) 
IR 0.004* 0.001 -0.000 
 (1.75) (0.27) (-0.07) 
ROA 0.157*** 0.242*** 0.183** 
 (2.98) (4.34) (2.56) 
Constant -0.552** -1.427*** -1.777*** 
 (-2.23) (-3.43) (-4.05) 
N 268 268 268 
Adjusted R
2
 0.118 0.146 0.127 
F-Statistic 3.569 7.427 5.586 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.001 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.12 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Size Adjusted BHAR of IPO Firms 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for size-matched firms’ 
adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of IPOs. The dependant variables are LBHAR1=IPO firm’s 
LBHR1ln(1+size matched firm’s 1-year BHR), LBHAR2=IPO firm’s LBHR2ln(1+ size matched firm’s 2-year 
BHR) and LBHAR3=IPO firm’s LBHR3ln(1+ size matched firm’s 3-year BHR) respectively. LU Months is the 
length of lockup period in months. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture 
capital/private equity, and zero otherwise. UW Reputation is underwriter reputation measured as the number of 
IPOs sponsored by an underwriter as a percentage of the total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO 
year. Assets is the natural log of total assets before IPO in £ millions. Insider Ownership is percentage of post-
IPO equity retained by the directors and officers. Age is the natural log of IPO firm age calculated as the 
difference (in years) between the date of IPO and the date company was founded. IR is initial returns calculated 
as first day closing price minus offer price divided by the offer price. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets in the year before IPO. The t-values in brackets are corrected using hetroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors (White, 1980). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels 
respectively. 
 Abnormal Log Returns-Size Adjusted 
Variables 
LBHAR1 
(1) 
LBHAR2 
(2) 
LBHAR3 
(3) 
LU Months 0.030*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (3.32) (2.82) (2.66) 
VC -0.086 0.003 0.180 
 (-0.74) (0.02) (0.84) 
UW Reputation 0.018 0.023 -0.034 
 (0.47) (0.36) (-0.49) 
Assets 0.051 0.146*** 0.185*** 
 (1.45) (2.71) (2.98) 
Insider Ownership 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.42) (0.46) 
Age 0.006 0.154 0.251** 
 (0.12) (1.65) (2.23) 
IR 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (1.13) (-0.16) (-0.48) 
ROA 0.162*** 0.250*** 0.179* 
 (2.83) (3.04) (1.71) 
Constant -0.734** -1.874*** -2.316*** 
 (-2.39) (-3.71) (-4.26) 
N 268 268 268 
Adjusted R
2
 0.110 0.139 0.126 
F-Statistic 3.173 5.185 5.126 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.002 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.13 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Size and BM Adjusted BHAR of IPO Firms 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for size and book-to-
market (BM) matched firms adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of IPOs. The dependant variables 
are LBHAR1=IPO firm’s LBHR1ln(1+size and BM matched firm’s 1-year BHR), LBHAR2=IPO firm’s 
LBHR2ln(1+ size and BM matched firm’s 2-year BHR) and LBHAR3=IPO firm’s LBHR3ln(1+ size and BM 
matched firm’s 3-year BHR) respectively. LU Months is the length of lockup period in months. VC is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital/private equity, and zero otherwise. UW Reputation 
is underwriter reputation measured as the number of IPOs sponsored by an underwriter as a percentage of the 
total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO year. Assets is the natural log of total assets before IPO in £ 
millions. Insider Ownership is percentage of post-IPO equity retained by the directors and officers. Age is the 
natural log of IPO firm age calculated as the difference (in years) between the date of IPO and the date company 
was founded. IR is initial returns calculated as first day closing price minus offer price divided by the offer price. 
ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets in the year before IPO. The t-values in 
brackets are corrected using hetroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White, 1980). ***, ** and * represent 
1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 Abnormal Log Returns-Size and BM Adjusted 
Variables 
LBHAR1 
(1) 
LBHAR2 
(2) 
LBHAR3 
(3) 
LU Months 0.014* 0.023* 0.028** 
 (1.66) (1.80) (2.00) 
VC -0.088 -0.084 0.054 
 (-0.82) (-0.50) (0.28) 
UW Reputation -0.017 -0.000 -0.025 
 (-0.45) (-0.01) (-0.33) 
Assets -0.006 0.058 0.094* 
 (-0.19) (1.18) (1.67) 
Insider Ownership -0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (-0.29) (0.04) (0.49) 
Age 0.003 0.012 0.065 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.54) 
IR 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.54) (-0.70) (-0.55) 
ROA 0.230*** 0.277*** 0.196*** 
 (5.38) (5.36) (3.28) 
Constant -0.081 -0.651 -1.112** 
 (-0.28) (-1.42) (-2.28) 
N 268 268 268 
Adjusted R
2
 0.127 0.100 0.055 
F-Statistic 4.661 6.240 4.000 
Prob. (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.14 Lockup Expiry Returns for Full Sample  
This table presents Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) over different event windows around the lockup expiry for full sample of IPOs from 1995-2006. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using three benchmarks; Market Returns (daily return on FTSE Allshare index around event windows), Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and a Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3F). The estimation window for CAPM and FF3F models is -240 days to -21 days prior to lockup expiration (day 0) and 
simple ordinary least regressions (OLS) are used. The daily factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively.   
 
Period 
Market Return 
 
CAPM 
 
FF3F 
Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat   Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat   Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat 
Day (-20,+20) -3.7 -2.579** 
 
-3.49 -2.333** 
 
-1.41 -0.886 
Day (-10,+10) -2.44 -2.172** 
 
-1.97 -1.742* 
 
-0.82 -0.719 
Day (-2,+2) -0.01 -0.019 
 
0.08 0.127 
 
0.39 0.643 
Day (-1,+1) 0.47 0.972 
 
0.44 0.911 
 
0.66 1.427 
Day (0 , 0) 0.18 0.788 
 
0.15 0.687 
 
0.27 1.287 
Day (+2,+10) -2.27 -3.382*** 
 
-1.97 -2.923*** 
 
-1.47 -2.183** 
Day (+2,+20) -3.32 -3.394***   -2.79 -2.724***   -1.87 -1.734* 
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Table 5.15 Lockup Expiry Returns for Lockups Stratified by Medians 
This table presents average Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) over different event windows 
around the lockup expiry for IPOs with lockups greater than median and IPOs with lockups less than median. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using three benchmarks; Market Returns (daily return on FTSE Allshare index 
around event windows), Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and a Fama and French (1993) three factor model 
(FF3F). The estimation window for CAPM and FF3F models is from -240 days to -21 days prior to lockup 
expiration (day 0) and simple ordinary least regressions (OLS) are used. The daily factors are from Gregory et al. 
(2013). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 
Period 
 
Lockup > Median 
 
Lockup < Median 
  Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat   Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat 
Panel A: Market Return 
Day (-20,+20) 
 
-1.5 -0.862 
 
-5.89 -2.598** 
Day (-10,+10) 
 
0.05 0.039 
 
-4.94 -2.755*** 
Day (-2,+2) 
 
0.69 0.959 
 
-0.71 -0.716 
Day (-1,+1) 
 
0.89 1.515 
 
0.04 0.049 
Day (0 , 0) 
 
0.04 0.115 
 
0.32 1.009 
Day (+2,+10) 
 
-0.58 -0.691 
 
-3.96 -3.855*** 
Day (+2,+20)   -2.09 -1.628   -4.55 -3.089*** 
Panel B: CAPM 
Day (-20,+20) 
 
-1.51 -0.814 
 
-5.65 -2.429** 
Day (-10,+10) 
 
-0.26 -0.190 
 
-4.03 -2.232** 
Day (-2,+2) 
 
0.66 0.891 
 
-0.6 -0.616 
Day (-1,+1) 
 
0.71 1.165 
 
0.16 0.216 
Day (0 , 0) 
 
-0.04 -0.147 
 
0.42 1.363 
Day (+2,+10) 
 
-0.46 -0.547 
 
-3.49 -3.334*** 
Day (+2,+20)   -1.53 -1.145   -4.05 -2.614*** 
Panel C: FF3F 
Day (-20,+20) 
 
1.87 0.87 
 
-4.69 -2.02** 
Day (-10,+10) 
 
1.7 1.25 
 
-3.17 -1.77* 
Day (-2,+2) 
 
1.28 1.76* 
 
-0.51 -0.53 
Day (-1,+1) 
 
1.09 1.86 
 
0.25 0.34 
Day (0 , 0) 
 
0.03 0.11 
 
0.53 1.25 
Day (+2,+10) 
 
0.11 0.13 
 
-3.08 -3.02*** 
Day (+2,+20)   -0.26 -0.17   -3.59 -2.34** 
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Table 5.16 Lockup Expiry Returns for Lockups Stratified by Different Lockup Lengths 
This table presents average Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) over different event windows 
around the lockup expiry for IPOs with lockups greater than 18 months and IPOs with lockups less than or equal 
to 12 months. Abnormal returns are calculated using three benchmarks; Market Returns (daily return on FTSE 
Allshare index around event windows), Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and a Fama and French (1993) 
three factor model (FF3F). The estimation window for CAPM and FF3F models is from -240 days to -21 days 
prior to lockup expiration (day 0) and simple ordinary least regressions (OLS) are used. The daily factors are 
from Gregory et al. (2013). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 
Period 
 
Lockup ≥ 18 months 
 
Lockup ≤ 12 months 
  Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat   Mean CAAR (%) T-Stat 
Panel A: Market Return 
Day (-20,+20) 
 
-0.93 -0.436 
 
-6.09 -2.650*** 
Day (-10,+10) 
 
0.59 0.307 
 
-5.04 -2.777*** 
Day (-2,+2) 
 
1.02 0.860 
 
-0.68 -0.680 
Day (-1,+1) 
 
0.74 0.744 
 
0.06 0.08 
Day (0 , 0) 
 
0.23 0.659 
 
0.32 1.009 
Day (+2,+10) 
 
-0.8 -0.724 
 
-4.25 -4.096*** 
Day (+2,+20)   -1.74 -0.950   -4.62 -3.097*** 
Panel B: CAPM 
Day (-20,+20) 
 
-0.45 -0.198 
 
-5.86 -2.488** 
Day (-10,+10) 
 
0.71 0.380 
 
-4.14 -2.262** 
Day (-2,+2) 
 
1.21 1.028 
 
-0.57 -0.576 
Day (-1,+1) 
 
0.73 0.720 
 
0.19 0.252 
Day (0 , 0) 
 
0.05 0.146 
 
0.44 1.411 
Day (+2,+10) 
 
-0.49 -0.452 
 
-3.62 -3.424*** 
Day (+2,+20)   -0.56 -0.303   -4.11 -2.618*** 
Panel C: FF3F 
Day (-20,+20) 
 
2.97 1.049  
-4.93 -2.103** 
Day (-10,+10) 
 
2.72 1.427  
-3.49 -1.927* 
Day (-2,+2) 
 
2.01 1.697*  
-0.49 -0.512 
Day (-1,+1) 
 
1.32 1.355  
0.27 0.367 
Day (0 , 0) 
 
0.15 0.426  
0.52 1.327 
Day (+2,+10) 
 
0.08 0.073  
-3.2 -3.101*** 
Day (+2,+20)   0.66 0.311   -3.64 -2.338** 
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Table 5.17 Lockup Expiry Returns by VC Backing and Different Lockup Lengths 
This table presents average Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) over different event windows 
around the lockup expiry for sub-samples; VC backed and non-VC backed IPOs. CARs for IPOs with lockups 
greater than median and IPOs with lockups less than median within each sub-sample are reported in Panel A. 
Panel B reports the CARs for IPOs with lockups greater than 18 months and IPOs with lockups less than or 
equal to 12 months within each sub-sample.  Abnormal returns are calculated using three benchmarks; Market 
Returns (daily return on FTSE Allshare index around event windows), Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and 
a Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3F). The estimation window for CAPM and FF3F models is 
from -240 days to -21 days prior to lockup expiration (day 0) and simple ordinary least regressions (OLS) are 
used. The daily factors are from Gregory et al. (2013). ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant 
levels respectively. 
Panel A 
 
  Period 
VC Backed 
 
Non VC Backed 
LU > Median LU < Median   LU > Median LU < Median 
 
Mean CAAR (%) Mean CAAR (%) 
 
Mean CAAR (%) Mean CAAR (%) 
1. Market Return 
Day (-20,+20) -2.2 -6.66** 
 
-2.53 -6.91* 
Day (-10,+10) 1.16 -5.08** 
 
-2.4 -5.78* 
Day (-2,+2) 0.8 -1.19 
 
0.33 -0.25 
Day (-1,+1) 0.52 -0.19 
 
1.23 0.25 
Day (0 , 0) -0.05 0.59   0.12 -0.07 
2. CAPM  
Day (-20,+20) -1.7 -5.78** 
 
-0.89 -5.46 
Day (-10,+10) 1.43 -3.83* 
 
-1.52 -4.18 
Day (-2,+2) 0.79 -1.1 
 
0.72 0.19 
Day (-1,+1) 0.27 0.12 
 
1.23 0.24 
Day (0 , 0) -0.24 0.70   0.01 0.04 
3. FF3F 
Day (-20,+20) 1.41 -3.6 
 
2.42 -6.2 
Day (-10,+10) 2.9 -2.65 
 
0.36 -4.37 
Day (-2,+2) 1.35 -0.75 
 
1.3 -0.17 
Day (-1,+1) 0.69 0.45 
 
1.6 1.65 
Day (0 , 0) -0.03 0.83   0.11 0.30 
 
 
177 
 
Table 17: Continued. 
 
Panel B 
 
Period 
VC Backed 
 
Non VC Backed 
LU > 18 Months LU ≤ 12 Months   LU > 18 Months LU ≤ 12 Months 
 
Mean CAAR (%) Mean CAAR (%) 
 
Mean CAAR (%) Mean CAAR (%) 
1. Market Return 
Day (-20,+20) -1.61 -6.78** 
 
-2.2 -7.25* 
Day (-10,+10) 0.88 -5.22** 
 
-0.75 -5.85* 
Day (-2,+2) 2.1 -1.17 
 
-0.18 -0.22 
Day (-1,+1) 1.03 -0.16 
 
0.31 0.27 
Day (0 , 0) 0.25 0.60   -0.60 -0.08 
2. CAPM  
Day (-20,+20) -1.23 -5.89** 
 
0.28 -5.82 
Day (-10,+10) 0.95 -3.94* 
 
0.62 -4.29 
Day (-2,+2) 1.9 -1.07 
 
0.58 0.22 
Day (-1,+1) 0.71 0.16 
 
0.74 0.26 
Day (0 , 0) 0.15 0.73   0.50 0.03 
3. FF3F 
Day (-20,+20) 2.37 -3.7 
 
3.54 -6.65* 
Day (-10,+10) 3.09 -2.77 
 
2.37 -4.49 
Day (-2,+2) 2.91 -0.72 
 
1.24 -0.15 
Day (-1,+1) 1.55 0.49 
 
1.18 -0.03 
Day (0 , 0) 0.21 0.86   -0.40 0.10 
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CHAPTER 6 DO IPO LOCKUPS CONSTRAIN EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT?  
6.1 Introduction 
Prior research has documented that earnings management is pervasive around IPOs. IPO 
provides both “opportunity” and “incentive” to manage earnings and make financial 
statements look as strong as possible. The opportunity exists in the form of high degree of 
information asymmetry between insiders and investors of newly public firm. Moreover, 
accrual accounting system under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
provides managerial discretion to change accounting policies and reported financial 
statements prior to the IPO (Armstrong et al., 2009, Ball and Shivakumar, 2008, Teoh et al., 
1998a). Insiders typically hold large fraction of equity in the firm before going public and IPO 
is the first opportunity for a company’s insiders and initial investors to realize the value of 
their investment in the company. The incentives for issuing firms to manage earnings upwards 
include higher issuing prices and large post IPO equity valuations.  Consistent with this 
argument, DuCharme et al. (2001) find that pre-IPO earnings management is related to the 
initial firm value. 
Earnings management has also been shown to have negative implications for the post-issue 
long term operating and return performance of IPOs and SEOs (Rangan, 1998, Teoh et al., 
1998a, Teoh et al., 1998b). These studies find that IPOs and SEOs manage earnings upwards 
at the time of equity offerings. The reversal of managed earnings in the post-IPO periods 
results in declining earnings creating disappointment in the market and revising stock prices 
and valuations downwards. Recent evidence also shows that IPOs associated with higher 
earnings management are also more likely to delist due to performance failure (Li and Zhou, 
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2006, Alhadab et al., 2015). This evidence suggests that earnings management around public 
offerings has severe negative consequences for the wealth of firms’ insiders depending on 
their ability to sell shares at IPO (secondary shares) or in periods immediately after IPO. 
Firms’ insiders, however, retain large equity shares at IPO to signal firm quality (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). IPO lockups, on the other hand, restrict insiders of issuing firms from selling 
their equity for a certain post-issue period. Prior research has documented an extensive use of 
compulsory and voluntary lockups in IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 2003, Espenlaub et al., 2001, 
Field and Hanka, 2001, Goergen et al., 2006b, Hoque, 2011, Yung and Zender, 2010). 
Therefore, the incentives to manage earnings are likely to persist in the months following IPO 
due to lockup period (Teoh et al., 1998a, Wongsunwai, 2012).  
While the motivations for the use of lockups in IPOs have been examined extensively, the 
linkage between a firm’s choice of lockup length and earnings management remains 
unexplored. The main aim of this chapter is to document the relation between earnings 
management at the time of IPO and firms’ choice of lockup length. Prior literature (Arthurs et 
al., 2009, Brau et al., 2005, Brav and Gompers, 2003, Goergen et al., 2006b, Yung and 
Zender, 2010) argues that lockups signal firm quality and also act as a commitment device to 
alleviate moral hazard in newly public firms. We extend the existing literature by testing to 
determine if the lockup period also decreases the extent of earnings management in IPO 
process. We argue that a longer lockup is a costly commitment by IPO insiders which has 
severe negative consequences for firm’s insiders in case of poor post-IPO operating and stock 
return performance. We maintain that firms with longer lockups avoid aggressive accounting 
accruals (earnings management) because of potential wealth losses at lockup expiry in the 
form of lower stock prices caused by earnings reversals and poor performance in post-IPO 
periods. Specifically, we expect a negative relation between lockup length and the level of 
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earnings management by IPO firms. In addition to testing for correlation between lockup 
length and earnings management, we also address the endogeneity problem as the choice of 
lockup length may not be exogenous.  
Overall empirical results support our predictions. Based on a sample of UK IPOs from 1995 
to 2006, we find a strong negative correlation between the lockup length and earnings 
management in the fiscal year of IPO. This inverse relation remains robust after addressing 
the possible endogeneity problem between lockup period and earnings management. These 
findings are consistent with the literature that shows that lockups signal firm quality and act 
as a commitment device to reduce moral hazard in IPO firms (Brau et al., 2005, Brav and 
Gompers, 2003, Yung and Zender, 2010).  
Our study makes important contribution to both lockup and earnings management literature. 
Although, there has been some examination of earnings management around lockup expiry 
(Wongsunwai, 2012), the question of whether lockup period could restrain earnings 
management around IPOs has remained unanswered. We also add to the literature that 
documents positive impact of reputed third party certifiers (underwriters, auditors, attorneys) 
and venture capitalists in IPO/SEO process (Brau and Johnson, 2009, Chen et al., 2013, Jo et 
al., 2007, Lee and Masulis, 2011, Morsfield and Tan, 2006) by showing that lockup period 
could serve as alternative/complementary mechanism for reducing earnings management 
around IPOs.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the related literature and 
provides the testable predictions. Section 6.3 provides details of sample, data sources and 
measure of earnings management. Descriptive statistics are provided in section 6.4. In section 
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6.5, we discuss model specifications and regression results. Section 6.6 provides results of our 
robustness tests. Finally, section 6.7 concludes the chapter.     
6.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis  
6.2.1 Earnings Management Around IPOs 
A growing body of literature has examined the use of accounting accruals to inflate earnings 
around public offerings. The IPO process is susceptible to upwards earnings management due 
to high information asymmetry and insiders’ opportunistic incentives at the time of public 
offering. Scarcity of publicly available information and lack trading history and news media 
coverage create information asymmetry between the issuers and investors at the time of IPO. 
IPO prospectus provides much of the information to investors including the operating and 
earnings information for mostly three pre-IPO years. However, Accounting Principles Board 
Opinion 20 allows managers discretion over changes in accounting policies and restatement 
of reported financial results retroactively before going public. This gives managers 
opportunity to manage accruals in order to strengthen earnings and to make their financial 
results look as strong as possible. The insiders of issuing firms have incentives to boost 
earnings through accruals in the IPO process to ensure that offerings are fully subscribed and 
priced higher to realise larger proceeds. Underwriters base their pricing of shares on reported 
earnings of prospective IPO firms and price-earnings multiples of listed firms in the same 
industry (Teoh et al., 1998c). Issuing price of the IPO firm has direct and immediate impact 
on the post-offering valuation of the firm and wealth of firms’ insiders (including large cash 
proceeds in case of higher percentage of secondary shares sold). Consistent with this 
argument, a number of studies suggest that insiders of issuing firms manipulate earnings to 
get higher offer prices and valuations (DuCharme et al., 2001, Teoh et al., 1998a, Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000).  
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Prior literature has identified that earnings management prior to and during the offering year 
has severe negative consequences for the post-issue IPO and SEO stock returns and operating 
performance (Rangan, 1998, DuCharme et al., 2001, Teoh et al., 1998a, Teoh et al., 1998b, 
Teoh et al., 1998c). These studies have found that issuing firms exhibit unusually high levels 
of income increasing abnormal accruals in the period around equity offerings. Furthermore, 
abnormal accruals during the offer year predict post-issue long term stock and operating 
underperformance. Teoh et al. (1998a), for example, find that IPO firms in the most 
aggressive quartile of earnings management experience 20 percent lower aftermarket stock 
returns than issuing firms in the most conservative quartile of earnings management. 
Examining the post-IPO earnings performance, Teoh et al. (1998c) report that high issue year 
unexpected current accruals predict future earnings underperformance. Similarly, Rangan 
(1998), Teoh et al. (1998b) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find evidence of abnormal 
accruals around equity offerings and show a negative relation between earnings management 
and long run post-issue operating and stock return performance for SEOs. The collective 
evidence from these studies suggests that investors are fooled by earnings inflation at the time 
of offerings and markets initially overvalue firms with higher level of accounting accruals 
(Sloan, 1996). The subsequent earnings reversal in post-IPO periods leads to earnings 
declines and poor operating performance. The disappointed investors revalue firms 
downwards causing poor long term stock returns. The poor long run stock and operating 
performance due to earnings management might result in failure and delisting of IPO firms. Li 
and Zhou (2006) and Alhadab et al. (2015) find evidence consistent with this argument and 
show that IPO firms with higher levels of earnings management are more likely to delist for 
performance failure and have lower survival rates.   
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Rangan (1998) concludes that pre-offering insiders of issuing firms benefit from 
overvaluation of share prices that is caused by the abnormal accruals (earnings management). 
This would benefit those pre-offering shareholders who are able to sell most of their shares at 
IPO or in the immediate periods after IPO. However, it is known that firms’ insiders and 
initial investors (venture capital/private equity providers) do not sell large portions of their 
equity at the time of IPO mainly due to two reasons. First, inside managers might retain large 
equity stakes to signal firm’s quality in order to reduce information asymmetry surrounding 
the issuing firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Moreover, VCs rarely complete a full exit by selling 
their shares at the time of IPO and continue to hold substantial equity stakes for many years 
after the IPO (Barry et al., 1990, Gompers and Lerner, 2002). Secondly, lockup agreements 
restrict the sale of shares by insiders and VCs for a certain post-IPO period
40
. Teoh et al. 
(1998a), therefore, suggest that the incentives for managing earnings are also present in the 
post-IPO periods.  
6.2.2 Lockup Agreements and Earnings Management 
Prior research in constraints of earnings management around equity offerings has largely 
focused on the role of third party certifiers (VCs, underwriters, auditors) in reducing earnings 
management around IPOs. Morsfield and Tan (2006), for example, find lower IPO year 
earnings management in US IPOs backed by VCs. Lee and Masulis (2011) report that reputed 
underwriters and VCs significantly reduce earnings management in IPOs. Brau and Johnson 
(2009) find a significant negative relation between earnings management and prestigious third 
party certifiers (auditors, underwriters, attorneys and VCs).Similarly, Wongsunwai (2012) 
find that companies backed by lower quality VCs report higher quarterly abnormal accruals in 
                                                 
40
  A standardised lockup period of 180 days is more common in US (Field and Hanka, 2001; Mohan and Chen, 
2001; Baru et al., 2004). Evidence from UK, however, shows the use of more diverse and longer lockups 
(Espenlaub et al., 2001; Hoque, 2011).   
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the periods leading up to the lockup expiration. However, none of these studies have focused 
on the role of lockup length in constraining earnings management by IPO firms. Extant 
literature on IPO lockups suggests that lockup reduce information asymmetry by signalling 
firm quality and also work as bonding mechanism in post-IPO periods to reduce moral 
hazard. Brau et al. (2005) find empirical support for their prediction that the insiders of better 
quality firms commit to longer lockup to signal their quality. Arthurs et al. (2009) report 
similar findings for US venture IPOs and find that lockups signal quality and reduce valuation 
uncertainty for ventures with negative information. Brav and Gompers (2003), on the other 
hand, find support for bonding role of lockups to alleviate moral hazard in aftermarket. 
Specifically, they show that firms associated with greater potential for moral hazard use 
longer lockups as a commitment device to assuage the concerns of investors. A lockup is a 
costly mechanism because it creates liquidity cost and non-diversification on the insider’s 
portfolios (Arthurs et al., 2009). The longer the lockup period, the higher will be the liquidity 
and non-diversifications costs. Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that firm quality will be 
revealed in post-IPO period through regulatory filings, news stories and analyst coverage and 
any negative information would hurt insiders in the same way as outside investors. Taken 
together, this evidence suggests that lockup length could affect the insiders’ incentives of 
managing earnings around IPOs. The predictions of both signalling and commitment 
hypotheses of lockups could explain association between lockup length and earnings 
management. Firstly, if firms signal their quality by accepting longer lockups, they will avoid 
aggressive accruals management and damage the quality signal by resorting to poor financial 
reporting. Secondly, if firms reduce moral hazard by committing to longer lockups, then 
lockup length will mitigate agency conflicts and restrict earrings management. Finally, 
empirical evidence shows that aggressive earnings management is related to poor earnings 
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performance and negative stock returns in post-IPO periods (DuCharme et al., 2001, Rangan, 
1998, Teoh et al., 1998a). The insiders of firms with longer lockups are subject to more 
wealth losses due to lower stock prices at the expiry of lockup. We predict that insiders of 
firms with longer lockups will not engage in aggressive earnings management to avoid 
substantial wealth losses at lockup expiry. As a result, firms selecting longer lockups are less 
likely to engage in earnings management. Hence, we hypothesise a negative relation between 
lockup length and earnings management.  
6.3 Data and Measurement 
6.3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
Our sample consists of UK IPOs that went public on Main Market of LSE between January 
1995 and December 2006. We exclude all financial firms (SIC code 6xxx) including 
investment trusts and venture capital trusts (VCTs), utility firms (SIC code 49xx), re-
admissions, non-UK firms and firms with missing prospectuses and necessary data for 
calculating discretionary accruals
41
. The IPO firms reporting no lockup provision in their IPO 
prospectus are also excluded from our sample
42
.  Thus, our final sample consists of 268 IPOs 
with lockups reported in their prospectuses. The issuing firms are identified from new issues 
list available from LSE website for the period 1998-2006. For years 1995-1997, we identify 
IPOs from Thomson One Banker and Perfect Filings database. Information on issue price, 
market capitalisation, date of IPO etc. is collected from these sources. We use Perfect Filings 
database to get IPO prospectuses and hand collect variables such as lockup type and duration, 
insider ownership, VC backing, underwriter, company founding date etc. Relevant financial 
                                                 
41
 This is consistent with the prior literature. For example, Lee and Masulis (2011) and Jo et al. (2007) state that 
financial and utility firms have significantly different disclosure requirement due to regulated industries and 
nature of their accruals might be different from other industrial firms.  
42
 After applying earlier filters, there were only 19 firms from 1995 to 2006 which reported no lockup provision 
in their IPO prospectus.  
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variables for IPO and control firms are from WorldScope database and from IPO prospectuses 
when information is missing in WorldScope. Finally, data on stock prices is collected from 
DataStream.        
6.3.2 Measure of Earnings Management 
We use discretionary accruals from a cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995) as our proxy of earnings management. Our focus is on working capital accruals because 
they are more likely to be manipulated by the managers of issuing firms (Teoh et al., 1998a). 
Consistent with prior US and UK studies (Peasnell et al., 2005, Teoh et al., 1998a), the 
normal (expected) working capital accruals of an IPO firm i in IPO fiscal year are estimated 
using the following cross-sectional OLS regression:  
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
= 𝛼0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + 𝛼1 (
∆ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + 𝜀𝑖                 (6.1) 
Where 𝑊𝐶𝐴 is working capital accruals measured as change in non-cash current assets minus 
the change in current liabilities, ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 is change in revenue,𝑇𝐴 is total assets in year before 
the IPO, 𝛼0 and 𝛼1 are regression coefficients and 𝜀𝑖 is the regression residual. The model is 
estimated separately for each year and each two-digit SIC industry category for all available 
non-IPO firms.
43
 The variables are scaled by lagged total assets to reduce the 
hetroskedasticity and the cross sectional approach controls for the industry-wide fluctuations 
in the economic conditions that impact accruals (Teoh et al., 1998c). We require at least ten 
industry-year observations in a two-digit SIC industry for estimation purposes.
44
 Using the 
estimated coefficients from equation 6.1, the non-discretionary (expected) working capital 
accruals for sample IPO firms are as follows: 
                                                 
43
 We exclude all observations within five years of an IPO from each year and two-digit SIC industry 
combination following Armstrong et al. (2009).  
44
 All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to prevent the influence of extreme values. 
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𝑁𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖 = ?̂?0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + ?̂?1 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
)          (6.2) 
 ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 is change in receivables during the year and ?̂?0 and ?̂?1 are estimates of  𝛼0 and 𝛼1 
respectively obtained from equation 6.1. ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 is included to control for the credit sales 
manipulation by the issuers (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Discretionary working capital accruals (DWCA) are measured as: 
𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖 =
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
− 𝑁𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖            (6.3) 
For robustness of our results, we also calculate total accruals using a cash flow statement 
approach following Hribar and Collins (2002). 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 provides sample distribution across issue years (panel A) and industry groups 
(Panel B) along with the summary statistics for DWCA, our proxy for earnings management. 
Panel A reports the frequency distribution of IPOs for the sample period from 1995 to 2006. 
IPO frequency ranges from a mere 1.87% in year 2003 to 20.15% in year 2000. The bubble 
period (1999-2000) accounts for about 27% of the sample IPOs and just over three quarters of 
the sample IPOs went public in years 1995-2000 which shows the negative impact of bubble 
period on market listings after year 2000
45
. Panel A also shows the DWCA as a percentage of 
lagged total assets across issue years. DWCA for year 2006 have the lowest mean and median 
respectively at -6.5% and -6.2% indicating very conservative accruals management. However, 
IPOs issued in years 2003 and 2004 show aggressive accruals management with mean 
DWCA at 19.5% (median=11.9%).  
                                                 
45
 This drop in IPO frequency is also partly due to the exclusion of a large number of financial IPOs from our 
sample for the period 1998-2006.   
188 
 
Panel B (Table 6.1) reports IPO frequency based on industry sectors measured by two-digit 
SIC codes and shows that IPOs are more frequent in computer equipment and services sectors 
comprising of almost 28% of the sample .Other industry sectors having large number of IPOs 
include engineering and management services, retail, and chemical products. Together with 
computer equipment and services, these three industry sectors account for 49% of the sample. 
Among industry sectors, transportation has the lowest mean DWCA at -18% (median= -7.8%) 
and two other industry portfolios (durable goods and engineering and management services) 
have mean (median) negative DWCA indicating conservative earnings management. IPOs in 
high tech industries such as computer equipment and services and electronic equipment 
exhibit aggressive accruals management with mean (median) DWCA at 12% (9%) and 11.1% 
(9.7%) respectively consistent with the earlier findings of (Brau and Johnson, 2009).       
[Insert Table 6.1 about here]   
Panel A of Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression 
analysis for full sample of 268 IPOs. The mean and median values of DWCA for full sample 
are 0.051 and 0.033 respectively. These statistics suggest that issuing firms, on average, boost 
their earnings by around 5% of beginning assets in the IPO year and are comparable to prior 
research on IPO earnings management (Brau and Johnson, 2009, Morsfield and Tan, 2006, 
Teoh et al., 1998a).
46
 The IPO firms go public with an average (median) period of 15.205 
(12.367) months, measured as number of month from IPO date until the lockup expiry date. 
There is high dispersion (σ =6.02 months) and significant clustering at 12 and 24 months 
lockups. The median lockup length of over 12 months in our sample is strikingly different 
from median lockup of 6 months consistently reported in US studies (Brav and Gompers, 
                                                 
46
 For example Morsefield and Tan (2006) and Brau and Johnson (2009) report mean (median) discretionary 
current accruals of 5.13% (4.12%) and 7.6% (2.4%) respectively for US IPOs.  
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2003, Field and Hanka, 2001, Mohan and Chen, 2001, Yung and Zender, 2010). This is also 
consistent with the heterogeneity and diversity of UK lockups reported by (Espenlaub et al., 
2001, Hoque, 2011). The IPOs experience average initial returns (IR) of 12.017% during the 
sample period. The mean (median) market share of underwriter based on number of IPOs 
underwritten in preceding year is 2.36% (2.41%) with a maximum of 4.99% (not reported) for 
a single underwriter. More than half (56.3%) of the sample IPOs are backed by VCs/private 
equity providers, and insiders (directors and officers) retain an average 24.65% of the post 
IPO equity. The mean value of total assets (Assets) for issuers in their pre-IPO year is £ 
195.451 million with a median value of assets is £22.637 million
47
.  The median values of 
return on assets (ROA) and operating cash flows (OCF) deflated by lagged total assets are 
0.07 and 0.09 respectively. IPO firms list with an average age of 15.727 years and have a 
mean long term debt to total assets ratio (Leverage) of 0.251.              
In panel B of Table 6.2, we break down DWCA by different lockup periods; up to 12 months, 
13-18 months and longer than 18 months. Consistent with our prediction, IPOs with longer 
lockups do not aggressively manage accruals. For example, the mean (median) values of 
DWCA for IPOs with shorter lockups (12 months or less) are 6.93% (4.69%) and statistically 
significant. IPOs with lockups longer than 18 months, on the other hand, have insignificant 
mean (median) DWCA of 1.16% (-0.32%). Comparing the three lockup period groups, we 
observe that DWCA are a decreasing function of lockup length. In addition, the mean and 
median differences in DWCA between the shortest (up to 12 months) and the longest (more 
than 18 months) lockups are statistically significant. These results suggest that the existence 
of heterogeneity in lockup length results in different levels of earnings management by the 
issuing firms.       
                                                 
47
 Due to high skewness in this variable, we use log of total assets in all of our tests.   
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[Insert Table 6.2 about here] 
We report bivariate correlations in Table 6.3 among the variables used in this study. The 
upper triangle shows Spearman correlations and the lower triangle presents Pearson 
correlations of the variables. These correlation coefficients are within normal range 
suggesting that our model is not affected by the multicollinearity problems.
48
 Notably, there is 
a significant negative correlation between lockup period (Lu Months) and discretionary 
working capital accruals (DWCA) indicating that lockup length is inversely related to 
earnings management.    
[Insert Table 6.3 about here] 
6.5 Model Specifications and Empirical Results 
6.5.1 OLS Regressions of Earnings Management 
The univariate tests so far have shown an inverse relation between lockup length and earnings 
management. In this section, we empirically test this relationship using multivariate analysis. 
Our aim is to answer the question of whether longer lockups can effectively restrain earnings 
management in IPO firms. We employ the following OLS model specification: 
𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖 = β0 + β1𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + β2IR + β3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + β4𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
+ β5𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + β6𝑅𝑂𝐴 + β7 𝑂𝐶𝐹 + β8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + β9𝑈𝑊 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ β10𝑉𝐶 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + ε𝑖                            (6.4) 
Where DWCA is our proxy for earnings management obtained from equation (6.3) and Lu 
Months is the length of lockup period in months. A negative coefficient for Lu Months is 
                                                 
48
 We also check the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for our regression analysis to ensure that our model is not 
significantly affected by multicollinearity. In our tests, the VIFs of all the explanatory variables are less than 
3.87.   
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consistent with our hypothesis that longer lockups constrain aggressive earnings management. 
We also control for additional variables in the model, following prior literature. 
Prior research suggests that aggressive earnings management is associated with higher 
underpricing (DuCharme et al., 2001, Teoh et al., 1998a). Francis et al. (2012), however, find 
that conservative accrual management tend to increase the underpricing for IPOs in general 
and for technology IPOs, in particular. Thus, to control for the effect of underpricing, we 
include initial returns (IR) calculated as percentage difference between offer price and first 
day closing price. A significant association between equity retention by insiders and earnings 
management has been documented in the literature (Fan, 2007, Larcker et al., 2007, Warfield 
et al., 1995). Accordingly, we include Insider Ownership measured as the percentage of post-
IPO ownership retained by insiders. Large and old firms are less likely to be involved in 
aggressive accruals management due to close scrutiny by the stock analysts and established 
management and accounting systems (Lee and Masulis, 2011).  We include natural logarithm 
of Total Assets and Age of firms in the model to control for the possible size and age effect, 
where Age is in years from initial founding date to IPO date.  Further, we control for the 
influence of firm performance on earnings management by adding return on assets (ROA) to 
the model, following previous studies (Kothari et al., 2005, Lee and Masulis, 2011).  Firms 
with strong operating cash flow performance have lower incentives to engage in accruals 
management (Dechow et al., 1995, Becker et al., 1998). Therefore, OCF, operating cash flow 
scaled by lagged total assets, is used to control for cash flow performance. Highly levered 
firms may resort to aggressive earnings management when they are close to violation of debt 
covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). We control leverage by including long term debt to 
assets ratio (Leverage) as the proxy for leverage in our model. Morsfield and Tan (2006) and 
Hochberg (2012) find that VC backing significantly reduces earnings management in IPOs 
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due to VC certification and monitoring. In addition, previous research also suggests that 
reputed underwriters effectively reduce earnings management in equity issuing firms (Chen et 
al., 2013, Jo et al., 2007, Lee and Masulis, 2011). Thus, we control for the monitoring effect 
of VC and underwriter reputation in our model by adding a VC dummy (VC) and UW 
Reputation variable, where UW Reputation is measured as percentage of IPOs sponsored by 
an underwriter in the year prior to IPO. Finally, we also include year and industry dummies to 
control for the possible time and industry effects.              
Table 6.4 presents OLS regression estimates where dependant variable is discretionary 
working capital accruals (DWCA) as percentage of lagged total assets based on modified 
Jones model. Columns (1) to (4) show different model specifications based on how we 
include third party financial intermediaries (VC and UW Reputation) and industry and year 
controls separately. In column (5), we include all control variables and both industry and year 
controls. In all of the regression models, the coefficient for Lu Months is significantly 
negative (coefficient=-0.028 to -0.041) with varying level of statistical significance depending 
on model specification. The results suggest that lockup length can effectively reduce earnings 
management by IPO issuers and are consistent with our earlier univariate analysis.      
Next, we discuss results regarding our control variables in the regression models. The 
variables IR, Insider ownership and Ln (Age) are statistically insignificant in all the 
regressions. The significant negative association of firm size (measured by total assets) is 
consistent with the argument that earnings management is more likely to be detected in large 
firms due to close scrutiny by market participants (Lee and Masulis, 2011) and large firms 
being politically sensitive (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). The variable OCF has a significant 
inverse relation with earnings management implying that firms with strong cash flow 
performance have lower incentives for managing accruals (Dechow et al., 1995).The 
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significant positive coefficient on ROA is in contrast to the hypothesis that firms with low 
profitability have higher incentives to manage accruals (Lee and Masulis, 2011). A possible 
explanation for this result is that an expected growth in sales and income would result in 
increased working capital accruals to support such growth, and is consistent with the findings 
of Kothari et al. (2005), that the discretionary accruals have positive correlation with firm 
performance. The coefficient of Leverage is significantly negative and inconsistent with the 
avoidance of debt covenant violation argument (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). However, 
high leverage may induce active monitoring by the creditors resulting in negative relation 
between leverage and earnings management (Lee and Masulis, 2011). Our results, thus, 
support the creditor monitoring argument.  
Contrary to the monitoring effect of quality underwriters in restraining earnings management 
proposed by Lee and Masulis (2011), we find that reputed underwriters are associated with 
significant earnings management. However, our results are consistent with Agrawal and 
Cooper (2010), who find no evidence of financial reporting quality certification by reputed 
underwriters and suggest that underwriters’ revenue generation concerns outweigh their 
concerns about reputation. Finally, regression results show a positive but insignificant sign on 
VC dummy predicting higher earnings management in VC backed IPOs. Our result is 
inconsistent with recent studies (Hochberg, 2012, Morsfield and Tan, 2006) in finding a 
negative relation between VC presence and earnings management. A potential explanation is 
the VC moral hazard problem, where VCs may ignore earnings quality and encourage 
earnings manipulation to improve short term performance and to achieve higher valuations. 
Similarly, VCs may grandstand (Gompers, 1996) and bring younger companies with low 
quality financial reporting and higher earnings management to public market.  
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In summary, results from Table 6.4 are consistent with our hypothesis that longer lockups 
significantly reduce earnings management in IPO firms.  
[Insert Table 6.4 about here]  
6.5.2 Endogeneity of Lockup Length and Earnings Management 
6.5.2.1 Two-Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) Regressions  
Up till now, our results have shown that lockup length is negatively associated with earnings 
management and suggest that lockup length significantly reduces earnings management. In 
our tests, we have assumed that firms with longer lockups choose not to manage earnings 
aggressively (and firms with shorter lockups manage earnings aggressively). However, the 
association between lockup length and earnings management may suffer from endogeneity 
problem as the choice of lockup length may not be exogenous. Firms with conservative 
earnings management may decide to have longer lockups. To address the possible endogenous 
choice of lockup, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. In the first stage, we 
use following OLS model to regress lockup length on a set of variables which are likely to 
affect the choice of a longer lockup
49
 
𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠       (6.5) 
𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 is length of lockup period in months, 𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 is our instrumental 
variable (IV) coded one for IPOs in years 1999-2000 and zero otherwise, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are all 
variables previously used in regression model in equation 6.4. We argue that Bubble Dummy 
is a good IV for lockup duration due to mainly two reasons. First during hot market periods, 
investors’ exuberance makes them less concerned about the information asymmetry problem 
                                                 
49
  We use OLS specification in both stages because dependant variables in equations of both stages are 
continuous variables.  
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due to high market sentiment and optimism in general. As lockups are used to reduce 
information asymmetry, there is less need for firms to commit to longer lockups. Secondly, 
prior studies (Brau et al., 2005, Brav and Gompers, 2003) on lockups suggest that better 
quality firms use longer lockups to distinguish themselves from poor quality firms. On the 
other hand, bubble period is associated with listing of lower quality firms taking advantage of 
market sentiment in bubble periods (Coakley et al., 2007, Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Taken 
together, this evidence suggests a strong correlation between bubble dummy and lockup 
length and supports our choice of bubble dummy as an IV for lockup period. We find that 
Bubble Dummy is correlated with LU Months, but not with DWCA.
50
  
In second stage, predicted values from equation 6.5 are used as a proxy for LU Months in the 
following regression: 
𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠_ℎ𝑎𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                         (6.6) 
Equation (6.6) is similar to OLS model (6.4) except that in equation (6.6), we use predicted 
value of LU Months from first stage regression model (6.5). 
The results of 2SLS model are presented in Table 6.5. In the first stage regression, Bubble 
Dummy is significantly negatively related to LU Months indicating that issuers are less likely 
to accept longer lockups in bubble periods. Consistent with our hypothesis, results from 
second stage regression show a significant negative association between DWAC and LU 
Months. The Hausman test rejects the null of exogeneity of LU Months at 5% level (p-
value=0.033), indicating the possible endogeneity of lockup period. Results regarding the 
control variables are also consistent with our earlier analysis. To conclude, the results from 
Table 6.5 show that longer lockups effectively reduce earnings management even after 
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 The Pearson correlation coefficient between Bubble Dummy and LU Months is -0.239 and significant at 1% 
level, while the coefficient between Bubble Dummy and DWCA is -0.014 and statistically insignificant. 
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addressing the possible endogeneity of lockup length. In next section, we use different model 
specification to test simultaneous determination of lockup length and earnings management.  
[Insert Table 6.5 about here] 
6.5.2.2 The Simultaneous Determination of Lockup Length and Earnings Management 
In this section, we address the possible simultaneous relationship between lockup length and 
the level of accruals management before IPO. Our previous tests, implicitly assumed that 
lockup length is decided first which in turn helps to reduce the level of earnings management. 
But the decision about length of lockup period and the level of earnings management may be 
taken concurrently and firms may employ a strategic mix of both. We use system of equations 
with DWCA and LU Months modelled as a function of each other, and a set of control 
variables. This approach also helps in testing the direction of causality between lockup length 
and earnings management. To test the simultaneous relationship, we follow Chahine and 
Goergen (2011)
51
 and use a three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach. More specifically, the 
system of equations is as follows: 
𝐿𝑈 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽6𝑈𝑊 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7 𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽9𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀1                                                                       (6.7) 
  
                                                 
51
 Chahine and Goergen (2011) use 3SLS to test the simultaneous relationship between IPO performance and VC 
board membership.  
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𝐷𝑊𝐶𝐴 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑢 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽6𝑈𝑊 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7 𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽10𝑂𝐶𝐹 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀2                                                                          (6.8) 
All the variables are as defined earlier. Bubble Dummy appears only in lockup length 
regression and is instrument for LU Months, and ROA and OCF appear in earnings 
management regression as instruments for DWCA. Rest of the variables are common for both 
equations.  
Table 6.6 presents the results of system of simultaneous equations. The results in model (1) 
show that Lu Months is negative and significant in earnings management regression whereas 
the coefficient of DWCA is insignificant in lockup length regression. The results lend support 
to our conjecture that lockup length causes reduction in earnings management and not vice-
versa. In model (2), following Jo et al. (2007), we exclude insignificant variables from both 
equations to cure the weak instruments problem. Again, the results are qualitatively similar to 
model (1) and weak instruments problem does not affect our earlier findings.  
[Insert Table 6.6 about here] 
The combined results from Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show that our inferences relating to 
negative association between lockup length and earnings management continue to hold after 
addressing the possible endogeneity of lockup length and joint determination problem 
(simultaneity).  
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6.6 Robustness Tests for Alternative Measurement of Earnings Management 
In this section, we check robustness of our findings by employing an alternative measure of 
earnings management. Hribar and Collins (2002) report that working capital accruals are 
biased when calculated using the balance sheet data, primarily due to events like mergers and 
acquisitions or discontinued operations. We use cash flow based modified Jones model 
suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002) to estimate total accruals
52
.  
We re-estimate all models specifications (OLS, 2SLS-IV and simultaneous equations) using 
discretionary total accruals (DTAC) as a proxy of earnings management. Results of robustness 
tests are presented in Table 6.7. In all models, the coefficient of LU Months is negative and 
significantly related with DTAC. The results from robustness tests suggest that endogeneity is 
not a serious problem in our sample thus confirming our earlier findings that lockups tend to 
reduce earnings management in IPO firms. 
[Insert Table 6.7 about here]   
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  We run following regression on all non-IPO two-digit SIC code firm and year combinations using total 
accruals: 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
= 𝛼0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + 𝛼1 (
∆ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + 𝛼2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + 𝜀𝑖      
  
Where  𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖  is gross property, plant and equipment 
 
The coefficient estimates from above equation are used to estimate non-discretionary  total accruals (NDTAC) 
for all IPO firms in each year and industry combination as follow: 
 
𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖 = ?̂?0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + ?̂?1 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) + ?̂?2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
) 
 
Discretionary total accruals (DTAC) are measured as: 
 
𝐷𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖 =
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖
− 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖  
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6.7 Conclusion 
Earnings management around equity offerings has been widely documented in the prior 
research. Similarly, research has also shown that aggressive earnings management around 
equity offerings has severe negative consequences for post-issue operating and stock return 
performance and survival of issuers. The incentives of managing earnings are large if insiders 
of issuing firms are able to sell larger equity stakes at public offering or immediately after the 
offering. Lockup, a formal agreement between underwriter and IPO firm insiders, prevents 
pre-IPO shareholders from selling their equity for certain period after the IPO. A lockup not 
only “forces insiders to put their money where their mouth is but to keep it there as well” 
(Brau et al., 2005, pp.529). Poor post-IPO performance related with aggressive earnings 
management around offering will result in larger wealth losses for insiders of firms with 
longer lockups. Accordingly, insiders of firms with longer lockup have incentive to constrain 
earnings management to protect wealth losses after lockup expiry. We predict a significant 
negative association between lockup length and earnings management.  
Based on a sample of 268 UK IPOs with lockups during 1995 and 2006, we find that lockup 
length is negatively related to earnings management in the year of IPO. We interpret these 
results to mean that firms with longer lockups have lower incentives for managing earnings 
around IPO given the considerable costs associated with longer lockups in post-IPO period. 
We continue to observe the negative impact of lockup length on earnings management even 
after adjusting for the possible endogeneity of lockup length or the simultaneous 
determination of lockup length and earnings management. The results from simultaneous 
equations also suggest that the direction of causality flows form lockup length to earnings 
management and not vice-versa. Our results from all model specification are also robust to 
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measuring earnings management from cash flow approach using total accruals as proxy for 
earnings management.      
This paper makes important contribution to the literature that deals with the constraints of 
aggressive earnings management. Prior research documents a positive impact of reputed third 
party certifiers (VCs, Underwriters, auditors) and certain corporate governance mechanisms 
(independent boards, audit committees) in reducing earnings management by equity issuers. 
We add to this literature by showing that lockups can effectively work as an alternative 
mechanism in reducing earnings management. Our research has also important implications 
for practitioners and regulators, who perceive earnings management as pervasive and 
problematic (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Investors in IPO stocks can infer the level of 
earnings management from lockup length which is clearly indicated in issuing prospectus. 
Similarly, regulators can consider longer lockups as an effective tool for restraining earnings 
management at the time of IPO which could lead to lower overvaluation of companies listing 
on the market.    
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Table 6.1 Sample Distribution 
This table presents distribution of sample IPOs across years and industry groups. Discretionary working capital 
accruals (DWCA) are estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model. Panel A presents sample 
distribution and DWCA across offer years, while Panel B gives the industry distribution of sample IPOs and 
DWCA.    
Panel A: Time distribution           
      DWCA     
Year Freq. % Mean Median Std. dev. 
1995 27 10.07 -0.016 -0.012 0.141 
1996 40 14.93 0.068 0.028 0.257 
1997 36 13.43 0.066 0.026 0.223 
1998 27 10.07 0.098 0.049 0.357 
1999 18 6.72 0.005 0.046 0.660 
2000 54 20.15 0.038 0.058 0.442 
2001 6 2.24 0.003 -0.024 0.166 
2002 12 4.48 0.063 0.055 0.127 
2003 5 1.87 0.195 0.165 0.174 
2004 15 5.60 0.119 0.070 0.284 
2005 14 5.22 0.109 0.028 0.214 
2006 14 5.22 -0.065 -0.062 0.094 
Total 268 100 0.051 0.033 0.329 
 
Panel B: Industry (SIC) distribution  
        DWCA     
Industry Two-digit SIC Freq. % Mean Median Std. dev. 
Oil and Gas 13 10 3.73 -0.010 0.012 0.140 
Paper and Paper Products 24-27 7 2.61 -0.046 0.033 0.220 
Chemical Products 28 17 6.34 0.088 0.036 0.262 
Electronic Equipment 36 13 4.85 0.111 0.097 0.230 
Scientific Instruments 38 13 4.85 0.030 0.033 0.119 
Communications 48 16 5.97 -0.017 0.010 0.667 
Durable Goods 50 15 5.60 -0.028 -0.025 0.327 
Computer Equipment and Services 35,73 75 27.99 0.120 0.090 0.421 
Engineering and Management 
Services 
87 20 7.46 -0.003 -0.028 0.210 
Retail 53,54,56,57,59 20 7.46 0.011 0.004 0.151 
Eating and Drinking Establishments 58 6 2.24 0.042 0.019 0.186 
Transportation 
37,39,40-
42,44,45 
6 2.24 -0.180 -0.078 0.280 
All Others 
 
50 18.66 0.062 0.001 0.213 
Total 
 
268 100 0.051 0.033 0.329 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression analyses for 268 IPOs from 1995 to 
2006. DWCA is discretionary working capital accruals based on the modified Jones model. LU Months is the 
length of lockup period in months. IR is initial returns calculated as first day closing price minus offer price 
divided by the offer price. UW Reputation is underwriter reputation measured as the number of IPOs sponsored 
by an underwriter as a percentage of the total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO year. VC is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capital/private equity, and zero otherwise. Insider 
Ownership is percentage of post-IPO equity retained by the directors and officers. Assets is the total assets before 
IPO in £ millions. Age is IPO firm age calculated as the difference (in years) between the date of IPO and the 
date company was founded. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets in the year before 
IPO. CFO is operating cash flow divided by total assets in the year before the IPO. Leverage is long term debt 
divided by total assets in the year before IPO. Panel B shows descriptive statistics of DWCA for various lockup 
length groups and tests of difference in means and medians for selected groups. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant levels respectively.   
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median First Quartile Third Quartile Std. Dev. 
DWCA 0.051 0.033 -0.044 0.164 0.329 
LU Months 15.205 12.367 12.167 18.167 6.022 
IR (%) 12.017 7.974 1.460 17.522 18.019 
UW Reputation (%) 2.360 2.410 1.030 3.185 1.377 
VC 0.563 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.497 
Insider Ownership (%) 24.646 19.800 5.370 40.850 21.980 
Total Assets 195.451 22.637 9.575 100.643 570.040 
Age 15.727 9.558 5.808 16.790 18.277 
ROA -0.257 0.070 -0.080 0.170 1.380 
OCF -0.202 0.090 -0.065 0.211 1.143 
Leverage 0.251 0.084 0.004 0.374 0.394 
Panel B: Test of difference in means (t-test) and medians (Mann-Whitney test) 
    DWCA 
Lockup Length Obs. Mean (p-value) Median (p-value) 
    
A.     0-12 Months 132 0.0693 (0.0298) 0.0469 (0.0001) 
B.     13-18 Months 70 0.0530 (0.1034) 0.0108 (0.1811) 
C.     > 18 Months    66 0.0116 (0.7668) -0.0032 (0.4154) 
Total 268 
  
    t-value C-A  
1.7194* 
 
z-value C=A     1.784* 
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Table 6.3 Bivariate Correlations 
This table presents Spearman correlations (upper triangle) and Pearson correlations (lower triangle) between variables used in the estimations. All variables are defined in 
Table 6.2. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 
DWCA 
LU 
Months 
IR 
UW 
Reputation 
VC 
Insider 
Ownership 
Ln(Total 
Assets) 
Ln (Age) ROA OCF Leverage 
DWCA 1 -0.15** 0.14** 0.12** -0.10 0.06 -0.06 0.08 0.21*** -0.07 -0.07 
LU 
Months 
-0.12** 1 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.18*** -0.18*** 0.11* 0.12 0.00 0.05 
IR -0.04 -0.03 1 -0.05 -0.01 0.14** -0.22*** -0.08 0.12*** -0.03 -0.09 
UW 
Reputation 
0.07 0.01 -0.04 1 0.08 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 
VC -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.09 1 -0.21*** 0.13** 0.00 -0.07 0.09 0.23*** 
Insider 
Ownership 
0.07 0.14** 0.03 -0.02 -0.31*** 1 -0.42*** -0.05 0.32*** 0.10 -0.18*** 
Ln(Total 
Assets) 
-0.01 -0.18*** -0.18*** 0.08 0.08 -0.36*** 1 0.27*** 0.08 0.36*** 0.31*** 
Ln (Age) 0.07 0.08 -0.15** 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.29*** 1 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.11* 
ROA 0.24*** 0.06 -0.11* -0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.24*** 0.27*** 1 0.68*** -0.03 
OCF -0.11** 0.04 -0.16*** -0.09 0.02 0.01 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.84*** 1 0.15** 
Leverage -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.19*** -0.14** 0.14** 0.09 0.10* 0.14** 1 
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Table 6.4 OLS Regression Models for Earnings Management and Lockup Length 
This table presents ordinary least squares estimates for 268 IPOs from 1995 to 2006. The dependant variable is 
earnings management defined as discretionary working capital accruals (DWCA) from a modified Jones model. 
All the variables are defined in Table-2. All tests use white heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The t-
values are in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively.   
 
  DWCA 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
LU Months -0.039** -0.041*** -0.030* -0.040** -0.028*   
 
(-2.51) (-2.62) (-1.88) (-2.34) (-1.65)    
IR 0.011 0.0123 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
(0.91) (1.07) (0.96) (0.96) (0.88) 
Insider  Ownership -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 
 
(-1.47) (-1.20) (-1.43) (-0.81) (-1.15) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.241*** -0.262*** -0.282*** -0.257** -0.290**  
 
(-2.73) (-2.87) (-2.76) (-2.52) (-2.41)    
Ln(Age) 0.102 0.103 0.174 0.0897 0.153 
 
(0.83) (0.86) (1.36) (0.72) (1.16) 
ROA 0.890*** 0.862*** 0.885*** 0.855*** 0.881*** 
 
(2.80) (2.70) (2.84) (2.62) (2.74) 
OCF -1.386*** -1.298*** -1.234*** -1.296*** -1.234*** 
 
(-4.37) (-4.20) (-3.91) (-4.14) (-3.86)    
Leverage -0.302* -0.341* -0.381* -0.326* -0.371*   
 
(-1.88) (-1.96) (-1.92) (-1.84) (-1.77)    
UW Reputation 
 
0.293*** 0.291*** 0.273** 0.292**  
  
(2.71) (2.73) (2.44) (2.54) 
VC 
 
0.008 0.078 0.048 0.103 
  
(0.03) (0.25) (0.15) (0.32) 
Constant 1.889*** 1.298** 1.304* 1.158* 1.37 
  (3.40) (2.34) (1.78) (1.79) (1.60) 
Industry No No No Yes Yes 
Year No No Yes No Yes 
N 268 268 268 268 268 
Adj. R-sq 0.239 0.267 0.257 0.244 0.228 
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Table 6.5 2SLS Regression on Earnings Management 
This table presents two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates for 268 IPOs from 1995 to 2006.In the first stage, 
lockup length is estimated using OLS regression. In second stage, the fitted values of lockup length from the first 
regression are replaced for lockup period. The dependant variable in the first stage is length of lockup in months 
(LU Months). The dependant variable in second stage is earnings management measured by discretionary 
working capital accruals (DWCA) from a modified Jones model. Bubble Dummy equals one for all IPOs during 
1999-2000, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in Table-2. All tests use white heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. The t-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels 
respectively. 
Independent Variables 1st Stage 
 
2nd Stage 
LU Months_hat 
  
-0.194** 
   
(-2.26) 
IR 0.003 
 
0.011 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.97) 
UW Reputation 0.101 
 
0.291*** 
 
(0.43) 
 
(2.64) 
VC -0.487 
 
-0.024 
 
(-0.62) 
 
(-0.08) 
Insider Ownership 0.043** 
 
0.000 
 
(2.26) 
 
(0.03) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.719** 
 
-0.368*** 
 
(-2.59) 
 
(-2.89) 
Ln(Age) 0.348 
 
0.213 
 
(0.80) 
 
(1.4) 
Leverage 0.096 
 
-0.328 
 
(0.11) 
 
(-1.48) 
Bubble Dummy -3.895*** 
  
 
(-4.18) 
  
OCF 0.157 
 
-1.225*** 
 
(0.42) 
 
(-4.28) 
ROA -0.189 
 
0.845*** 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-2.85) 
Constant 17.011*** 
 
3.615** 
 
(8.28) 
 
(2.43) 
Industry  Yes 
 
Yes 
N 268 
 
268 
R-Sq. 0.2097   0.1566 
F (23,244) 3.59  1.87 
Prob. > F 0.000  0.011 
  
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 4.514 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.0336 
Instrumented LU Months   
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Table 6.6 Simultaneous Equations Model for Earnings Management and Lockup Length 
This table reports results of simultaneous relationship between lockup length and earnings management in the 
system of three stage least squares (3SLS) equations. The sample includes 268 IPOs with lockups from 1995 to 
2006. The dependant variables are earnings management defined as discretionary working capital accruals 
(DWCA) from a modified Jones model and the length of lockup period in months (LU Months). Bubble Dummy 
equals one for all IPOs during 1999-2000, and zero otherwise. The variables are defined in Table-2. All tests use 
white heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The t-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 
10% significant levels respectively. 
 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Dependant 
Variable   
Dependant 
Variable 
 
Dependant 
Variable   
Dependant 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
LU Months   DWCA 
  
LU Months   DWCA 
DWCA -0.145 
   
-0.022 
  
 
(-0.32) 
   
(-0.06) 
  
LU Months 
  
-0.198** 
   
-0.178** 
   
(-2.26) 
   
(-2.44) 
IR 0.005 
 
0.011 
    
 
(0.22) 
 
(1.53) 
    
UW Reputation 0.148 
 
0.293*** 
   
0.261*** 
 
(0.51) 
 
(3.12) 
   
(3.05) 
VC -0.487 
 
-0.0257 
    
 
(-0.65) 
 
(-0.09) 
    
Insider Ownership 0.041** 
 
0.001 
 
0.045*** 
  
 
(2.27) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(2.84) 
  
Ln(Total Assets) -0.766*** 
 
-0.373*** 
 
-0.688*** 
 
-0.356*** 
 
(-2.95) 
 
(-3.53) 
 
(-2.87) 
 
(-3.69) 
Ln(Age) 0.354 
 
0.212 
    
 
(0.79) 
 
(1.19) 
    
Leverage 0.0204 
 
-0.333 
    
 
(0.02) 
 
(-1.02) 
    
Bubble Dummy -3.709*** 
   
-3.997*** 
  
 
(-3.84) 
   
(-4.47) 
  
OCF 
  
-1.220*** 
   
-1.287*** 
   
(-5.58) 
   
(-6.20) 
ROA 
  
0.856*** 
   
0.894*** 
   
(5.14) 
   
(5.58) 
Constant 17.88*** 
 
3.697** 
 
17.71*** 
 
3.890*** 
 
(6.72) 
 
(2.39) 
 
(11.80) 
 
(2.68) 
Industry Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 268 
 
268 
 
268 
 
268 
R-sq 0.2143 
 
0.1495 
 
0.2066 
 
0.1725 
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Table 6.7 Robustness Tests for Alternative Measure of Earnings Management 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS); two stage least squares (2SLS) and Simultaneous 
Equations model (3SLS) for 268 IPOs from 1995 to 2006. All models use discretionary total accruals (DTAC) 
from a modified Jones model as the proxy for earnings management. Bubble Dummy equals one for all IPOs 
during 1999-2000, and zero otherwise. The variables are defined in Table-2. All tests use white 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The t-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant levels respectively 
 
OLS   
2SLS  
(2nd Stage) 
  Simultaneous Equations 
 Variables DTAC   DTAC   LU Months   DTAC 
DTAC 
    
-0.028 
  
     
(-0.06)    
  
LU Months -0.003* 
 
-0.016** 
   
-0.016** 
 
(-1.861) 
 
(-2.24)    
   
(-2.04) 
IR 0.001*** 
 
0.001** 
 
-0.007 
 
0.001* 
 
(2.628) 
 
(2.10) 
 
(-0.36) 
 
(1.78) 
UW Reputation 0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.179 
 
0.002 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.25) 
VC 0.016 
 
0.018 
 
-0.031 
 
0.018 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.79)    
 
(-0.04) 
 
(0.69) 
Insider Ownership 0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.029* 
 
0.001 
 
(0.83) 
 
(1.10) 
 
(1.67) 
 
(1.11) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.001 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.791*** 
 
-0.01 
 
(0.12) 
 
(-1.02)    
 
(-3.64) 
 
(-0.91) 
Ln(Age) 0.001 
 
0.012 
 
0.309 
 
0.012 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.69) 
 
(0.72) 
Leverage -0.052* 
 
-0.05 
 
0.221 
 
-0.05 
 
(-1.70) 
 
(-1.56)    
 
(0.25) 
 
(-1.57) 
Bubble Dummy 
    
-4.012*** 
  
     
(-4.67) 
  
OCF -1.049*** 
 
-1.046*** 
   
-1.045*** 
 
(-24.89) 
 
(-27.48)    
   
(-50.95) 
ROA 1.034*** 
 
1.035*** 
   
1.035*** 
 
(30.07) 
 
(35.44) 
   
(61.87) 
Constant 0.075 
 
0.268*** 
 
17.195*** 
 
0.271** 
  (1.31)   (2.68)   (10.31)   (2.07) 
Industry  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 268 
 
268 
 
268 
 
268 
R-sq 0.943   0.934   0.1311   0.9364 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigates the role and impact of lockup length on the success of IPOs in UK. 
Prior literature suggests that longer lockups reduce information asymmetry and hence signal 
better issuer quality and reduce moral hazard at the time of IPO. However, the focus of this 
literature has been on finding the motivations for longer lockups. We extend this literature and 
relate lockup length to three important aspects of IPOs which have received considerable 
attention in the past literature. A detailed review of the existing literature on IPOs reveals that 
prior studies have ignored the possible impact of lockup characteristics, particularly lockup 
length, in explaining the survival, long-run performance and earnings management in IPOs. 
We argue that given the positive impact of lockup length in signalling better issuer quality 
and mitigating moral hazard as documented in the literature, lockup length could be an 
important determinant of IPO survival, performance and earnings management.    
We use a sample of IPOs on Main Market of LSE and hand collected data on lockups to test 
the implications of longer lockups on aftermarket survival, long-run performance and 
earnings management at the time of IPO. Our choice of Main Market IPOs is motivated by at 
least two reasons. First, the majority of the research on IPO lockups has focused on US 
markets and there are only a handful of studies on UK markets. Moreover, chapter 2 identifies 
that there are significant differences in terms of lockup characteristics between US and UK 
markets. While lockups in US are virtually standardised at 180 day period, there is large 
variation in terms of length and other characteristics for lockups in UK. Second, although an 
important segment of the LSE market, AIM rules require certain companies to have 
mandatory lockups for listing on AIM. On the other hand, there are no compulsions of 
lockups for IPOs on Main Market. These two reasons make Main Market an ideal setting to 
test the implications of longer lockups on three related areas of IPOs mentioned above. To the 
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best of our knowledge, this thesis presents the first attempt to relate lockup length to the 
survival and earnings management of IPOs.   
In the remainder of this chapter, we summarise the main findings from empirical chapters in 
section 7.1, highlight the contribution and implications of the study in section 7.2 and 
acknowledge some limitations and suggest further areas for related research in section 7.3.  
7.1 Key Empirical Findings  
7.1.1 Lockup Agreements and Survival of IPO Firms 
Chapter 4 examines the survival of 580 IPOs on the Main Market of LSE issued between 
1990 and 2006 and relates the post-IPO survival to the length of lockup period. IPOs are 
tracked for 5 years following the listings and until December, 2011 for full sample. We define 
survivors as IPOs which remain listed on the stock market or transfer to another market. 
Consequently, non-survivors are IPOs which get delisted from the market due to mergers and 
acquisitions, administration/liquidation and other reasons such as permanent suspension etc. 
We examine survival profile of IPOs using Kaplan-Meier survival function by dividing IPOs 
first on the basis of median lockup length and then into three groups; lockup length of 0-12 
months, 13-24 moths and greater than 24 months. We find that survival rates of IPOs with 
longer lockups are consistently higher than those with shorter lockups. Similar results are 
observed when median survival times instead of rates are analysed. Next, we focus on the 
delisting reasons and compare the failure rates of IPOs across three delisting categories 
mentioned above. We observe that failure rates for IPOs with longer lockups are notably 
lower than IPOs with shorter lockups for more negative delisting reasons like 
administrations/liquidations and other reasons. This shows that longer lockup IPOs do not die 
a bad death. For our multivariate analysis, we use accelerated failure time model with log-
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normal form and control for other determinants of IPO survival documented in the literature. 
Our results show that lockup length is significantly and positively related to the post-issue 
survival time of IPOs.  More precisely, we document that a 12-month increase in lockup 
period increases the survival time by more than 24-months. In order to test the robustness of 
our results we use a number of robustness tests. First, we check the consistency of our results 
to alternative survival model (cox proportional hazard model), heterogeneity of issuing firms 
and high IPO activity in certain issue years. Second, we control for the institutional changes 
in lockup requirements in year 2000 as discussed in chapter 2. Third, we use alternative 
definitions of some control variables affecting IPO survival. We conclude that our main 
results remain strongly robust to all these additional tests and are not affected by estimation 
model, changes in rules regarding lockups and different definitions of some control variables. 
The findings from this chapter suggest that longer lockups represent a credible signal of issuer 
quality not only at the time of IPO but also in aftermarket. Moreover, longer lockups could 
also act as an important incentive realignment mechanism between the inside managers and 
investors in the long-run. 
7.1.2 Long-Run Performance of IPOs: The Role of Lockups 
In chapter 5, we investigate long-run stock performance of IPOs in relation to the length of 
lockup period. Our sample consists of IPOs on LSE Main Market from 1995-2006. In order to 
analyse three year post-IPO performance, both event-time and calendar-time approaches are 
used. In event-time approach, we use BHARs utilising three different benchmarks and equal 
as well as value-weighting scheme. We also calculate wealth relatives using three 
benchmarks. For calendar-time analysis, different factor models and OLS as well as WLS 
regression models are used. In order to compare relative performance between short and long 
lockups, we divide IPOs into two groups: based on median lockup length and on the basis of 
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top and bottom quartile of lockup length. In general, results from event-time analysis show 
that IPOs with longer lockups have higher BHARs than IPOs with shorter lockups. Using 
calendar-time portfolio analysis, we find even more striking results showing superior 
performance on part of IPOs with longer lockups (in top quartile of lockup length) relative to 
those with shorter lockups (in bottom quartile of lockup length). Results from our multivariate 
regression analysis are consistent with the event-time and calendar-time analysis. We find that 
lockup length is positively related to three year raw IPO returns (BHR) and BHARs using all 
three benchmarks. Finally, we examine the abnormal returns around lockup expiry using 
CAARs for different windows around lockup expiry. We use three different estimation 
models for estimating expected returns namely: a simple market return model, CAPM and 
Fama and French (1993) three factor model. Contrary to the US findings of significant 
negative abnormal returns on lockup expiry day (Field and Hanka, 2001, Brau et al., 2004), 
we do not observe significant negative performance in shorter windows (3, 5 days) around 
lockup expiry and on the day of lockup expiry. These results, however, are consistent with 
Espenlaub et al. (2001) for UK and Goergen et al. (2006b) for France and Germany.  For 
wider windows (21, 41 days) around lockup expiry, we report significant negative abnormal 
returns across all estimation models. Moreover, we find that these negative returns are 
concentrated in IPOs with shorter lockups; IPOs with lockups shorter than median lockup 
length and IPOs in bottom quartile of lockup length. Previous literature suggests that VC 
backed IPOs show worst performance around lockup expiry (Bradley et al., 2001, Field and 
Hanka, 2001). As more than half of our sample IPOs are VC backed, the observed negative 
performance around lockup expiry may be due to the VC backed sub-sample. In order to 
check the further robustness of our results, we split sample IPOs on the basis of VC backing 
and further sub-dividing them into shorter and longer lockup as described above.  Our results 
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are consistent with previous evidence and negative abnormal returns are concentrated in IPOs 
with shorter lockups irrespective of VC backing or not. Overall empirical results from chapter 
5 are consistent with the signalling role of lockups which is evident from a positive 
association between lockup length and three year long-run IPO performance. Moreover, lack 
of significant negative performance around lockup expiry also shows that higher quality IPOs 
do not suffer at the time of lockup expiry. These results could also be partly consistent with 
reduction of moral hazard and agency problems due to longer lockups. The relatively longer 
lockups in UK might act as a stronger bond and a longer commitment of insiders with the 
issuing firm might result in better long-run performance.         
7.1.3 Do IPO Lockups Constrain Earnings Management? 
A vast body of literature reviewed in chapter 3 provides empirical evidence that earnings 
management is pervasive in IPOs. Similarly, there is no shortage of literature on finding 
mitigating factors for earnings management in issuing firms. No prior study has, however, 
considered the role of lockup length in restricting earnings management around IPOs. In 
chapter 6, we try to fill this gap and aim to answer the question that do lockups constrain 
earnings management in IPOs? We argue that longer lockups can effectively remove the 
insiders’ incentives to manage earnings at the time of IPO. Lengthy lockups expose insiders 
to non-diversification costs for a significantly longer period of time. Prior literature shows 
that issuing firms engaged in aggressive earnings management experience poor post-IPO 
return performance (Teoh et al., 1998a, Rangan, 1998). If insiders in IPOs with relatively 
longer lockups engage in aggressive earnings management, they are likely to face the negative 
financial consequences in the long-run when they will sell their shares. We test our prediction 
on a sample of IPOs from 1995 to 2006 on LSE Main Market. We observe positive abnormal 
working capital accruals, our proxy of earnings management, for the full sample of issuing 
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firms. In our univariate analysis, we compare these abnormal accruals across three groups of 
lockup length: 0-12 months, 13-18 months and longer than 18 months. Results show that 
magnitude of abnormal accruals decreases with the increase in lockup length. Moreover, 
abnormal accruals for longer lockup groups are not statistically different from zero. Further 
results from regression analysis also confirm a significant and negative relation between 
lockup length and abnormal accruals. Specifically, we find that after controlling for a number 
of factors affecting earnings management, longer lockups effectively reduce earnings 
management in the year of IPO. However, it may be argued that this result might suffer from 
endogeneity as the choice of lockup may not be exogenous. This could give rise to two related 
issues. First, firms with conservative earnings management may decide to have longer 
lockups in order to make their financials more credible. Second, as both the lockup length and 
quality of reported earnings are decided before IPO, these decisions might be taken 
simultaneously and firms might use a strategic mix of these two mechanisms. In order to 
check the robustness of our earlier findings, we employ an instrumental variable regression 
approach and a simultaneous equations model approach using 3SLS. This approach would 
test the direction of causality between lockup length and earnings management. The results 
from instrumental variable regression are consistent with our earlier results and show that 
lockup length has significant inverse relation with the earning management. Furthermore, 
results from simultaneous equations system also confirm that it is the lockup length which 
causes reduction in earnings management and the level of earnings management is not a 
determinant of lockup length. Finally, we also use total accruals as an alternative proxy of 
earnings management and re-estimate all the earlier regression models. Results show that our 
inferences regarding the lockups length are consistent and robust to this alternative measure of 
earnings management. Overall results from chapter 6 show that longer lockups effectively 
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constrain earnings management in IPOs and these results are consistent across different 
econometric models and alternative measures of earnings management.  
7.2 Further Contributions and Inferences  
This purpose of this thesis is to extend the existing literature on IPO lockups which has 
remained focused on the motivations of lockups at the time of offering. In addition to 
contributing to the lockups literature, we contribute to three widely researched areas in the 
corporate finance literature: survival, long-run performance and earnings management in 
IPOs.  The thesis contributes to the extant literature in following ways. First, previous studies 
on lockup motivations use various variables and issue characteristics at the time of IPO to 
proxy for quality of offerings. We extend this literature and use two important post-issue 
performance measures (long-run stock returns and aftermarket survival) and relate them with 
the lockup length.  While prior literature suggests that longer lockups signal issuer quality and 
reduce agency problems at IPO, we provide evidence that longer lockups continue to predict 
success of issuing firms in the aftermarket. Second, we contribute to the small but growing 
literature on survival of issuing firms in the aftermarket. The survival literature recognises 
that survival is an important success metric for companies which come to the market for 
meeting capital needs. Previous studies, therefore, have tried to find variables with predictive 
power of survival in the aftermarket. Chapter 4 of this thesis adds to this strand of literature 
and shows lockup length as an important factor in survival of issuing firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, no other study has considered lockup length as a determinant of post-IPO 
survival. Research in this area needs to focus on lockup characteristics and control for the 
length of lockup in future research. Third, a plethora of literature has examined the long-run 
performance of issuing firms and it is recognised as an IPO anomaly. The overwhelming 
literature in this area provides evidence of poor performance after listing in most of the 
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markets around the globe. Contrary to this, we find no evidence of poor performance for our 
sample IPOs. We argue that the results of long-run underperformance might be sensitive to 
the sample period and/or market segment (main vs second board). Moreover, we also 
document that lockup length is an important determinant of the post-issue stock return 
performance of IPOs. Fourth, we also contribute to the literature on earnings management 
which has documented that issuing firms opportunistically manage earnings around the equity 
issuing. Moreover, the research on mitigating factors in earnings management has mainly 
focused on third party certifying agents and corporate governance mechanisms. We show that 
lockups length is an effective contractual mechanism to restrain the accrual management in 
IPOs before going public. Finally, this thesis also contributes to the limited understanding of 
IPO lockups in UK markets. We exploit the unique features of LSE Main Market and 
examine the effect of lockup in some important aspects of IPO research. Moreover, we also 
add to the limited research on survival and earnings management in UK IPOs.         
Apart from contribution to the existing academic literature, results in this thesis have broader 
practical implications for investors, corporate insiders and policy makers alike. Our results 
regarding the impact of lockup on survival, long-run performance and earnings management 
suggest that investors ought to pay close attention to the choice of lockup length at the time of 
IPO. Ex ante, knowledge about the survival likelihood and return performance in the long-run 
is extremely useful for the investors, particularly long term ones. Our results show that 
investors can pick IPOs which are a good long term investment by carefully looking at lockup 
characteristics in IPO prospectuses. Lockup characteristics, particularly the length, could help 
investors assess the quality of issuing firms in terms of survival and return performance after 
the IPO. Moreover, academic research suggests stock markets temporarily overvalue the 
earnings management in equity issuing firms. Investors cannot see through the earnings 
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management at the time of equity issue and could end up paying more for overvalued firms. 
This would result in poor long term investment. Our results show that longer lockups could 
guard against investing in overvalued firms. Prospective investors can judge the accounting 
quality by paying attention to lockup characteristics and this information could signal to 
investors about the levels of potential earnings manipulation in issuing firms.      
Our results are equally important to the entrepreneurs and managers in issuing firms. 
Academic research shows that longer lockups signal better issuer quality at the time of IPO. 
Moreover, survey evidence from corporate managers also suggests that a longer lockup acts 
as a signal of firm value at the time of listing (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). The results in this 
thesis complement this argument and show that issuers can signal longer survival prospects 
and better performance in aftermarket through the length of lockup period as well. 
Furthermore, issuers can also assuage the investors’ concerns about the opportunistic accruals 
manipulation around IPO through longer lockups.       
Finally, although this research has remained focused on the role of lockups in various 
important aspects of the IPO, the results may have implications for policy makers and capital 
market regulatory bodies.  Firstly, the question of long-run survival and success of issuing 
firms is as important to a stock market as it is to the investors and issuers. Better survival and 
performance of public companies is one of the success measures for performance and working 
of a stock exchange. Moreover, it would bolster the issuing activity on a successful stock 
market raising its reputation and revenues and also capital formation in the wider economy. 
Secondly, a recent report initiated on behalf of the government in UK raised concerns about 
the short termism in UK capital market (Kay, 2012). This report identifies misalignment 
between corporate insiders and investors as a major source of short term focus at the expense 
of long term sustainable growth. Focusing on corporate manager’s remuneration, the report 
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suggests to structure directors’ remuneration to be more aligned to the long term business 
performance. For example, Kay suggests that the directors’ performance incentive be paid in 
the form of shares of the company which are to be held until directors’ retirement. More 
recently, similar concerns about the alleged short termism have also been raised by some 
institutional investors (BBC, 2013). The institutional investors have argued in favour of 
lengthening executive’s incentive schemes to constrain the myopic behaviour. Our thesis 
provides empirical evidence that locking-in insiders for a longer period after the listing, 
improves the long term survival and performance, at least, in IPOs. Our results lend support to 
these recommendations and policy makers and regulatory bodies may consider lockups as an 
incentive alignment device between the corporate insiders and investors.            
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The results in thesis are subject to certain limitations which need to be recognised. 
Nevertheless, these limitations can lead to future research in the related areas. We first discuss 
some potential limitations of the thesis. First, the results and inferences in empirical chapters 
of the thesis are drawn from the evidence collected from the different datasets. The validity of 
results may, to some extent, be sensitive to the sample period, measurement of variables, 
model specifications and   estimation techniques. Moreover, we only use cross sectional data 
in chapters 5 and 6 and thus have less control over the unobservable IPO characteristics. 
Second, this thesis relies on the existing theoretical prediction about the use and choice of 
lockup characteristics and does not attempt to develop any theoretical models. The thesis aims 
to find empirical support for the existing models in corporate finance using econometrics 
techniques rather than proving these theoretical explanations. We do not try to address the 
theoretical issues in this thesis. Finally, we have some limitations specific to the individual 
empirical chapters. For example, due to data unavailability we do not include any corporate 
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governance variables in empirical analysis which could also affect the survival and 
performance of issuing firms. Some recent studies have shown that apart from accruals 
management, issuing firms also engage in real activities management which may be hard to 
detect (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). We do not analyse this alternative form of earnings 
management in chapter 6. Furthermore, we could use only one instrument for lockup period in 
our instrumental variable regressions which could undermine our results. Finally, in chapter 5 
we only use market adjusted, size adjusted and size and book-to-market adjusted benchmarks 
in event-time analysis, however, recent studies have also utilised industry matched 
benchmarks.   
Finally, the results of this study open up some interesting avenues for future research. There is 
need to conduct further research on IPO lockups, particularly in different institutional contexts 
as the role and impact of lockups might be different in different contexts. As briefly 
mentioned earlier, one such area is the interaction of lockup characteristic with other 
corporate governance characteristics in newly public firms. Although, we complement the 
previous research which suggests that lockups are a credible signal of IPO quality, there is 
need to further examine how issuing firms trade-off among different signals of quality. 
Lockup is a costly signal and issuers might try to substitute it with some less costly signalling 
mechanisms. Another area for future research could be the separate examination of exit routes 
from the market. In chapter 4, we do not differentiate between different delisting reasons in 
our AFT survival models. However, it would be interesting to investigate these reasons 
differently using the competing risk survival models. And last but not the least, a promising 
area for future research would be to examine real activities management alongside the 
accruals management in equity issuers and relating it to the issuer characteristics at the time of 
IPO.   
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